flex-auth/decisions/decisions.md

Decision records

FLEX-DEC-2026-001 — Assent to GH-DEC-2026-001: Engine framing, access-engine rename, authoring/evaluation split

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-001
kind: decision
title: 'Assent to GH-DEC-2026-001: Engine framing, access-engine rename, authoring/evaluation
  split'
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: gate-house GH-DEC-2026-001
standard: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.1.md
intake_ref: FLEX-IN-0001
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- gate-house
- net-kingdom
- ops-warden
- secrets-engine
- zone-engine
requested_dispositions:
- assent
- revise
- reject
created: '2026-08-28T19:43:38.443788Z'
updated: '2026-08-28T19:44:29.505314Z'
rationale: 'Assent to all three items of GH-DEC-2026-001. Item 1: flex-auth is Engine-layer
  and the sole decision point; the INTENT reframe at fe46122 stands. flex-auth accepts
  one conformance debt of its own — DecisionProvenance carries no registry snapshot
  digest, so a decision turning on registry content is not replayable from its own
  provenance (standard section 6). Item 2: access-engine is the right name; execution
  is a separate governed migration, conditioned on renaming repository identity and
  runtime identity in separate revertible steps (the enforcing ops-warden pin binds
  tokens to the protected-system name flex-auth, and a single-step rename would 401
  every warden sign) and on FLEX-WP prefix ownership staying with the repository.
  Item 3: the authoring/evaluation split is accepted; gate-house authority ceilings
  must reach the decision as input claims or as rules in the versioned policy package
  so their application is reconstructable from the decision record — the same section
  6 test flex-auth applied to zone-engine and now to itself. FLEX-WP-0017-T03/T05
  stay wait: the design half is re-routed to gate-house, the durable storage half
  remains unowned and is raised as an engine gap.'
decided_by: flex-auth (reviewing side)
decided_at: '2026-08-28T19:44:29.505314Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "c990e442-77c2-4556-a40b-61f65eded10b"

Context

gate-house asked flex-auth, via FLEX-IN-0001, to assent to the three items ratified in GH-DEC-2026-001. The request follows the estate precedent that a boundary is drawn on review by the other side rather than asserted — the precedent flex-auth itself set when it reviewed a zone-engine draft and ruled that flex-auth is the policy decision point and stays the only one.

This record is flex-auth's answer. It is written from the reviewing side: the questions asked were not "is this flattering to flex-auth" but "does this hold against what flex-auth actually is, and does flex-auth actually conform".

Disposition

Assent to all three items, with one accepted conformance debt and two conditions on the rename. Nothing here revises or rejects any part of GH-DEC-2026-001.

Item 1 — Engine framing and the sole decision point: assent

flex-auth is Engine-layer under §3.3 and §4 of the standard. The defining property holds: the same authoritative input state yields the same result. The INTENT reframe is applied at fe46122 and is correct as written — "control plane" is dropped as Staff vocabulary, and the exclusive decision-point role of §6 is stated.

The generalization in §6 is the ruling flex-auth drew against zone-engine, applied to the estate. flex-auth cannot consistently hold that boundary against another repository and decline it as a general rule.

Accepted conformance debt — registry provenance. §6 states that compiled data determining an outcome is still deciding, and that provenance must remain reconstructable from the engine's decision. flex-auth does not fully satisfy this today. DecisionProvenance (pkg/api/canonical.go) carries the evaluator, mode, policy package, policy version, and a directory ETag — but no digest of the registry snapshot that supplied resource, subject, and relationship facts. A decision that turned on registry content therefore cannot be replayed from its own provenance.

flex-auth accepts this as its own gap rather than claiming conformance it does not have. It is the same argument flex-auth made to zone-engine — zone membership compiles into the registry snapshot, per-zone stance belongs in the versioned policy package, precisely because registry content is absent from decision provenance. The clean fix is to make registry content provenanced, and a workplan will carry it. Until it lands, the flex-auth position that outcome-determining content belongs in the versioned policy package stands unchanged, and stands for gate-house's inputs on the same terms (item 3).

Item 2 — The flex-auth → access-engine rename: assent to the name, not yet to execution

access-engine is the right name. The rejection of auth-engine is correct — key-cape owns authentication, and auth- preserves exactly the ambiguity the rename exists to remove. The §8 lane/rule demarcation is an acceptable cost and flex-auth adopts it: ops-warden and ops-mason own access lanes, flex-auth owns access rules.

flex-auth agrees the rename is a separate governed migration and does not treat GH-DEC-2026-001 as authorizing it. Two conditions, from the consumer side rather than the documentary side:

1. Repository identity and runtime identity must be renamed in separate, independently revertible steps, repository first. The name flex-auth is not only a repo slug: it is a deployed service, an in-cluster DNS name, a chart and image name, and — since FLEX-WP-0016 moved the ops-warden pin to callerAuth.mode: enforce — a protected-system identifier that inbound tokens are bound to. A single-step rename would make every warden sign a 401, including the certificate the ops-bridge tunnels depend on. This is the same dependency shape that caused ops-warden's ADR-0006 to defer policy.enabled permanently.
2. FLEX-WP prefix ownership stays with the repository across the rename. Existing FLEX-WP-0001..0018 identifiers are referenced by State Hub records, by consumer repositories, and by decision provenance in shipped audit records. They are not renamed retroactively; whether new work takes a new prefix is a question for the migration record, not for this assent.

The migration also touches State Hub identifiers, ops-warden's routing tables, zone-engine's boundary text, and secrets-engine integrations, as GH-DEC-2026-001 states. flex-auth will not begin any of it under this record.

Item 3 — The authoring/evaluation split: assent, with the §6 test applied symmetrically

The split is correct and flex-auth gives up the authoring half willingly: gate-house owns the doctrine, the invariants, the authority ceilings, the operating modes, and the authority context; flex-auth owns evaluation exclusively plus the policy-as-code mechanism; policy content stays with the protected system's owner.

flex-auth draws one boundary back, which is the §6 test applied to gate-house's inputs on the same terms flex-auth applies it to zone-engine and to itself:

An authority ceiling that determines an outcome must reach the decision as either an input claim on the request or a rule in the versioned policy package — and its application must be reconstructable from the decision record. A ceiling that resolves an outcome before evaluation runs has decided early, and gate-house is Staff, where §6 forbids a decision point.

Concretely: gate-house authors the ceiling; flex-auth renders it. The principal /actor/runtime triple, the mandate, and the operating mode arrive as input claims and appear in the decision binding. Where a ceiling constrains an outcome, it is expressed in the versioned policy package so that the policy version in provenance identifies the ceiling that applied. This is not a restriction on gate-house's authorship; it is what keeps the authorship auditable at decision time.

Effect on FLEX-WP-0017. The split resolves the overlap and re-routes the design half of the blocked work: gate-house designs the approval contract, flex-auth validates approvals at decision time. It does not unblock FLEX-WP-0017-T03 — the durable approval object, authenticated approval entries, and atomic supersession still need an owner for storage and lifecycle, which is neither gate-house's (Staff holds no state another layer depends on at runtime, §3.4) nor flex-auth's (flex-auth does not own the organizational approval lifecycle). T03 and T05 stay wait, with the design half now addressed to gate-house. That unowned half is flagged to gate-house as an engine gap under §5, not solved locally.

Consequences

• The standard's §11 blocker "flex-auth reframed as an Engine … not yet assented" is answered for flex-auth. kings-guard and ops-warden assent remains outstanding and is not flex-auth's to give.
• INTENT.md records the assent and the registry-provenance debt.
• A workplan will carry the registry snapshot digest into DecisionProvenance.
• The rename is not started, and must not start before a migration record exists that satisfies the two conditions above.

FLEX-DEC-2026-002 — Review of security layer model v0.4: assent with findings, one rule contested

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-002
kind: decision
title: 'Review of security layer model v0.4: assent with findings, one rule contested'
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: net-kingdom security-layer-model_v0.4
standard: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.4.md
intake_ref: FLEX-IN-0002
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- gate-house
- net-kingdom
- ops-warden
- approval-engine
- maturity-engine
requested_dispositions:
- assent
- revise
- reject
created: '2026-08-29T00:41:21.171665Z'
updated: '2026-08-29T00:42:13.009799Z'
rationale: 'Assent to security-layer-model v0.4, with one rule contested and two capability
  assignments not accepted as assented. Section 9.3 conflicts with shipped assented
  behavior: it rules engine-unreachability fallback into the engine, where it cannot
  live, and collides with ops-warden ADR-0009''s per-zone consumer PEP map. Section
  13 names access-engine as intended owner of containment (accept as proposed owner
  only, pending per 9.2) and of authentication/assurance evidence (declined as stated;
  the identity layer and audit-core own that). Three consistency defects: frontmatter
  status proposed contradicts section 14 ''accepted''; the adoption count reads seven
  of fifteen with remaining eight against sixteen estate-authored repositories and
  nine listed; section 14 says three repositories above a table of four. FLEX-IN-0002
  answered: the approval boundary unblocks T03 design, T05 additionally needs the
  approval claim bound to the NewDecisionBinding request digest and a named owner
  and ordering for single consumption; the maturity claim route is practical as a
  request claim but not as registry content until the self-declared provenance digest
  gap closes.'
decided_by: flex-auth (reviewing side)
decided_at: '2026-08-29T00:42:13.009799Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "2e96321d-c7bf-4127-9c30-f3def32e5bee"

Context

FLEX-IN-0002 asked flex-auth to review v0.3. By the time of review the current text is v0.4 (plus the in-place §11 amendment at 2aaf46c), which supersedes v0.3. This record reviews v0.4 and answers the two questions FLEX-IN-0002 put.

Three versions have landed since FLEX-DEC-2026-001, which answered v0.1.

Disposition

Assent to v0.4, with one rule contested, two capability assignments not accepted as assented, and three consistency defects. Nothing here blocks adoption; §9.3 needs correction before it is relied on.

What v0.4 gets right, from flex-auth's side

§6.2 adopts flex-auth's boundary from FLEX-DEC-2026-001 in substance and binds gate-house on the same terms. §9.4 upholds the self-dealing objection: the evaluator does not own the object it evaluates, access-engine consumes approvals as input claims and never mutates them. §13 attributes the registry-snapshot digest gap to flex-auth as self-declared, which is correct. §9.5's guardrail — a maturity level MUST NOT gate a decision directly — is §6.1 applied to a new engine, and flex-auth endorses it.

Contested — §9.3 conflicts with shipped, assented behavior

"The deterministic fail to reduced authority default is access-engine's, applied when it cannot reach its own inputs."

Two different failure cases are conflated:

1. access-engine is reachable but cannot reach its own inputs. The fallback is flex-auth's, it is deterministic, and §9.3 is right. flex-auth accepts it.
2. access-engine is not reachable at all. The engine applies nothing, because it is not running. Whatever happens next is the consumer's behavior, necessarily. flex-auth has held since 2026-08-19 that fail-open is not expressible by a PDP at all — not as a preference, but because there is no evaluator in the path to express it.

§9.3 as written rules case 2 into the engine, where it cannot live. It also collides with shipped behavior in a repository that has assented to this standard: ops-warden ADR-0009 (accepted 2026-08-22, superseding ADR-0006) retires the global policy.enabled and policy.fail_closed and replaces them with a total per-zone map in the consumer PEP — fails open for z0-experimental, z1-operational, z2-protected, z2-continuity and unknown; fails closed for z3-critical. That map is a Staff-layer degraded-mode fallback, and it is the correct design: the alternative makes flex-auth a hard dependency of every warden sign, including the SSH certificate the ops-bridge tunnel carrying the policy call depends on.

Proposed correction: §9.3 should rule the input-degradation fallback into the engine and state that engine-unreachability residue is the consumer's, bounded by a requirement that the consumer's stance be declared per zone and auditable — which ADR-0009 already satisfies. The sentence "engine-unavailable is not grounds for a Staff break-glass path" is sound and should be kept: a bypass path around a reachable engine is a second decision point. A consumer choosing its own behavior when there is no engine to ask is not.

Not accepted as assented — two capability assignments

v0.4's frontmatter lists flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001 under assented_by, and §14 presents it as adoption of the current text. That record answered v0.1. Since then §13 names access-engine as intended owner of two capabilities flex-auth has never reviewed:

Gap row	Position
Containment surface → access-engine + runtime engines	Plausible and consistent with §8's posture asymmetry — rendering reduced authority is what a PDP does. Not yet reviewed, and §9.2 marks it pending anyway. Record it as proposed owner, not owner.
Authentication / assurance evidence → user-engine, access-engine	Declined as stated. flex-auth consumes assurance claims as input and never re-defines them; INTENT.md is explicit that the identity layer owns authentication. Evidence of authentication belongs to the identity layer and audit-core. flex-auth owns evidence of the decision, which it already emits.

An intended_owner in a gap register is a proposal to the named repository, not an assignment to it — §2 keeps what a repository owns in that repository's own INTENT.md. flex-auth suggests §13 gain a column distinguishing a proposed owner from an assented one, so the register does not accumulate silent assignments the way §14's assent row nearly did.

Consistency defects

1. Frontmatter status: proposed contradicts §14 "Status is accepted." Material, because §2 makes this standard the authority for layer assignment. The change log records v0.2 as accepted and v0.3/v0.4 as proposed, so §14 appears to be a carryover.
2. §14's adoption count does not add up. "seven of fifteen" and "the remaining eight" against a §4 catalog of 17 rows, 16 of them estate-authored (OpenBao excepted by §11's own who-must-declare rule). Seven declared plus the nine repositories actually listed is sixteen. Should read seven of sixteen and the remaining nine.
3. §14 says "All three repositories whose boundaries moved" above a table of four. audit-core is the fourth.

Answers to FLEX-IN-0002

(1) Is the boundary enough to unblock FLEX-WP-0017 T03/T05 design? Yes for T03. Not quite for T05, which needs two things specified in approval-engine's contract first:

• Claim shape must bind to the request digest flex-auth already computes. The approval claim should carry the approval id plus the digest of the action it approves, computed over the same canonical binding as NewDecisionBinding (FLEX-WP-0017-T01). Otherwise "approved" and "approved for this exact request" are not distinguishable at decision time, and T05's wrong-action/lane/stage/targets proofs have nothing to compare against.
• Single consumption needs an owner and an ordering. flex-auth never mutates approvals, so consumption is approval-engine's. But the decision precedes the action, and the action precedes consumption — so an allow rendered against an approval that is then never consumed, or consumed twice by a racing caller, is a gap neither engine closes alone. Naming who marks consumed and at what point relative to the decision belongs in the contract before T05, not after.

(2) Is the maturity claim route practical from where flex-auth sits? Yes, with one caveat that is flex-auth's own fault rather than maturity-engine's. A level reaching flex-auth as a request claim is practical today and lands in the decision binding. A level reaching flex-auth as registry content is not reconstructable, because DecisionProvenance carries no registry-snapshot digest — the gap flex-auth self-declared in §13. Until that closes, maturity levels should arrive as request claims or versioned policy rules, never compiled into the registry snapshot. This is the same constraint flex-auth placed on zone stance, for the same reason.

Consequences

• FLEX-IN-0002 is closed; the assessment covers v0.4 rather than v0.3.
• flex-auth's assent now attaches to v0.4 for §§1–8, §9.1–9.2, §9.4–9.6, and §§10–16, and to §9.3 only in its input-degradation half.
• FLEX-WP-0017 T03/T05 stay wait on approval-engine, with the two contract items above raised as prerequisites for T05.
• SCOPE.md cites ops-warden ADR-0006 as current; it is superseded by ADR-0009. Correcting that is flex-auth's own housekeeping.

FLEX-DEC-2026-003 — Review of security layer model v0.6 and companion v0.1: assent, two answers, five findings

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-003
kind: decision
title: 'Review of security layer model v0.6 and companion v0.1: assent, two answers,
  five findings'
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: net-kingdom security-layer-model_v0.6 + companion_v0.1
standard: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- gate-house
- net-kingdom
- info-tech-canon
- ops-warden
- approval-engine
requested_dispositions:
- assent
- revise
- reject
created: '2026-08-29T08:18:39.602701Z'
updated: '2026-08-29T08:19:41.832549Z'
rationale: 'Assent to v0.6 and companion v0.1, with two answers and five findings,
  none blocking. Q1: section 6.4.2 is right but collides with 9.7.1''s session-bound
  allow, needs the request digest as its mechanical replay test, and should rule explicitly
  on deny-caching. Q2: the visibility deadline does land on a PDP and harder than
  at a PEP, but must be per input class rather than one number, and it makes flex-auth''s
  registry-provenance gap load-bearing rather than untidy. Findings: 6.4''s stance-map
  register does not exist in section 13 and neither document says where a map is published;
  the companion omits it too, which is the sufficiency gap gate-house asked for; section
  17 puts the decision-record schema in Taxonomy when it is the PDP''s output artifact,
  inverting the section 2 rule flex-auth used to decline authentication evidence;
  sections 17-19 are H1 outside the hierarchy; section 19 grades the document it lives
  in and will age.'
decided_by: flex-auth (reviewing side)
decided_at: '2026-08-29T08:19:41.832549Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "def6a31b-4cd7-4474-8cfa-339b0fc9fcc6"

Context

gate-house published v0.5 (answering FLEX-DEC-2026-002), then v0.6 with a new two-page companion, and asked flex-auth to review two rules specifically. This record reviews v0.6 + companion v0.1 and answers both questions.

Every finding in FLEX-DEC-2026-002 was honored: §9.3 rewritten along the two- owner split, §13 given an owner-status column with containment recorded as proposed and authentication/assurance evidence as declined with flex-auth's reasoning, all three consistency defects fixed, and both T05 answers folded into approval-engine's INTENT and GH-WP-0002-T06. gate-house also recorded plainly that v0.4 had ruled against shipped assented behavior and that neither it nor ops-warden caught it. That is the loop working.

Disposition

Assent to v0.6 and companion v0.1, with two answers and five findings. None blocks adoption.

The Engine typing in §3.3 is a real improvement and flex-auth endorses it, particularly "a new engine is a PIP unless this standard is amended" — that sentence is the structural form of §6, and it forecloses the drift §6 was written to prevent.

Answer to question 1 — §6.4.2, no local recaching of the verdict

The rule is right and flex-auth supports it. Caching the answer is deciding early at the consumer; caching an input claim under its own freshness rule is not. Three refinements, one of which is a genuine collision:

(a) It contradicts §9.7.1 as written. §9.7.1 permits an allow bound to "a session or obligation that ends." A session-bound allow is used across later requests by construction — that is what binding to a session means. §6.4.2 forbids replaying a stored verdict "for a later request." Taken together, a session-bound allow is both permitted and prohibited. The fix is small: scope §6.4.2 to requests outside the decision's own stated binding and lifetime, which preserves the rule and legalizes exactly the case §9.7.1 already intends.

(b) "Later request" needs a mechanical test, and flex-auth already ships one. A PEP retrying an identical action after a transport failure is not a later request, but nothing in the standard says how to tell. flex-auth computes a canonical request digest over the normalized subject, action, resource, and context (NewDecisionBinding, FLEX-WP-0017-T01), and it is already in every decision binding. flex-auth offers it as the normative test: replay is permitted iff the request digest matches and the decision's lifetime holds. That makes §6.4.2 checkable rather than a matter of implementer judgment, and it costs the estate nothing new.

(c) Deny-caching is the one real pattern the rule outlaws without naming it. A consumer caching a deny under load cannot manufacture authority — §8's asymmetry holds, and it protects the PDP from retry storms, which is a real operational need. But it does breach §6.4.4: an action refused with no decision record naming that request is not reconstructable, and a stale deny is an availability failure that will be misdiagnosed as a policy one. flex-auth's recommendation is to rule on it explicitly rather than leave implementers to infer: permit short-lived negative caching only where the refusal is still recorded, or forbid it in terms. Either is defensible; silence is not, because this is the pattern an implementer under load reaches for first.

Answer to question 2 — §9.7.2, does the visibility deadline land on a PDP

Yes, and it lands harder on the PDP than on the PEP — but one number is the wrong shape for a decision point.

A PEP has one boundary and can state one deadline. A PDP's revocation visibility is per input class, because a decision is a join over sources with unrelated refresh behavior: approval-claim freshness from approval-engine, registry snapshot cadence, policy package activation, and directory ETag. A single flex-auth number would be either a fiction or the worst case, and the worst case is the registry snapshot — which is the slowest and the least visible. Proposed: §9.7.2 requires a per-input-class deadline at a PDP and a single boundary deadline at a PEP.

The consequence for flex-auth is worth stating plainly, because it changes flex-auth's own priorities. §9.7.2 makes the self-declared registry-provenance gap load-bearing rather than untidy. Without a snapshot digest in DecisionProvenance, nobody can determine after the fact which snapshot a decision read, so a stated visibility deadline for registry-borne facts is unfalsifiable — the deadline and the digest are the same gap seen from two sides. flex-auth accepts that this raises the gap from housekeeping to a conformance prerequisite and will plan it as one.

Finding 1 — §6.4's stance-map register does not exist

§6.4 requires every PEP-shaped consumer to publish its stance map and requires those maps to be "inventoried — in maturity-engine once it exists, in §13 until then." §13 contains no stance rows and does not mention stance maps. Neither document says where a map is published or in what form.

This matters for precisely the reason §6.4 gives: without the register, "z0–z2 and unknown fail open" is the estate's effective policy with nobody having compiled it. ops-warden ADR-0009 is cited three times across the two documents as the reference shape and appears in no register. flex-auth has a direct interest here — the aggregate of consumer stances is the estate's real authorization behavior, and flex-auth is the only repository positioned to notice when it diverges from what the policy packages say.

Finding 2 — the companion omits it too, which answers the question asked

gate-house asked what would show the companion is not sufficient on its own. Companion §5.3 says "publish your unreachable-engine stance" but never says where, and omits the inventory obligation entirely. A repository satisfying the companion faithfully would publish a stance map into its own repo and believe itself conforming, and no register would learn of it. On every other point reviewed the companion is faithful to the statute; this is the one gap.

Finding 3 — §17 puts the decision-record schema in the wrong layer

The four artifacts are the right four, and Taxonomy is right for three of them. The request-claim schema is genuinely cross-engine vocabulary and belongs there; so do the gap-record and emission-cadence artifacts.

The decision-record schema does not. A decision record is the PDP's output artifact — the one thing in the estate that only access-engine produces — and §2 keeps what a repository owns in that repository's own INTENT.md. flex-auth already publishes its shape: the binding in DecisionEnvelope, the request digest, and schemas/action_authorization.schema.json. Taxonomy authoring the schema for an artifact only flex-auth emits inverts the ownership rule the standard applies everywhere else.

This is the same §2 argument flex-auth used to decline authentication and assurance evidence in FLEX-DEC-2026-002, and gate-house accepted it there. Symmetry requires flex-auth to apply it against its own interest as well as for it: proposed split is claim / gap-record / emission-cadence to Taxonomy, decision-record schema to access-engine as a published contract, with Taxonomy holding only the shared field vocabulary the claim schema needs to reference. flex-auth will publish that contract; it should not receive it.

Finding 4 — §§17–19 are H1, outside the section hierarchy

They use # where every other section uses ##, so they render as siblings of the document title rather than sections of it. Mechanical, but the standard asks repositories to cite section numbers, and §§17–18 carry normative content.

Finding 5 — §19 grades the document it lives in

A "Verdict on fitness" inside a standard of record makes the assessment normative by adjacency and will age against the text it grades — v0.7 will either restate it or leave a stale verdict in force. Suggest it live in the 2026-08-29 assessment history document and be cited from §16, where the open questions already carry the same content as questions rather than as a grade.

Consequences

• flex-auth's assent attaches to v0.6 + companion v0.1, with §6.4.2 and §9.7.2 read as refined above pending gate-house's disposition.
• The registry-snapshot digest gap is reclassified from housekeeping to a conformance prerequisite under §9.7.2, and will be planned as one.
• flex-auth offers the canonical request digest as the §6.4.2 replay test and offers to publish the decision-record schema as its own contract.

FLEX-DEC-2026-004 — Decision lifetime does not reach past issuance: answer to ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0034-T05

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-004
kind: decision
title: 'Decision lifetime does not reach past issuance: answer to ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0034-T05'
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: WARDEN-WP-0034-T05
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- ops-warden
requested_dispositions:
- answer
- decline
decided_by: flex-auth (access-engine / PDP)
rationale: 'Answered, not declined. A decision lifetime shorter than the SSH certificate
  TTL is meaningful, but only as an authority-to-issue window, never as an authority-to-use
  window over an already-issued certificate. flex-auth lifetime.expires_at bounds
  how long that one allow may be relied on to authorise a sign; it cannot bound an
  artifact ops-warden issued under it, and flex-auth does not claim it does. The downstream
  contract that consumes the shorter lifetime is the pre-sign gate itself: no replay
  of an allow past expires_at, and a fresh Check per sign. The lever that actually
  shortens effective access is the requested TTL as a policy input, which is already
  deployed as the ttl_out_of_bounds deny; ops-warden section 9.7.2 window through
  cert TTL is correctly stated and correctly owned by the PEP.'
created: '2026-09-05T23:08:38.877787Z'
updated: '2026-09-06T00:00:00.000000Z'
decided_at: '2026-09-06T00:00:00.000000Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "f6bfb02a-bbf3-4488-acf9-0e1cb57ce19d"

Context

ops-warden now states its §9.7.2 revocation window explicitly: an allow can remain effective through an already-issued SSH certificate until TTL expiry (adm 48h, agt 24h, atm 8h), because there is no CRL/KRL recall channel. It asked flex-auth, as the access engine, whether a decision lifetime shorter than the certificate TTL is meaningful under that PEP behaviour, and if so what downstream contract should consume the shorter lifetime.

Disposition

Answered, not declined. The lifetime is meaningful, and the mismatch ops-warden noticed is not a defect on either side. It is two different objects with two different revocation stories.

A decision lifetime is authority to issue, not authority to use

lifetime.expires_at (docs/decision-record-contract.md, default TTL 15m) bounds one thing: how long that particular allow may be relied on as the authority for the action it decided. For ops-warden the action is sign, and the action completes at issuance. Once the certificate exists, the decision has been consumed; nothing in the decision record reaches the artifact.

flex-auth does not claim otherwise, and a PDP that did would be lying. The estate already ruled that fail-open is not expressible by a PDP because there is no evaluator in that path; recall of an issued credential is the same shape of claim. There is no flex-auth in the path of an SSH session already authenticated by a valid certificate.

So a 15m decision lifetime against a 48h adm certificate is not an inconsistency to reconcile. It says the gate's answer goes stale in 15 minutes; it says nothing about the certificate, and was never asked to.

The downstream contract is the pre-sign gate itself

That is the only consumer of the shorter lifetime, and it consumes it two ways:

1. No replay past expires_at. An allow may not be reused to authorise a second warden sign, and a cached verdict must not outlive its TTL. This is already the published rule (docs/decision-input-freshness.md, "How to read this as a consumer") and it is the whole of what the lifetime binds.
2. Fresh Check per sign. Because the lifetime is short and claims are not cached PDP-side, revocation of a subject, actor, or approval claim is visible to the next sign immediately — deadline 0 for the claim class. That is the real value of the short lifetime: it bounds how long a revoked principal can keep obtaining new certificates, which is the part flex-auth can bound.

The lever that shortens effective access is already deployed

If the goal is to shrink the window in which a revoked principal retains live access, the mechanism is not a shorter decision lifetime — it is a shorter certificate TTL, and the requested TTL is already a policy input. The shipped ops-warden.ssh-certificate.sign package denies ttl_out_of_bounds before OpenBao is reached (verified 2026-06-29). Capping the requested TTL per actor class or per zone in the policy package is a policy change flex-auth can make and explain; asking the decision lifetime to reach past issuance is not.

flex-auth is not proposing that change here. Certificate TTLs are ops-warden's to set, and this record does not reopen them.

Consequences

• ops-warden's §9.7.2 statement — allow effective through certificate TTL, bounded by 48h/24h/8h, no recall channel — is correct as written and correctly owned by the PEP. flex-auth does not want that residue moved to the PDP's side of the line.
• No change to flex-auth.decision-record.v1. lifetime keeps its published meaning; this record states the boundary it already had rather than adding one.
• If ops-warden ever wants a certificate TTL bound to policy rather than to actor class, that is a policy-package change under a new workplan, not a lifetime semantics change.

FLEX-DEC-2026-005 — secrets-engine policy package is expected but unpublished; /v1/check has no estate-wide endpoint by design

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-005
kind: decision
title: secrets-engine policy package is expected but unpublished; /v1/check has no
  estate-wide endpoint by design
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: secrets-engine SECRETS-WP-0009-T03
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- secrets-engine
- approval-engine
requested_dispositions:
- answer
decided_by: flex-auth (access-engine / PDP)
rationale: 'Two answers. (1) Yes, a real package is expected, and flex-auth authors
  it in this repo as it did for every other consumer; the reserved coordinate is secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle
  at version v1, and it does not exist yet. Until it is published and pinned, secrets-engine
  keeping SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE and _VERSION as required configuration
  with no fallback is the correct shape and flex-auth endorses it. (2) POST /v1/check
  is deployed, but there is no estate-wide PDP address and there is not meant to be
  one: each consumer gets its own cluster-local pin whose NetworkPolicy default-denies
  ingress except from that one approved workload. The 2026-09-06 probe finding no
  reachable PDP is the design working, not an outage. A reachable endpoint for secrets-engine
  is a per-consumer pin that follows its policy package.'
created: '2026-09-05T23:08:51.144287Z'
updated: '2026-09-06T00:00:00.000000Z'
decided_at: '2026-09-06T00:00:00.000000Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "f318e4e2-6195-4db8-b8c0-c71eeecad766"

Context

secrets-engine applied flex-auth's earlier PDP answers in commit 627810b (resource.type: secret-catalog-lane, resource.system: secrets-engine, catalog id as request.resource.id, and a join that validates ActionAuthorization.decision.binding.request_digest against flex-auth.decision-record.v1). It then asked two questions, with Glas real-key execution (SECRETS-WP-0009-T03) waiting on the answers.

Disposition

Answer 1 — yes, a package is expected; it does not exist yet

Every shipped consumer's policy package is authored in this repository, not in the consumer's, and baked into the image: ops-warden.ssh-certificate.sign (v2), tenant-engine.write-api.mutate, user-engine.portal.authorize, railiance-platform.credential-grant.issue, qonto-assistant.finance-read. secrets-engine follows the same path. The reserved coordinate is:

Package	secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle
Version	v1

This is a reservation, not a publication. No such package exists in examples/ today, and until one is published and pinned, a Check naming it evaluates nothing. FLEX-WP-0021 carries the work.

secrets-engine's decision not to default the pin was the right call and flex-auth endorses it explicitly: keeping SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE and _VERSION as required configuration with no fallback is exactly correct. Defaulting them would have pinned production to example vocabulary nobody publishes, and the failure would have been a silent evaluation against a package that is not there rather than a loud missing-configuration error.

Answer 2 — /v1/check is deployed; there is no estate-wide address, by design

The 2026-09-06 probe finding no reachable PDP found the design working.

flex-auth runs as per-consumer cluster-local pins, not as one shared service. Three are live (flex-auth-ops-warden, flex-auth-tenant-engine, flex-auth-user-engine). Each is a three-document manifest whose third document is a default-deny NetworkPolicy admitting ingress from exactly one approved consumer workload, and each is pinned to its own image digest so one consumer's policy can roll without moving another's (deploy/README.md). Caller authentication is per-pin: on the ops-warden pin it is enforce, so an anonymous /v1/check is 401 and a token bound to another protected system is 403 (FLEX-WP-0016).

There is therefore no address for secrets-engine to reach because none has been created for it. A reachable endpoint is a per-consumer pin, and a pin follows its policy package — so both questions resolve to the same piece of work, in that order: publish the package, then pin it.

Consequences

• FLEX-WP-0021 is opened in this repo to publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 and stand up a flex-auth-secrets-engine pin. It needs secrets-engine's real action vocabulary as input; the example secrets-engine.lifecycle/v1 vocabulary is explicitly not it.
• secrets-engine should keep the pin required and unset until the package is published. Nothing in this record authorises a fallback value.
• No change to flex-auth.decision-record.v1. The digest join secrets-engine built against it is correct as described.

FLEX-DEC-2026-006 — ActionAuthorization deferral accepted; G3 is closed and does not argue for ratifying it

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-006
kind: decision
title: ActionAuthorization deferral accepted; G3 is closed and does not argue for
  ratifying it
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: APPROVAL-IN-0002 / GH-DEC-2026-003
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- approval-engine
- gate-house
- secrets-engine
requested_dispositions:
- accept
- contest
decided_by: flex-auth (access-engine / PDP)
rationale: 'Accepted, and flex-auth argues against its own proposal. The composed
  ActionAuthorization object was never ratified; the approval-claim plus DecisionEnvelope
  split lands each check on the layer that owns it and drops none. approval-engine
  asked whether the open G3 finding (DecisionEnvelope carries no lifetime) argues
  for ratifying the composed object now. It does not, because G3 is already closed
  the other way: FLEX-WP-0019 added lifetime to the DecisionEnvelope itself, required
  on every allow by schema conditional, published 2026-09-02. The revisit trigger
  is spent, and it resolved by adding a field rather than by composition, so the decision
  now stands alone and needs no bundle. Separately, the provenance.authority == state-hub
  constant is flex-auth defect: it came from examples/caring/action_authorization.json,
  which contradicted our own ownership section. Corrected at source, with the schema
  and contract doc marked deferred-not-withdrawn so no other consumer builds a validator
  against them.'
created: '2026-09-05T23:29:20.156770Z'
updated: '2026-09-05T23:29:20.156770Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "762e5d75-2377-4e1a-bcea-c57398ef636b"

Context

approval-engine filed APPROVAL-IN-0002 with gate-house and raised it here directly, because the request touches flex-auth's artifact and accepting the shelving is flex-auth's call.

The trigger was concrete damage: secrets-engine built its PEP validator against the ActionAuthorization schema in docs/action-bound-authorization-contract.md, then pointed it at GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim. It rejects every response. Both envelopes declare schema_version: 0.1, so the mismatch surfaces late as a field or authority error that reads like an approval-engine outage rather than a contract mismatch.

Disposition

Accepted. The approval-claim is the step-1 artifact; ActionAuthorization is not required on that path; a PEP validates across the claim (approval fact) and flex-auth's step-2 DecisionEnvelope (exact CheckRequest match and policy pin).

flex-auth argues against its own proposal here. The composed object had the PIP republish flex-auth's decision, which is the part that was wrong: it moves an artifact across a layer boundary that the estate's own §2 rule says it should not cross. flex-auth used that rule to decline authentication evidence in FLEX-DEC-2026-002 and to win §17's decision-record schema in FLEX-DEC-2026-003. It applies the same way when it costs us the object.

The split drops no check. Each of the five verifications in the contract's "Required verification" section lands on the layer that owns it — status, validity window, supersession, and distinct authenticated approvers on the approval-claim; effect, binding match, digest, and policy pin on the DecisionEnvelope.

Answer to the question asked before the decision: G3 does not argue for it

approval-engine named the open G3 finding — DecisionEnvelope carries no lifetime — as a revisit trigger, if it is settled by composition rather than by adding a lifetime field, and asked flex-auth to say so before the decision if G3 is the strongest case for ratifying now.

It is not, and the reason is that G3 is already closed, the other way.

FLEX-WP-0019 closed it by adding the field. schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json now carries a conditional requiring lifetime whenever effect is allow; the duration comes from the policy package's allow_ttl with a 15m engine default, and a package declaring allow_ttl: none produces a deny with reason allow_lifetime_unstated rather than a standing grant. This was published in docs/decision-record-contract.md on 2026-09-02.

So the trigger is spent, and it resolved on the branch that removes the argument rather than the one that supports it. A DecisionEnvelope now states its own end without borrowing ActionAuthorizationValidity. The bundle is not needed to give an allow a lifetime, which was the only structural thing it did that the split does not.

The 2026-08-29 alignment review's table still shows G3 open. That file is a dated review record and is not rewritten; this record supersedes its status.

The provenance.authority == "state-hub" constant is flex-auth's defect

Correct on the merits, and correctable regardless of how the deferral landed. approval-engine located a real contradiction inside one flex-auth document set, and the source is narrower than the report suggested — it is a fixture, not prose:

"provenance": { "authority": "state-hub" }

That was the tail of examples/caring/action_authorization.json, directly contradicting the same contract's ownership section: "State Hub decision records are coordination and provenance evidence; they are not the runtime approval authority." A consumer reading the example rather than the paragraph gets the wrong constant, which is what happened.

Corrected at source. The example now names approval-engine as the approval fact's authority and flex-auth as the decision's, and says State Hub is neither. Its stale secrets-engine.lifecycle policy pin is also corrected to the reserved-but-unpublished coordinate from FLEX-DEC-2026-005.

Consequences

• docs/action-bound-authorization-contract.md status is now deferred, not withdrawn, with the two-step split stated up front and an explicit "do not build a validator against it" warning. The PROPOSED material is retained as the record of what was proposed.
• schemas/action_authorization.schema.json carries the same deferral in its description, so a machine reader sees it too. schema_version stays 0.1; bumping it would imply a ratified successor that does not exist.
• The execute-time half is untouched and stays published: POST /v1/check, binding, the canonical request digest, and flex-auth.decision-record.v1. Nothing secrets-engine built against the digest join is invalidated.
• No revisit trigger remains open on flex-auth's side. If the composed object is ever revisited, it needs a fresh argument, not G3.

FLEX-DEC-2026-007 — A claim cannot name the request that carries it: publish approval_binding_digest

id: FLEX-DEC-2026-007
kind: decision
title: 'A claim cannot name the request that carries it: publish approval_binding_digest'
status: resolved
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: secrets-engine T03 re-verification / GH-DEC-2026-008
owner: flex-auth
affects:
- flex-auth
- secrets-engine
- approval-engine
- gate-house
requested_dispositions:
- resolve
decided_by: flex-auth (access-engine / PDP)
rationale: 'secrets-engine found that an approval pdp_digest recorded at issue time
  can never equal the request_digest of a request that carries the claim inside its
  hashed context, because the claim is part of the context that is hashed. The circularity
  is structural, not a fixture defect, and it made GH-DEC-2026-008 unimplementable
  for exactly the dual-control case it was written for. flex-auth owns the canonical
  request digest, so the resolution is ours. Publishing binding.approval_binding_digest:
  the same digest computed with context.approval removed, present only when a claim
  was carried, stable across attaching the claim, and therefore nameable by a pdp_digest
  recorded at issue. Deliberately additive rather than a redefinition: request_digest
  keeps covering the claim and remains the replay identity, because two requests differing
  only in which approval was presented must not share a replay identity when one allows
  and the other denies dual_control_required. Tests assert the two functions disagree
  on a claim-bearing request and agree on a claim-free one.'
created: '2026-09-06T12:52:06.960329Z'
updated: '2026-09-06T12:52:06.960329Z'
state_hub_decision_id: "4f0a0de3-1b21-48d1-b157-53bc1f6d03d8"

Context

secrets-engine confirmed FLEX-WP-0021-T03 — both replay envelopes reproduce — and in doing so found a defect in their own digest join: they were hashing id, policy_version, and caring_context, which canonical-request-digest.md excludes. Their previously pinned constant had been computed with id inside the material, so it was wrong and its passing proved nothing. Two real envelopes caught it.

Re-verifying against the regenerated destroy fixture, they then found something neither repository can fix alone.

The finding

A pdp_digest recorded at issue time cannot equal the request_digest of a request that carries the claim in its context.

Completing context.approval to a full approval-claim is what moved the destroy fixture's digest — because context is part of the digest material. That is correct behaviour, and it is circular: embedding the claim changes the very digest the claim would need to name.

It is not fixture staleness. It holds for every dual-control request whose claim travels in context, which is the shape GH-DEC-2026-008 had just ruled mandatory: claim.binding.pdp_digest must equal the decision's request digest, and a claim without one must not be used on the PDP path. Left unresolved, the ruling would have been unimplementable for exactly the case it was written for — and destroy would have been permanently un-allowable in production, failing closed forever on a check that could never pass.

Disposition

flex-auth resolves it, because flex-auth owns the digest. secrets-engine raised it correctly and could not fix it; approval-engine records the value but does not define it; gate-house ruled on the correspondence but the mechanism is the PDP's.

binding.approval_binding_digest is published: the same canonical material with context.approval removed, emitted only when the request carried a claim.

claim.binding.pdp_digest == decision.binding.approval_binding_digest

An approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's request_digest; the later claim-bearing request reproduces the same value in approval_binding_digest. The circularity is broken because the excluded key is exactly the one whose contents would otherwise perturb it.

Why this is a second digest and not a redefinition

The tempting fix is to drop context.approval from request_digest entirely. That is wrong, and the reason is worth recording because it is not obvious.

request_digest is the §6.4.2 replay identity. Two requests differing only in which approval was presented must not share one, because their decisions differ: one allows, the other denies dual_control_required. Collapsing the two digests would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a request carrying none. The decision is not a function of the approval-excluded material, so the approval-excluded material cannot be the replay identity.

So request_digest still covers the claim and still moves when it changes. approval_binding_digest deliberately does not move, and is documented as not a replay identity. pkg/api/approval_binding_test.go asserts the two functions disagree on a claim-bearing request — a test that a distinction is real is how a distinction that looks like duplication is defended, which is approval-engine's formulation and it applies here.

The fixture demonstrates it rather than asserting it

examples/secrets-engine/replay/decision_destroy_dual_control.json now carries a claim whose pdp_digest equals the envelope's approval_binding_digest, with pdp_path: true. Changing the claim's contents moved request_digest and left approval_binding_digest untouched, which is the whole property, visible in two files a consumer can diff.

Consequences

• Additive to flex-auth.decision-record.v1. No existing digest changed meaning, and no consumer that never sends context.approval sees the field at all — approval_binding_digest is omitted rather than duplicated onto every ordinary decision.
• secrets-engine must compare pdp_digest to approval_binding_digest, never to request_digest. Their fixture pins move because the fixture's claim changed; the property does not.
• approval-engine needs no change. The value they record at issue is already the right one.
• The three shapes secrets-engine offered are answered by the first: the digest an approval names is computed without context.approval, and it is now stated in the contract rather than left to be discovered.

---

FLEX-DEC-2026-008 — secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 had no tenant rule and allowed a foreign tenant; v2 supersedes it

Date: 2026-09-06 Status: accepted Workplan: FLEX-WP-0021 (T02 reopened, T05) Raised by: flex-auth, answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request

Context

glas-harness asked flex-auth to reconcile three tenant values before real credentials are materialized — approval store platform, proposed client JWT tenant:coulomb, policy tenant tenant:platform — and to return wrong-tenant denial evidence.

There was none to return. secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to input.tenant anywhere: not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a test. Run against the deployed package, a rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant: tenant:coulomb returned:

decision:066e629bbf0c0924   effect: allow   reason: catalog_lane_policy_matched
policy_version: v1          binding.tenant: tenant:coulomb

The exact value in the JWT that glas-harness flagged as needing reconciliation was allowed by the package it was being reconciled against.

Why nothing caught it

Three independent covers failed in the same direction.

1. Every fixture carried tenant:platform. 29 fixtures, 11 of them allows, and not one varied the field. A suite that never varies an input cannot report on it, and its passing rate says nothing about it.
2. FLEX-WP-0021-T02's own gate named it. The task text required "wrong- tenant deny" among the minimum fixtures. The task was recorded done with the gate unmet — the gate was written, read, and not executed.
3. The engine does not supply the check. tenant is hashed into binding.request_digest and rendered in the decision record, so it is visible in every envelope. Visible is not enforced. Nothing in the evaluation path compares the request tenant to anything.

railiance-platform, qonto-assistant, ops-warden, and user-engine all carry the branch. This package was the single outlier, which is the strongest argument that the omission was an oversight rather than a scoping decision.

Decision

Tenant scoping is the policy package's responsibility, and a package with no tenant rule is not tenant-scoped at all. v2 adds known_tenant to well_formed and wrong_tenant as the first rung of the denial ladder, above wrong_system.

Three tests and three fixtures, chosen so each can only pass for the intended reason:

• wrong tenant on an otherwise-valid request — proves the tenant alone carried the denial.
• absent tenant — the first draft read input.tenant != known_tenant directly, which is undefined on a missing key in Rego, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported no_matching_rule. Still a deny, so still fail-closed, but it named the wrong cause. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it. A denial ladder that reports the wrong rung is a diagnostic defect even when the effect is right — a consumer debugging no_matching_rule looks at their action, not their tenant.
• wrong tenant carrying a fully valid approval-claim — asserts the ordering: a foreign tenant with perfect dual-control evidence is denied wrong_tenant, not invited to present a better claim.

Why v2 rather than an amended v1

This package was corrected once before, at v1, without a version bump: the dual-control rule had been written against an invented claim shape and was unsatisfiable. That correction stayed v1 because the defective rule denied everything — nothing had been wrongly allowed and no consumer could have relied on it.

This one runs the other way. A consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows it should never have had, with no signal that the rule beneath the version string had changed.

A fail-open correction must be visible to a consumer as a version change; a fail-closed one need not be. v1 is superseded, not amended.

The tenant reconciliation itself

flex-auth answers only for the values it owns and does not map the other two.

Value	Owner	flex-auth's position
CheckRequest tenant	flex-auth	tenant:platform — the only accepted value on this lane, now enforced
Approval store platform	approval-engine	not ours to interpret; flex-auth reads approvals as claims and never mutates them
Client JWT tenant:coulomb	key-cape	denied by policy today, with the receipt above

Resolved by the operator, 2026-09-06. glas-harness decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6 (glas-harness/docs/platform-tenant-decision.md): tenant:platform is accepted as the platform management, administration and services tenant — the landlord zone — with exact spelling required across the approval store, both proposed service-client JWT claims, and the lifecycle CheckRequest. No alias to platform or tenant:coulomb, and no implicit cross-tenant grant.

The operator's choice is what v2 already enforces, and flex-auth widens nothing. Verified rather than asserted: known_tenant := "tenant:platform" compared by exact string equality, no case folding and no normalisation of tenant anywhere in the evaluation path. The only occurrences of tenant:coulomb in the package are the correction narrative and the three deny tests. tenant:platform is a single constant, so registering a second tenant would be a visible edit to it rather than a configuration change.

This resolves the choice. It does not resolve verification or the remaining admission gates, as glas-harness was explicit about — the caller access path is FLEX-WP-0023.

No mapping is published, and spelling similarity is not one. This is the same refusal as the action-vocabulary mapping ruled out in GH-DEC-2026-008, and for the same reason: a mapping asserted between two vocabularies by resemblance produces a confident wrong answer, and here it would fail open — admitting a foreign tenant on the strength of a shared word. If tenant:coulomb is intended to reach this lane, the owner-reviewed answer is either a JWT carrying tenant:platform or a policy change registering a second tenant. Both are decisions with named owners; neither is a spelling observation.

Consequences

• The deployed pin serves v1 until a redeploy lands. The over-permissive package is live now. Deployment approval is the user's; this record does not grant it.
• No consumer re-pinning is needed for the digest join: request_digest is computed over tenant/subject/action/resource/context and not over the package, so both FLEX-WP-0021-T03 replay digests are byte-identical at v2. Only policy_version and policy_package_digest moved.
• FLEX-WP-0021-T02's gate is now actually met rather than recorded as met.
• Generalizable beyond this package: a fixture suite that holds an input constant provides no coverage of it, however many fixtures pass.

The sweep, run rather than recommended

Every published package's fixture suite was checked for a constant tenant:

Package	Fixture tenants	Tenant rule in package
secrets-engine	now 3 distinct	added at v2
qonto-assistant	2 distinct	yes, wrong_tenant
user-engine	2 distinct	yes, cross_tenant
ops-warden	constant	yes, wrong_tenant — rule covered by Rego tests, not fixtures
railiance-platform	constant	yes, wrong_tenant — same
tenant-engine	constant	none

ops-warden and railiance-platform have the rule and exercise it only in Rego tests, which is thin but not a hole.

tenant-engine has no tenant rule and is deployed. Verified: a tenant.create allow re-sent under tenant: tenant:coulomb returns allow / write_api_policy_matched.

It is not the same fix. secrets-engine's request tenant is the calling identity's own tenant, so a constant is correct. tenant-engine's subjects all sit in tenant:platform while its fixtures send tenant:friendly:binky — the request tenant there names the target of the operation, and a service whose whole purpose is creating tenants legitimately acts across them. A constant known_tenant would break it. The correct rule is a relation between the request tenant and the resource, and it needs tenant-engine to say which.

So the finding is recorded and not unilaterally patched: what is wrong today is that the omission is undocumented, and a reader cannot tell a deliberate cross-tenant scope from a missing rule. Carried as FLEX-WP-0022.

---

FLEX-DEC-2026-009 — The decision record cannot show who called: caller identity is absent from flex-auth.decision-record.v1

Date: 2026-09-06 Status: accepted, gap open Workplan: FLEX-WP-0023 Raised by: flex-auth, while designing the operator access path glas-harness asked for

Context

glas-harness asked for "a supported owner access path and authenticated caller binding/lifetime with positive and negative tests", and ruled out Service DNS and a permanent operator token. Designing that path (docs/operator-caller-access-path.md) produced the answer — a TokenRequest token, short-lived, audience-scoped, bound by exact sub to one ServiceAccount — and then produced a question the design cannot answer.

Where does the authenticated caller appear in the artifact? It does not.

flex-auth.decision-record.v1 has no caller field. provenance carries evaluator, mode, policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest, policy_version, and decision_time. binding carries the normalized tenant, subject, action, resource, context and the request digest. The word caller does not occur in the schema.

Why this is not the same as the subject

It is tempting to answer that the subject is the caller, and for the secrets-engine lane it happens to be: subject.id is secrets-engine and the bound principal is system:serviceaccount:secrets-engine:secrets-engine. That coincidence is exactly what makes the gap easy to miss.

They are different claims, and callerAuth exists because they are:

• subject is an input to the decision. It is asserted by the caller and the policy reasons about it.
• the caller principal is authenticated by flex-auth against the cluster and is not an input to the decision. It gates whether the request may be made at all, per resource system.

A caller bound to secrets-engine may present any subject its policy permits, and a request whose subject is secrets-engine may arrive from an unauthenticated caller — which is precisely the state under warn. Reading the subject as evidence of the caller reads an input as if it were a verification.

The consequence, in the terms the consumer asked in

glas-harness wants a scoped delivery receipt. What the record supports today is:

this decision permits this action on this resource under this policy version

What it does not support, and what was asked for:

this caller was authenticated, under this identity, with this lifetime, when it obtained this decision

The four negative tests in the access-path design (missing header, wrong ServiceAccount, wrong audience, expired token) can all pass, and no artifact retains the fact that they passed for the request that mattered. The verification is real and leaves no trace. That is the defect.

It is also the same shape as FLEX-DEC-2026-008, one layer up: there, a tenant was carried into the digest and never compared — visible but not enforced. Here, a caller is authenticated and never recorded — enforced but not visible. A control that leaves no evidence and evidence that exerts no control are the two ways the same seam opens.

Decision

The caller principal belongs in provenance, not in binding.

binding is the §6.4.2 replay identity: the material the decision is a function of. The caller is deliberately not that material — the same request from a different authenticated caller must decide identically, or the caller has become a policy input by the back door. Putting it in binding would change request_digest, break every consumer's replay join, and assert something false about what the decision depends on.

provenance is where flex-auth records how the decision was produced, which is exactly what an authentication event is. The shape, additive:

"provenance": {
  "caller": {
    "mode": "enforce",
    "principal": "system:serviceaccount:secrets-engine:secrets-engine",
    "audience": "flex-auth",
    "not_after": "2026-09-06T20:10:00Z"
  }
}

mode is required and load-bearing: a record from a warn-mode pin must say so, because a principal recorded under warn was observed and not enforced, and a reader who cannot tell those apart will read an unverified string as verification. Under disabled the object is {"mode": "disabled"} with no principal — absence stated rather than a missing key, following the pdp_digest precedent from approval-engine (FLEX-DEC-2026-007).

not_after comes from the reviewed token's exp. internal/callerauth.Identity carries only Username and Audiences today, so the expiry is validated by TokenReview and then discarded. It has to be captured to be recorded, which is the one real code change here.

Consequences

• Additive to flex-auth.decision-record.v1. No digest changes meaning and no existing consumer field moves — the same reasoning that let approval_binding_digest be additive in FLEX-DEC-2026-007.
• Every consumer's replay join is unaffected, because request_digest is computed over binding and the caller is not in binding. Stated explicitly so nobody re-pins in response to this record, as they nearly did for v2.
• security-layer-model §17 makes the decision-record schema flex-auth's, so this is ours to change and ours to have missed. Worth reporting to gate-house as a finding against the v0.8 round rather than only fixing: §9.7.2 promoted registry-snapshot provenance to a conformance prerequisite on the argument that a decision turning on registry content must be replayable from its own record. A decision gated by caller authentication is not auditable from its own record by the same argument, and the standard does not ask for it.
• Does not block the access path. The TokenRequest shape stands on its own; this makes its result visible in the artifact rather than only in the pin's logs.

---

FLEX-DEC-2026-010 — The response channel is unauthenticated: stated as a stance, and the envelope will be signed

Date: 2026-09-06 Status: accepted, stance recorded, fix open Workplan: FLEX-WP-0024 Raised by: secrets-engine, who asked rather than mitigating it locally

Context

secrets-engine probed the address this repo handed them under FLEX-WP-0021-T05 and found that on the workstation a bare *.svc.cluster.local name resolves through search ad.binect.de to one unrelated public host. Reproduced here:

$ getent hosts flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local
80.158.43.29   ...svc.cluster.local.ad.binect.de
$ getent hosts this-service-does-not-exist.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local
80.158.43.29   (identical — suffix expansion, not a record)
$ getent hosts flex-auth-secrets-engine.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local.
(no resolution)

They then asked the question the misdirection makes urgent: how is the response channel authenticated? And they declined to answer it locally, on the grounds that choosing a transport control for flex-auth's service is not a consumer's call and inventing one is how a consumer ends up authoring semantics it does not own. That is the right boundary — the same one that kept them from authoring a tenant mapping — and it is why this record exists instead of a mitigation in their repo.

The stance, stated because an unstated stance is an assumption

The response channel is unauthenticated. The pin serves plain HTTP on :8080; flex-auth.decision-record.v1 carries no signature field. A responder that knows the package id and version — both published in this repo — can return a well-formed effect: allow with a matching binding, and every check a consumer performs will pass it.

callerAuth authenticates the caller to the PDP. Nothing authenticates the PDP to the caller. Those are not two views of one control.

Why the digests do not help, which is the part that would be misread

A consumer that recomputes request_digest, policy_package_digest, and registry_snapshot_digest, finds all three correct, and concludes the responder is genuine has verified nothing about who answered.

Every input to those digests is either sent by the caller or published. The request material is what the caller just transmitted. Both the package and registry digests are computable from files in a public repo. A forger reproduces all three exactly, and the more digests flex-auth publishes the more authenticated a forged envelope looks.

The digests establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of the source. This is the third instance of one seam in as many decisions: FLEX-DEC-2026-008 had a tenant carried into the digest and never compared — visible, not enforced; FLEX-DEC-2026-009 has a caller authenticated and never recorded — enforced, not visible; here the record is verifiable and unauthentic — checkable, but not evidence of anything. Each time, an artifact invited a conclusion one step stronger than it supports.

The consequence for a fail-closed consumer

secrets-engine runs fail-closed in production, and stated that its posture "silently assumes the PDP is the PDP". Precisely:

Fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies. A lying PDP allows. The posture that makes the first safe does nothing about the second, and a consumer reading its own fail-closed configuration as covering both has drawn exactly the wrong inference.

Today that risk is carried entirely by their pin being unset — which is to say, by nothing structural.

Decision

Three parts, in increasing durability.

1. Never publish a bare Service name again. Publish the trailing-dot FQDN and say in-cluster only. The trailing dot makes resolution fail rather than succeed at the wrong place, which is the behaviour a fail-closed consumer needs from a name. Corrected in examples/secrets-engine/README.md, SCOPE.md, and the FLEX-WP-0021-T05 handover note.

2. For the operator shape, kubectl port-forward is the recommended path, and not only for reachability. It resolves no DNS name, targets one named pod explicitly, and runs over the API server's TLS with the operator's cluster credentials — so it is currently the only path on which a consumer knows it is talking to the real pin.

Note this is the exact reverse of the caller direction, where the port-forward bypasses the NetworkPolicy entirely (FLEX-WP-0023). The two properties are independent and point opposite ways. They must be stated separately; summarising either as "the network protects it" gets one of them backwards.

3. Sign the decision envelope. §17 makes the decision-record schema flex-auth's, so responder authenticity is ours to provide rather than a deployment concern to delegate. A detached signature over the canonical envelope is preferred to transport-only mTLS, for two reasons:

• It survives the transport. A decision recorded now must still be attributable when it is audited later, and mTLS authenticates a connection that no longer exists.
• It composes with FLEX-DEC-2026-009. A record that names its authenticated caller and carries flex-auth's signature is an audit artifact. Either alone is a claim.

mTLS remains worth having for the live channel and is not excluded; it is not a substitute.

Consequences

• flex-auth published a hazardous address. The handover was ours, the probe was theirs, and the finding is against this repo. Recorded that way.
• Until signing lands, a consumer must not treat digest recomputation as responder verification. docs/decision-record-contract.md says so explicitly — the contract is the only place a consumer is guaranteed to read.
• FLEX-WP-0024 carries signing. Key custody is not flex-auth's to invent: route it through warden route and OpenBao rather than minting a key in this repo, per the estate credential-routing rule.
• Worth carrying into the v0.8 assent round. §6.4 obligates the PEP to act on a decision and §9.3 splits degraded mode by owner, but nothing in the standard requires a PDP's response to be authenticable, so a conformant PEP can be fully conformant while trusting a forged allow. That is a gap in the standard and not only in this implementation.

---

FLEX-DEC-2026-011 — Review of security layer model v0.8: assent with four findings, one of them fail-open

Date: 2026-09-07 Status: accepted — assent to v0.8 with findings Reviewed: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.8.md (status proposed) Workplan: FLEX-WP-0023-T05, FLEX-WP-0024-T04

flex-auth (access-engine) assents to v0.8 as a boundary. Four findings follow, ordered by severity rather than by section. F1 is fail-open and we consider it blocking for acceptance; the rest are corrections that do not.

Two of the five contributions credited to us in §15 are confirmed dispositioned against the body rather than the change log: §6.4 obligation 5's replay-identity property is stated as we reported it, and §9.7.3's exclusion-scoped comparison now names binding.approval_binding_digest and is implementable. §13.1's axis column and the cross-axis statement are as described.

---

F1 — "a decision from access-engine" is not a checkable predicate, and §6.4's mechanical test does not make it one

Severity: fail-open. A conformant PEP performing exactly the prescribed checks accepts a forged allow.

§6.4 obligation 1 requires a PEP to hold "a decision from access-engine identifying the request it was rendered for". Obligation 2 supplies the test and is emphatic that it is not a judgement call: "replay is permitted iff the canonical request digest matches and the decision's lifetime holds… The test is mechanical, not a matter of implementer judgement."

That test establishes which request a decision is for. It establishes nothing about who issued it, and it cannot.

Every input to every digest a PEP can check is either sent by the caller or published. The request material is what the PEP itself transmitted. policy_package_digest and registry_snapshot_digest are computable from files in a public repository. A responder that knows the package id and version — both published — reproduces all three exactly and returns a well-formed effect: allow. The digests establish integrity of the binding, never authenticity of the source, and the more of them a PDP publishes the more authenticated a forged envelope looks.

This is ours before it is the standard's: flex-auth.decision-record.v1 carries no signature and pins serve plain HTTP. We recorded it as FLEX-DEC-2026-010 before writing this review, and FLEX-WP-0024 carries the fix. But the standard is not merely silent — it uses the phrase "a decision from access-engine" as though it named a verifiable property, and prescribes a mechanical test that a careful implementer will reasonably read as discharging it.

The internal inconsistency that makes this sharp. §9.4 requires the approval object to have "durable, authenticated entries". §6.4 obligation 5 then requires that where a PEP's decision rests on more than one artifact, "each artifact MUST be validated against the layer that owns its data", and the live instance it names is exactly the approval-claim / DecisionEnvelope pair.

So the standard requires authenticity of the PIP's artifact and not of the PDP's, and then writes an obligation over both. Obligation 5 is unsatisfiable for half the pair it was written about: a PEP can validate the approval's authenticity and cannot validate the decision's. The asymmetry is not argued anywhere; we believe it is an oversight rather than a position.

Consequence for every fail-closed consumer, and it is the operative sentence: fail-closed protects against a PDP that is absent, not against one that lies. An unreachable PDP denies. A lying PDP allows. §9.3's whole degraded-mode apparatus — two failure cases, two owners, published stance maps — addresses absence. Nothing in the standard addresses a responder. secrets-engine put it better than we did: their production posture "silently assumes the PDP is the PDP", and today that assumption is carried by their pin being unset rather than by anything structural.

§16 has already noticed this one layer up and not seen it here. It carries "Publication integrity of the Taxonomy layer itself. This standard demands reconstructability of decisions while its own publication path has no digest, freeze, or rollback discipline." That is precisely the same observation about the standard's own text. Applied to the artifact the standard regulates, it is F1. The gap was visible from inside and got recorded against the wrong artifact.

Proposed: §6.4 obligation 1 should require the decision be attributable to access-engine, not merely held; §13 should carry the gap with access-engine as owner until signing ships. We are not asking for a signature scheme in the statute — the shape is ours under §17 — only that the obligation stop reading as satisfied by a digest comparison. A declared gap is honest; an unstated assumption inside a mechanical test is not.

---

F2 — An unknown cell can launder an incomplete map into an apparently total one

This answers §16's new question — "whether §6.4's unknown ruling should extend to other total-map scopes that are absent rather than unknown" — which gate-house flagged as ours. The distinction is real, and it is not a distinction in the stance.

Runtime behaviour must be identical: absent fails closed too, and for a stronger reason. A consumer cannot tell the two apart at the point of failure — in both cases it holds a scope value with no stance for it, on one code path. Worse, absent is the case in which the consumer's model of its own scope axis has just been demonstrated wrong. Being more permissive on the branch reached by discovering you were mistaken about your own coverage inverts the appropriate response to surprise. §8's asymmetry forbids it on the same grounds §6.4 already gives for unknown: the cheapest state for an attacker to induce must not be the most permissive.

But the distinction belongs in reporting, and omitting it makes the totality obligation unfalsifiable. This is the finding.

§6.4 obligation 3 requires the map be total. A map carrying an unknown cell set to fail_closed satisfies totality vacuously: every scope the author never enumerated lands in unknown, fails closed, and no one ever learns which scopes those were. The map is total by having a catch-all rather than by covering its axis. The obligation that the published map equal shipped behaviour, asserted by a test, passes — because the test exercises the catch-all, not the axis.

We have just published the same defect in our own repository and it is the reason we recognise this one. FLEX-DEC-2026-008: a policy package shipped with no tenant rule at all while 29 fixtures passed, because every fixture carried the same tenant. A suite that never varies an input cannot report on it, however many assertions pass. A stance map with a catch-all cannot report which scopes were never enumerated, however green its test. Coverage counted rather than executed, in a stance map instead of a fixture suite.

approval-engine independently reached the remedy that works, and it is better than ours: vary the value across the near misses that actually occur and require each to fail, plus a positive asserting the exact value succeeds — otherwise a deny-everything defect passes the entire negative set.

Proposed: two cells, one behaviour, two meanings. Require a published map to enumerate its axis's values explicitly rather than relying on a catch-all, and require an absent-scope hit to be distinguishable in the record from an unknown-scope hit. Same stance, different finding: an unknown hit is normal operation under a considered stance; an absent hit is evidence that obligation 3's totality requirement is violated and must surface as a conformance failure rather than be absorbed silently.

---

F3 — The strongest obligation in §6.4 has the weakest verification

Obligation 3 states: "The published map MUST equal the shipped behaviour, and that equality SHOULD be asserted by a test." And then, in its own words: "A published map free to drift from the code is worse than none, because it invites reliance it cannot support."

If drift is worse than no publication, the check that detects drift is not a SHOULD. The property is MUST and its only verification is optional, which leaves the sanctioned failure exactly where the paragraph says it is worst: a map published, believed, drifted, and silently wrong.

The cost of promoting it is zero. §13.1's own Shape column records a test for four of the five rows; the SHOULD is already met wherever a map exists. Making it MUST closes the case where a consumer publishes a map and never pins it, and changes nothing for anyone currently conformant.

---

F4 — §13.1 marks one violation and not the plainer one in the same table

ops-warden's row carries an explicit mark: "unknown → fail_open is non-conformant under §6.4 obligation 3 as of this version". Correct, and the kind of marking §11 exists to require.

ops-mason's row reads "— | — | not published; catalogued PEP-shaped in §4". §6.4 states "Every PEP-shaped consumer MUST publish its stance map at a path named in its layer declaration." An unpublished map is a plainer violation of that obligation than a wrongly-valued cell in a published one, and the register states it as a fact without marking it as non-conformance.

A reader scanning the table for the bolded non-conformance marks finds one row and concludes the other four are fine. That is the §11 marking obligation applied to the standard's own register — and it is the argument gate-house made to us about our stale G3 row, returned unchanged. We are the worked example for this class, which is why we recognise it rather than why we are entitled to raise it.

---

On whether you over-read our divergence report

You asked directly, and the answer is no, and the record is right as written.

GH-DEC-2026-009 is grounded in doctrine we did not supply: §8's asymmetry, and the argument that unknown is the cheapest state for an attacker to induce so a permissive unknown makes being unclassifiable an escalation requiring no credential. That reasoning is yours. We reported two conformant maps taking opposite stances and said explicitly it was not a request that either consumer change. The distinction between "access-engine reported a divergence" and "access-engine's preferred stance won" is preserved correctly in both §6.4 and §13.1.

One thing worth adding to that record rather than leaving implied: the ruling costs us nothing. flex-auth is not PEP-shaped and publishes no stance map, so concurring was free, and a PDP's concurrence with a ruling that falls entirely on other repositories is weak evidence for it. The strength of the ruling is the asymmetry argument, not our agreement with it. ops-warden bears the cost and its assent is worth more than ours here.

---

Disposition

Assent to the boundary at v0.8, with F1 outstanding. We will not treat F1 as blocking anyone else's adoption — it describes a condition that already exists under v0.7 and is not created by this version. It is blocking for calling the PEP obligations complete, and the fix is substantially ours: FLEX-WP-0024 signs the envelope, and FLEX-DEC-2026-009 puts the authenticated caller in provenance so a record eventually attests both ends of the channel rather than neither.

---

FLEX-DEC-2026-012 — A caller could raise its own ceiling: registry facts now win, and the replay digest a consumer was told to compute was never computable

Date: 2026-09-07 Status: accepted Workplan: FLEX-WP-0025 Raised by: secrets-engine (the digest half, on its first live request); flex-auth (the escalation half, found while answering it)

Context

secrets-engine adopted the operator access path, sent a real CheckRequest through the enforcing pin, and its validator rejected the allow. Not a near miss — unsatisfiable. binding.request_digest is computed over material the consumer never sent: subject.attributes, subject.tenant, resource.tenant, all contributed by flex-auth's registry.

They declined to fix it locally. Their reasoning is the reason this record exists: they could have compared only the fields they sent and treated additions as benign, but "additions I decided were benign" is a rule authored over flex-auth's registry semantics, and it fails open by accepting a binding that differs from the proposal in some way they did not think to check.

Answering it meant reading the enrichment path, and the enrichment path had a worse defect in it.

The escalation

Enrichment was additive-if-absent. addAttribute wrote a registry value only where the request had no value for that key:

if _, exists := target[key]; !exists { target[key] = value }

So where a caller supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied. Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the shipped ops-warden package — each is one added key on a request that otherwise denies:

Sent by the caller	Registry says	Result before
resource.attributes.max_ttl_hours: 99	8	allow — a 12-hour certificate the registry caps at 8
resource.attributes.allowed_principals: [root, …]	[platform, root]	allow — disallowed_principal bypassed
resource.attributes.allowed_subjects: [<caller>]	[platform-steward, …]	allow — unknown_subject bypassed

The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked against.

Exploitability, stated honestly. This is not remotely reachable today. The PEP builds the CheckRequest, ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and callerAuth: enforce admits only its bound identity. It is a defence-in-depth failure: the registry's ceilings were not binding, so any path that lets attacker-influenced data into a CheckRequest field becomes a full policy bypass rather than a bounded input problem. And callers sending resource.attributes is not hypothetical — secrets-engine does it on every request.

Decision: the registry wins. A registry fact is an authority statement; the same key on the request is the caller's proposal about itself. Where they disagree the registry's value reaches policy. diagnostics.registry_overrode names every displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have.

The exception that had to be carved out, and it is a finding of its own

Making the registry win on subject.type denied every secrets-engine allow, and the reason is worth recording rather than patching around.

The registry's type is CARING vocabulary — Human, Agent, Automation, Service. The request's subject.type is the protected system's actor vocabulary — service, adm, agt, atm. Policies compare against the latter. "Service" is not "service". These are two different fields sharing a name, and overwriting one with the other is translation rather than identity, which is exactly what GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against.

So subject.type keeps fill-if-empty. The residual is real and stated: a caller can still assert its own subject.type, and packages branch on it. It is not fixable by substituting a value from another vocabulary — that is strictly worse, as the denials proved. FLEX-WP-0025 separates the two fields.

Note what surfaced this: the registry's type had been dead data for as long as the field has existed. Nothing read it, because the caller's value always won. A defect is invisible while the value it produces is never used.

The digest

binding.request_digest is over the enriched request, and was published as "the canonical request digest as the published replay test for consumers" (SCOPE.md, §6.4.2). It cannot be that. The registry is flex-auth's, so a consumer recomputing over what it sent gets a different value on every request whose subject or resource the registry knows.

binding.submitted_request_digest is published: RequestDigest over the request exactly as received, before any enrichment. This is the digest a PEP compares for §6.4 obligation 2.

Nothing is lost by hashing the pre-enrichment form. Enrichment is a function of the request and the registry snapshot, and provenance.registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot — so the submitted digest together with that digest identifies the evaluated request completely. Registry staleness between issue and replay is bounded by the decision's own lifetime and by §9.7.2's per-input-class visibility deadline, which is the mechanism that already covers exactly this.

request_digest keeps its value and its meaning: what the decision was actually a function of, and flex-auth's own audit-replay identity. It is now documented as not a consumer check.

approval_binding_digest needs no submitted form. It is compared to claim.binding.pdp_digest, which approval-engine recorded from flex-auth's own output at issue — a flex-auth value against a flex-auth value. But a consumer must not compute either side itself, and secrets-engine's described pre-flight step does exactly that, which reintroduces this defect on the dual-control path. Flagged to them.

Why three rounds of digest work missed it

secrets-engine's replay tests rebuilt the request from envelope["binding"] — the enriched form. So every digest assertion passed by hashing our output and comparing it to our output. It survived the excluded-fields fix, the approval_binding_digest fix, and the tenant fix, because all three were tested the same way.

That is the fourth instance this week of one mechanism: a self-consistent artifact agreeing with itself. FLEX-DEC-2026-008 was a fixture suite that never varied a field; approval-engine's was a fixture built by the function that omitted the field; ours was a registry value nothing read. Each time the thing that caught it was a real artifact crossing a repository boundary, not a review of the assertions.

Consequences

• Existing pins do not move. The three replay fixtures' request_digest and approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical after this change — those requests contradict no registry fact, so nothing they hash moved. submitted_request_digest is a field to add, not a value to correct. Stated explicitly because the last two corrections both prompted re-pinning.
• ops-warden should be told directly. All three demonstrated escalations are against its package and its pin is enforcing in production.
• Regression tests assert the registry value reaches policy on a contradicting request, against attribute keys real packages branch on — a test over an unused key would pass while the escalation stayed open. Verified failing against the old behaviour before being kept.
• The residual is published in docs/request-enrichment.md: a caller-supplied attribute for a key the registry does not define still reaches policy. A policy enforcing a ceiling or an allowlist MUST read a key its manifest declares, and that is now a review obligation on every package.
• Bears on FLEX-DEC-2026-011 F1. A PEP cannot verify who answered; it now at least can verify that the answer is about the request it sent. Those are different properties and neither substitutes for the other.