flex-auth had no image workflow, so its production images were hand-built
on a workstation and pushed with workstation credentials -- an artifact
whose provenance was someone's working tree rather than a forge revision.
Ports activity-core's canonical image.yaml: the container-build runner
fetches a tarball of the pushed commit, builds, and pushes :latest and
:main-<short-sha>, then reports the immutable digest for the rollout step.
examples/** is a build-trigger path on purpose -- policy packages are
COPYed into the image and there is no hot reload, so a policy change is
an image change.
Runbook updated to say plainly that images are not built on workstations.
FLEX-WP-0011 filed for the rest of the gap: flex-auth runs two production
Deployments on railiance01 but has never been brought under the
staged-promotion contract (RAIL-BS-WP-0006). No railiance/app.toml, no
stage commands, no canary or approval evidence; the deploy/ directory is
a rescue of specs that existed nowhere, not the sanctioned overlay shape.
Pre-existing debt found during the FLEX-WP-0010 rollout, not a regression
from it, and not a blocker for routine policy rollouts -- flex-auth fails
closed. T03 also flags that the coulombcore drain plan still lists
flex-auth on a host it no longer runs on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FLEX-WP-0010-T04: the deployed flex-auth-tenant-engine Deployment bakes
the policy package into its image, so production still serves the
four-action policy -- probed live, tenant.retire returns deny
unknown_action there while tenant.create allows. TEN-WP-0005-T05 is
unblocked in source but needs an image build from 8e127e5 and a rollout,
which this workplan does not scope. Stated in the workplan and in
examples/tenant-engine/README.md rather than left implied.
FLEX-WP-0009-T04: replayed all six user-engine fixtures against the
deployed flex-auth-user-engine service; all six matched expected effect
and reason, confirming the deployed failure matrix is still fail-closed.
T04 stays in progress -- the criterion also requires user-engine to
retire its local bridge, which is not flex-auth's to close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TEN-WP-0005 added tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate to
tenant-engine's write API. FLEX-WP-0008's policy package predates them, so
every lifecycle mutation resolves to deny unknown_action -- correct
fail-closed, but it blocks TEN-WP-0005-T05 rollout and USER-WP-0021.
Requested by tenant-engine; action strings taken verbatim from the live
_RESOURCE_TYPES mapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/adapters/tenantengine: HTTPClient.LiveRoles() calls tenant-engine's
GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live. LiveRolesResult.Available is the load-bearing
field -- false on any transport error, non-200, or malformed body, never
inferred as zero roles. AttachToContext() writes both tenant_roles and
tenant_roles_available into a CheckRequest.Context map; a consuming Rego
policy must check tenant_roles_available before trusting tenant_roles.
Architectural finding recorded in the workplan: engine.go's Check() has no
context-adapter hook, and none of the existing topaz/relationship/rule
adapters are wired into cmd/flex-auth either -- they're standalone packages
for downstream composition. This adapter is a request-preparation helper a
protected system's own request-building code calls before POST /v1/check,
not an engine-internal hook, matching that precedent exactly.
9 Go tests; gofmt/vet/build clean; go test ./... green repo-wide.
Verified as a real three-service chain: live flex-auth serve + live
tenant-engine, created a tenant and granted it a CUS role through the real
flex-auth-gated write path, then read it back through this adapter (via a
throwaway harness, not committed) -- known tenant: roles=[CUS]
available=true; unknown tenant: roles=[] available=false err="status 404".
FLEX-WP-0008 closed: T01-T04 all done. tenant-engine's write path is now
real end-to-end; any other protected system can pull live tenant capability
role context, fail-closed. Remaining open item unchanged from TEN-WP-0003:
KEY-WP-0005 (key-cape's IAM Profile core-claims gap).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Registers tenant-engine as a flex-auth protected-system consumer in both
directions its boundary contract requires: tenant-engine's writes need
authorization (FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer in TEN-WP-0003 currently gets
deny/not_applicable for everything until a policy package exists), and
flex-auth's own decisions for other protected systems need tenant
capability roles as context input via a live-lookup adapter.
Scoped closer to FLEX-WP-0006/0007 (ops-warden's small security-lane
integration) than FLEX-WP-0003 (Markitect's CARING-benchmark integration)
-- tenant-engine's resource/action vocabulary is small.
Registered, not implemented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add production_registry_snapshot.json from ops-warden inventory with CI
coverage for real actors, IAM subject binding, ttl_out_of_bounds, and
unknown_actor_resource. Extend serve contract tests with /healthz and
publish the registry sync contract for operator deployment.
- Align agent files with on-disk workplan prefixes (infer from workplan ids)
- Set workplan domain to registered domain_slug; add topic_slug where applicable
- Repair frontmatter delimiter formatting; migrate legacy task status literals
- Regenerate AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, and .claude/rules from State Hub templates
Completes FLEX-WP-0005 T05 and closes the Foundations and Topaz
Alignment workstream.
docs/iam-profile-consumption.md captures flex-auth's input surface
against NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.1:
- boundary (flex-auth consumes verified claims; upstream layer
validates signatures and audiences)
- normalized input envelope (matches Markitect's EnterpriseIdentity)
- required, recommended, and tolerated claim variations
- role-claim location union (top-level / realm_access / resource_access)
- scope encoding (string vs array)
- principal-type detection (human / service / emergency)
- group-overage and freshness expectations
- production vs local-development handling
examples/claims/ ships five contract fixtures:
- key-cape-lightweight.yaml (profile minimum)
- keycloak-heavy.yaml (full variation set + MFA)
- service-account.yaml (svc-* hub-to-hub)
- emergency.yaml (break-glass with incident metadata)
- keycloak-group-overage.yaml (Entra-style hasgroups: true)
All fixtures parse as valid YAML. They become contract tests for the
standalone evaluator (FLEX-WP-0002 P2.4) and the Topaz adapter
(FLEX-WP-0004 T01); both code paths must produce identical normalized
envelopes for the same fixture.
FLEX-WP-0005 workstream marked status=done in this file and completed
in the State Hub. FLEX-WP-0002 is now fully unblocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes FLEX-WP-0005 T04. Validates ADR-003's commitment to shape the
standalone core for cheap Topaz adapter work.
Spike output:
- docs/topaz-mapping-spike.md — vocabulary map (subject, group, tenant,
knowledge_base, document, plus parent / owner_team / reader / steward /
member relations), Rego module shape, decision envelope, wire-protocol
ranking (gRPC primary, REST fallback, embedding rejected), schema
restatement recommendation, implications for FLEX-WP-0002 / 0004.
- examples/topaz/ — runnable docker-compose deploying Topaz with the
flex-auth-shaped manifest. seed and probe one-shots cover three
scenarios: alice (steward) allow, bob (group→reader) allow, eve
(outsider) deny. End-to-end green on 2026-05-16:
probe: steward-allow OK (check=true)
probe: reader-allow OK (check=true)
probe: outsider-deny OK (check=false)
probe: all checks passed
Key findings recorded as Implementation Notes in the spike doc:
- Rego input contract bridging (Topaz raw shape ↔ flex-auth canonical
shape) is adapter scope, not core scope.
- Topaz identity objects are a Topaz convention; the adapter
materializes them at directory import time.
- Directory-only permission resolution is sufficient for the common
case; Rego is reserved for context-dependent decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes FLEX-WP-0005 T03. Shape pinned against the Markitect-side emitter
in markitect-tool/src/markitect_tool/policy/enterprise.py (FlexAuthResource
+ FlexAuthResourceManifest dataclasses, MKTT-WP-0014).
Artifacts:
- schemas/resource_manifest.schema.json (JSON Schema draft 2020-12)
- examples/markitect/resource_manifest.yaml (mirrors markitect-tool's
example; metadata.flex_auth_contract = resource-registration-v0)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest.go (Go type with json + yaml tags, plus
FlexAuthContractV0 const)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest_test.go (golden parse of the example +
minimal-fields round-trip)
First external dep: gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1. SBOM ingested into State Hub
(2 entries) — repo last_sbom_at now non-null. Makefile sbom target gains
a GOPATH/bin fallback so it works without ~/go/bin on PATH.
Interface change published to State Hub (a4a5293e-…) and inbox-notified
markitect-tool. The change is additive — Markitect's existing emitter
matches the pinned schema exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-implementation assessment and boundary review
(docs/pre-implementation-assessment.md) lead to three ADRs:
- ADR-001 Go + repo skeleton
- ADR-002 Rego-in-Markdown policy package format
- ADR-003 Topaz-aligned MVP (Topaz spike moves into foundations)
New workplan FLEX-WP-0005 (Foundations and Topaz Alignment) is inserted
between WP-0001 (done) and WP-0002 (core). WP-0002 pins Rego-in-Markdown
for P2.3; WP-0004 P4.1 refocused from Topaz evaluation to Topaz adapter.
Go skeleton at repo root: cmd/flex-auth + internal/{registry,policy,
decision,audit,adapters} + pkg/api + Makefile + .golangci.yml + GitHub
Actions CI. make ci green locally; bin/flex-auth --version works.
INTENT/SCOPE cite the NetKingdom IAM Profile and add the ops-warden /
ops-bridge disjoint-surface clarifications.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
