key-cape/src/internal/domain/model.go

87 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

// Package domain contains the canonical identity model for KeyCape.
// This is the source of truth for all user, group, client, and MFA data.
// All provisioning, tests, and migrations derive from these types.
package domain
import "time"
// User is the canonical identity entity — source of truth for all user data.
type User struct {
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 00:03:31 +02:00
ID string `yaml:"id" json:"id"`
Username string `yaml:"username" json:"username"`
DisplayName string `yaml:"displayName" json:"displayName"`
Email string `yaml:"email" json:"email"`
Enabled bool `yaml:"enabled" json:"enabled"`
Groups []string `yaml:"groups" json:"groups"`
Roles []string `yaml:"roles" json:"roles"`
// Tenant is the NetKingdom IAM Profile tenant claim value
// (e.g. "tenant:friendly:binky"), per net-kingdom/canon/standards/
// iam-profile_v0.3.md. Empty means "not yet assigned" -- token
// issuance falls back to the platform default (KEY-WP-0005-T01) rather
// than emitting an empty tenant claim, since the profile requires
// tenant on every token.
Tenant string `yaml:"tenant,omitempty" json:"tenant,omitempty"`
MFAEnrollment *MFAEnrollment `yaml:"mfaEnrollment,omitempty" json:"mfaEnrollment,omitempty"`
LDAPAttributes map[string]string `yaml:"ldapAttributes,omitempty" json:"ldapAttributes,omitempty"`
}
// Group is a named collection of users.
type Group struct {
ID string `yaml:"id" json:"id"`
Name string `yaml:"name" json:"name"`
Description string `yaml:"description" json:"description"`
Members []string `yaml:"members" json:"members"`
}
// Role is a named permission set.
type Role struct {
ID string `yaml:"id" json:"id"`
Name string `yaml:"name" json:"name"`
Description string `yaml:"description" json:"description"`
}
// Client is a registered OIDC client (static in v0.1 — no dynamic registration).
type Client struct {
ClientID string `yaml:"clientId" json:"clientId"`
DisplayName string `yaml:"displayName" json:"displayName"`
RedirectURIs []string `yaml:"redirectUris" json:"redirectUris"`
AllowedScopes []string `yaml:"allowedScopes" json:"allowedScopes"`
GrantTypes []string `yaml:"grantTypes" json:"grantTypes"`
ClientType string `yaml:"clientType" json:"clientType"` // "confidential" | "public"
SecretRef string `yaml:"secretRef,omitempty" json:"secretRef,omitempty"`
ClientSecret string `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
Audience string `yaml:"audience,omitempty" json:"audience,omitempty"`
ServiceSubject string `yaml:"serviceSubject,omitempty" json:"serviceSubject,omitempty"`
Tenant string `yaml:"tenant,omitempty" json:"tenant,omitempty"`
Roles []string `yaml:"roles,omitempty" json:"roles,omitempty"`
// TokenLifetime overrides the server default for this confidential client.
// It is internal runtime policy, not identity data serialized into tokens.
TokenLifetime time.Duration `yaml:"-" json:"-"`
MFARequired *bool `yaml:"mfaRequired,omitempty" json:"mfaRequired,omitempty"`
RegistrationURL string `yaml:"registrationUrl,omitempty" json:"registrationUrl,omitempty"`
EnrollmentURL string `yaml:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty" json:"enrollmentUrl,omitempty"`
}
// Membership links a user to a group.
type Membership struct {
UserID string `yaml:"userId" json:"userId"`
GroupID string `yaml:"groupId" json:"groupId"`
}
// MFAEnrollment records that a user has enrolled MFA via privacyIDEA.
type MFAEnrollment struct {
UserID string `yaml:"userId" json:"userId"`
Provider string `yaml:"provider" json:"provider"` // "privacyidea"
State string `yaml:"state" json:"state"` // "enabled" | "disabled" | "pending"
EnrolledAt time.Time `yaml:"enrolledAt,omitempty" json:"enrolledAt,omitempty"`
}
// Directory is the full canonical identity directory snapshot.
// Used for provisioning, validation, and migration operations.
type Directory struct {
Users []User `yaml:"users" json:"users"`
Groups []Group `yaml:"groups" json:"groups"`
Roles []Role `yaml:"roles" json:"roles"`
Clients []Client `yaml:"clients" json:"clients"`
}