Per gate-house GH-DEC-2026-001 and net-kingdom canon
security-layer-model_v0.1. The rename to access-engine is NOT part of this
change; it remains a separate governed migration.
- Drop the "control plane" self-description: that is Staff-layer vocabulary,
and flex-auth is an Engine — a deterministic API where the same
authoritative input state yields the same result.
- State the exclusive role: flex-auth is the only policy decision point in
NetKingdom. No other repository, in any layer, renders or caches a decision.
- Split authoring from evaluation. flex-auth owns evaluation exclusively plus
the policy-as-code mechanism; gate-house owns the doctrine, invariants,
authority ceilings, operating modes, and the authority context consumed as
input claims; policy content stays with the protected system's owner.
- Record the access lane/rule demarcation: ops-warden and ops-mason own lanes
(how a worker reaches a host), flex-auth owns rules (whether they may).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
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Records this repository's layer in the NetKingdom IT-security layer model
(Taxonomy / Tooling / Engines / Staff) and what should change in this INTENT
as a result. Links to the review that established the model:
gate-house/history/2026-08-28-security-layer-model-and-gate-house-recut.md
The note flags pending adaptation only; the body is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
These workplans exist only in the retired local hub. Their random pre-ADR-007
identifiers are refused by C-06 as stale references, so they cannot be
registered. Deriving from the canonical record id takes no identity from
anything: central does not hold them and the old ids die with the cache.
Records central already holds were deliberately left untouched.
Refs CUST-WP-0068-T06
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The remote row pointed at 127.0.0.1:18000, a reverse tunnel back to the
workstation. On railiance01 the State Hub runs in the cluster on that same
machine, so the request left the box and came back to reach a local service.
Refs CUST-WP-0067-T07
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FLEX-WP-0016 was titled 'so policy.enabled can flip' and the flip is not
coming. ops-warden's ADR-0006 defers it permanently in favour of
zone-scoped enforcement, so this closes rather than stalls: every task
it owned is delivered and enforce is independently verified by both
sides. The pin stays enforce and is not reverted to warn.
SCOPE's account of policy.enabled was stale - it read as a
build-stage timing choice. Replaced with the actual reason and with
flex-auth's boundary as the reviewing PDP: membership compiles to the
registry, stance stays in the policy package, fail-open is not
expressible by a PDP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
flex-auth stays the only PDP. Zone membership reaches /v1/check as compiled
registry data, never a synchronous lookup. Uncommitted tenant-engine
read/role/grouping policy was discarded, not mixed into this pin.
ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0031 T04 minted audience-flex-auth tokens as
system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden and held the warn-log count.
Helm rev 2 is enforce. Live probe 200/401/403. policy.enabled is theirs.
policy.enabled cannot flip against the user-engine or tenant-engine
bindings. Helm release flex-auth-ops-warden rev 1 serves the production
registry in warn. Workstation warden sends no caller token; enforce and
the yaml flip stay ops-warden's.
flex-auth-tenant-engine Helm rev 2 is enforce on sha256:138aa347 after
tenant-engine 2063470 started sending a projected caller token
(sha256:7dc9d7bf). Probe 200/401/403. tenancy.current.A is 2. T04
cancelled: AuthZEN waits for a PEP we do not control.
Helm-adopted the kubectl-managed user-engine pin, promoted sha256:138aa347
warn then enforce. Reviewer volume needs fsGroup 65532; reviewer tokens
must use the API default audiences or TokenReview 401s on this k3s.
Live probe from user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px: 200 / 401 / 403. tenant-engine
is unchanged. tenancy.current.A stays 0 until that pin moves.
The sanctioned Helm chart could not promote ADR 0004 at all, and the
emergency manifests selected enforce. That made a FLEX-WP-0011 apply
either a no-op or a global 401. First production pin is now warn, per
consumer, on CI digest sha256:138aa347… . Enforce stays a later
per-consumer flip so USER-WP-0023-T03 can close without waiting on
tenant-engine.
TokenReview-based caller identity with audience-scoped tokens and exact
resource.system to ServiceAccount bindings, per ops-warden's recommendation.
Deletes the unwired tenant-engine live-roles adapter (T03) and adds
make verify-posture (T05). Source implements A2; running digest is still A0
until promotion, so tenancy.current.A stays 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Publishes tenancy.yaml (I1 A0 E2 P n/a R n/a, enables A3), the review
answering rapp-postgres's three asks, and FLEX-WP-0015 to close the gaps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI digest sha256:1bf060e6 (main-f304688) is live. Seven pre-existing
actions still allow; guardrail.read/set match the FLEX-WP-0014 split.
user-engine pin unchanged. Rollback target is sha256:9320df39.
