Closes the path for AUDIT-IN-0002. tenant-engine emits through a local
outbox and cannot land production events until audit-core admits the
sender, so this is another repo's production blocked on ours — a
workplan of its own rather than a task inside AUDIT-WP-0009.
The request arrives with its bound already declared: attributive class,
non-blocking drain, trade documented at tenant-engine/docs/evidence-
emission.md. Under §9.6 that is legitimate. Nothing needs renegotiating;
it needs admitting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both were untracked and blocked registrar-reconcile's clean-worktree
precondition, leaving AUDIT-WP-0009 and AUDIT-IN-0001 unregistered.
.repo-manager/index.json follows the estate convention — ops-warden,
flex-auth and kings-guard all track it; only gate-house ignores it.
TamqMessagingIntroduction.md is received documentation that belongs in
the repo.
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The standard is accepted at v0.7 and all three of audit-core's v0.6
findings landed in it (§9.6 threat decomposition, cadence MUST for
load-bearing sources with reconciliation/heartbeat for low-volume
classes, §3.3's Evidence row restated as an estate trade).
INTENT.md: layer/role declared in frontmatter as §11 and companion §2
require — layer.yaml alone did not discharge it. Layer section rewritten
for the Evidence role and its obligations. New Evidence Bound section
carrying the §9.6 sound/unsound forms and the three-row threat table,
including the residual nothing in the model prevents.
SCOPE.md: replaced the statehub register stub, which carried no boundary
at all. Statute-fixed prohibitions now live here, separated from the
merely-not-yet — §16 ruled the stronger-custody gap closed, so WORM and
data.archive are not ours rather than not yet.
Assessment found nine gaps. Headline: postgres_backend returns
tamper_evidence=True unconditionally while docs/integrity.md permits it
only against a live external attestation, and the one on record is
2026-08-16 with no job renewing it — audit-core overclaiming its own
bound, the §9.6 defect turned inward. Also: no cadence, heartbeat,
reconciliation, or load-bearing classification exists, so the obligation
audit-core argued up from SHOULD to MUST is not yet dischargeable
against audit-core.
AUDIT-WP-0009 raised, ten tasks.
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All three v0.4 findings landed in v0.5 (local outbox, machine-readable
declaration, §14 arithmetic). §9.6's load-bearing/attributive split and
§16's ruling on approval custody both improve on what audit-core raised.
Findings, all correcting audit-core's own contribution: (1) the local
outbox closes accidental omission, not the compromised-source case §9.6
opens with — a compromised emitter can decline the insert or drop the row
before drain; §16 rests a ruling on that conflation. (2) cadence is the
only control touching the residual and is a SHOULD, and rate-based
detection is weakest for the rare negative events §9.6 says matter most —
recommend positive reconciliation for load-bearing low-volume classes.
(3) §3.3's Evidence row states an availability/independence trade as a
property of evidence engines.
Adds layer.yaml in ops-warden's reference form, per §11.
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gate-house incorporated all of audit-core's AUDIT-IN-0001 corrections and
generalized the omission bound into §9.6 as estate-wide doctrine.
Findings: (1) §9.4's emission MUST is safe only if the outbox is local;
"or equivalent" admits a synchronous emit to audit-core inside the state
transaction, which would make an audit outage an inability to revoke —
recommend one sentence requiring the queue live in approval-engine's own
store. (2) §11's new who-must-declare rule is not mechanically checkable
despite §11 claiming it is; recommend a canonical frontmatter form.
(3) §14 says "seven of fifteen" and "remaining eight" but enumerates nine;
the catalog has 16 estate-authored rows.
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gate-house proposed (security layer model v0.3 §9.4) that audit-core own
the tamper-evident record of approvals while approval-engine owns the
operative state. Assented, with two corrections and one condition.
Correction 1: INTENT principle 6 overstated the delivered guarantee.
docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not
withstand a database owner without the external chain-head attestation,
and even then it is not WORM. Principle 6 now points at that bound.
Correction 2: the chain proves alteration and truncation, not omission
at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact.
Condition: approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity, so an
approval cannot change state without the event being durably queued in
the same transaction. Not a task audit-core can discharge for it.
Boundary: no approval-validity query will be exposed — that would be
deciding early under §6.1.
Also declares audit-core's layer (Engine, not a decision point), which
§11 requires and INTENT.md was missing.
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Regenerated by fix-consistency; adds AUDIT-IN-0001.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-08-25:
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These workplans exist only in the retired local hub. Their random pre-ADR-007
identifiers are refused by C-06 as stale references, so they cannot be
registered. Deriving from the canonical record id takes no identity from
anything: central does not hold them and the old ids die with the cache.
Records central already holds were deliberately left untouched.
Refs CUST-WP-0068-T06
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The remote row pointed at 127.0.0.1:18000, a reverse tunnel back to the
workstation. On railiance01 the State Hub runs in the cluster on that same
machine, so the request left the box and came back to reach a local service.
Refs CUST-WP-0067-T07
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T08 fixes two defects in our own declaration. provider.R.available quoted a
30-day horizon audit-core does not solely control: at P1 the erasure horizon is
the instance maximum across co-residents, so a co-resident declaring longer
extends what a sender's records remain recoverable for, silently. Decision 4.5.4
names this for tiers; it applies to a provider quoting a number too, and the
provider block now says so. And user-engine, the only consumer, was notified
under Decision 6.1 -- what we declared, that E4 and R4 are unreachable here, and
that the retention number is a floor rather than a ceiling.
T03 writes docs/erasure-and-audit.md: the fact/payload split, why shreddability
is not retrofittable onto a chain committing to cleartext, and why the retained
hash is a confirmation oracle over low-entropy audit records. The framework half
was already resolved as Decision 4.5.3, so what remains is our own position. The
legal basis for retaining audit facts is routed to risk-nexus, open and visible.
T06 closes the review loop with net-kingdom: five findings adopted, declaration
validates clean, and the E line will go stale on an upgrade that Decision 6.1
deliberately does not require anyone to announce.
T07 enumerates the seven dependencies on the accept path and specifies five
recovery scenarios with integrity as a pass condition. It settled one thing: V2
is not reachable from P1 as built, since platform-pg runs instances 1 and
Decision 4.6.1 makes V the minimum across synchronous providers. V1 is the
ceiling here, not the next step. The exercise needs a live window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The framework moved from draft-5 to draft-8 while this workplan ran. No finding
was reversed, but three things changed underneath it: R moved to 2 once
rapp-postgres declared the window, a sixth axis V (availability) appeared, and
the implemented-versus-evidenced distinction became a schema field.
T03 reduces: the confirmation-oracle finding landed as Decision 4.5.3 and
question 11 is marked framework-resolved, so no amendment remains -- only our
own position document. The legal question routes to risk-nexus rather than
the-custodian, per §19.11 and policy-nexus INTENT.
T06 reduces to confirmation: all five findings were adopted and the two stale
status lines it was going to flag are already fixed.
T07 is new. V1 needs critical dependencies enumerated, restart recovery
exercised and recovery time measured. The 2026-08-16 reboot walk observed ~40s
of unreadiness but is not an exercise and does not enumerate the dependency set.
T08 is new and covers two defects in our own declaration. provider.R.available
quotes a 30-day horizon we do not solely control -- at P1 the horizon is the
instance maximum across co-residents. And under Decision 6.1, user-engine was
never told what we declared, which makes the declaration drift rather than a
completed change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Written against draft-7, which landed after the task was drafted and moved the
target. Decision 5.4 fixes the location at tenancy.yaml in the repo root rather
than docs/, and fixes the schema: current, target, reviewed, gap,
placement_exceptions, service_class, per-path detail, provider block.
Declares I1 A2 E1 P1 R1. E is quoted at 1 although T04 put the E2 mechanism on
both paths, because §13.2 states a passing CI run is not E2 evidence -- the
artifact is adversarial, compares separate tenant contexts and carries a review
date. Our cross-tenant tests are mechanical, so under §13.1 the level is not
claimable until T05. The mechanism is recorded in paths.E and the reason in
gap.E. Claiming E2 off unit tests would be the overclaim §6 prohibits, and
refusing that reasoning is what found the read-path defect.
R stays at 1: R2 needs backupRetentionDays in rapp-postgres's consumer file,
requested in T02 and not ours to declare.
Two additions draft-7 forced. A credentials gap under Decision 9.2 -- our own
finding, adopted as a rule, and it binds us: ingest credentials are static
long-lived bearer tokens, declared as a stated gap rather than a silent
exclusion. And a provides block under Decision 5.5, declaring what a sender can
reach through this service: E2 now, E3 pending ADR-0003, E4 and R4 unreachable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
