tegwick
0bc624ba62
secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding. request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it. Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied. Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied request: max_ttl_hours: 99 registry says 8 -> allowed a 12h certificate allowed_principals registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed allowed_subjects registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked against. Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest, ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity. It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request. Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have. subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own. Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service) and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service, adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against. Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the field existed, because the caller's value always won. Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form: enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot. Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct. Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy still cannot tell a fact from an assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
109 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
109 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
# T03 replay fixtures
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Real `DecisionEnvelope`s emitted from the published package, for secrets-engine
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to verify its digest join (`627810b`) unchanged. `FLEX-WP-0021-T03`.
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| File | From |
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| --- | --- |
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| `decision_rotate.json` | `../check_request_allow_rotate.json` — plain allow, empty context |
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| `decision_destroy_dual_control.json` | `../check_request_allow_destroy_dual_control.json` — dual control, valid approval-claim |
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| `decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json` | `../check_request_deny_wrong_tenant.json` — foreign tenant, denied `wrong_tenant` |
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Regenerate either with:
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```bash
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go run ./cmd/flex-auth check \
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-policy examples/secrets-engine/policy_package.md \
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-registry examples/secrets-engine/registry_snapshot.json \
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-request examples/secrets-engine/check_request_allow_rotate.json
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```
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## What is stable and what is not
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**Stable across runs** — these are the fields to pin a contract test against:
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| Field | `rotate` | `destroy` |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `binding.request_digest` | `sha256:de67324f…4345` | `sha256:c749ee2…091a` |
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| `provenance.policy_package_digest` | `sha256:bd11c5fe…c643` | same |
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| `provenance.registry_snapshot_digest` | `sha256:f5a309bc…40bb` | same |
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| `provenance.input_claim_digests.context` | absent (empty context) | `sha256:8b73d29…2800` |
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Verified identical across two runs.
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**Regenerated 2026-09-07 — `submitted_request_digest` added; every existing
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digest unchanged.** From `FLEX-DEC-2026-012`, which `secrets-engine` found by
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running against the live pin.
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`request_digest` is computed over the **enriched** request — after the evaluator
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overlays registry facts onto subject and resource — so it is not
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consumer-computable and never was. Pin **`submitted_request_digest`** instead:
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it is the digest over the request exactly as sent, and it is the §6.4.2 replay
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test. `request_digest` keeps both its meaning as flex-auth's own audit-replay
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identity and its exact value here — `de67324f…`, `c749ee2d…`, `c9c6e6f8…` are
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unchanged, as is `approval_binding_digest` at `fa07bec…`. The enrichment
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precedence changed in the same decision but these three requests contradict no
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registry fact, so nothing they hash moved. **Nothing you have pinned needs
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re-pinning; there is a new field to add, not an old one to correct.**
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| Field | `rotate` | `destroy` | `wrong-tenant` |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `binding.submitted_request_digest` | `sha256:41c8fc08…` | `sha256:c605a9ec…` | `sha256:9aab6de9…` |
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A consumer that pinned `request_digest` from these files was pinning a value it
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could not have computed itself — it matched because it was copied from our
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output, not derived. That is the defect `submitted_request_digest` closes: the
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same assertion now has a value you can recompute from the request you sent.
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**Regenerated at `v2`, 2026-09-06.** The package gained the tenant rule it had
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been missing, so `provenance.policy_version` is now `v2` and
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`policy_package_digest` moved from `sha256:fe0070b7…bd8c` to
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`sha256:bd11c5fe…c643`. **Both `request_digest` values are unchanged** — the
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canonical digest covers tenant/subject/action/resource/context and not the
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package, so a consumer that pinned the digest join has nothing to re-pin. Only
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the two provenance fields moved, and they moved because the policy did.
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`decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json` is the denial evidence for the tenant
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question: the same `rotate` request as `decision_rotate.json` with
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`tenant: tenant:coulomb` substituted. Its `request_digest` differs from the
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allow's, which is the replay identity working — the tenant is hashed material,
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so the two requests are not the same request. A deny carries no `lifetime`.
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| `binding.approval_binding_digest` | absent (no claim) | `sha256:fa07bec…cd56` |
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That last row is the value an approval's `pdp_digest` must equal — never
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`request_digest`, which a claim can never match on the request that carries it.
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It equals the `request_digest` of the same request with `context.approval`
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removed, which is verifiable from this directory: strip the context from
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`../check_request_allow_destroy_dual_control.json`, re-run `check`, and the
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claim-free request digest is the same value (it denies `dual_control_required`,
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which is the point).
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**This fixture verifies itself.** The claim inside the request carries
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`binding.pdp_digest` equal to the envelope's `approval_binding_digest`, and
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`binding.pdp_path: true`. Compare the two values in the two files. Note that
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`request_digest` moved when the claim's contents changed while
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`approval_binding_digest` did not — that is the stability property, demonstrated
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in the artifact rather than asserted in prose.
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**Not stable:** `id`, `provenance.decision_time`, and `lifetime.not_before` /
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`lifetime.expires_at` move with the clock. `lifetime.ttl` is `15m` from the
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package's `allow_ttl`. Do not pin the record as a whole.
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`input_claim_digests.context` appears only when the request carries a non-empty
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context — which is why both fixtures are here rather than just one. A consumer
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asserting the field is always present would pass on `destroy` and fail on
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`rotate`.
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The `destroy` request's `context.approval` is a **complete** approval-claim,
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valid against `approval-engine/schemas/approval_claim.schema.json` including the
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now-required `binding.pdp_digest`. It was regenerated on 2026-09-06 when that
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claim was completed, so its digests differ from the first emission — a partial
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claim in a fixture is how a consumer learns the wrong shape.
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## Not a deployment
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These come from `flex-auth/local` in `standalone` mode
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(`provenance.evaluator` / `mode`), not from a cluster pin. No
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`flex-auth-secrets-engine` pin exists yet (`FLEX-WP-0021-T04`), and the consumer
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policy pin stays unset until `T05`.
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