key-cape/src/cmd/keycape/main.go

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// keycape is the main server binary for the KeyCape IAM profile service.
// It orchestrates Authelia, LLDAP, and privacyIDEA to implement the
// NetKingdom IAM Profile (OIDC/PKCE Authorization Code Flow).
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"flag"
"fmt"
Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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"keycape/internal/server/readiness"
"net/http"
"os"
Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 09:43:49 +02:00
"os/signal"
"strings"
Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 09:43:49 +02:00
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/rs/zerolog"
"keycape/internal/adapters/authelia"
"keycape/internal/adapters/lldap"
"keycape/internal/adapters/privacyidea"
"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
"keycape/internal/authclient"
"keycape/internal/config"
"keycape/internal/domain"
servererrors "keycape/internal/server/errors"
"keycape/internal/server/oidc"
"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
)
const version = "0.1.0"
func main() {
if len(os.Args) > 1 && os.Args[1] == "probe-upstream-issuer" {
if err := authelia.RunIssuerProbe(context.Background(), os.Args[2:], os.Stdout); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
return
}
Ship the live-registration check both blocked tasks depend on KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay blocked on custody and on ops-warden, but each contains a KeyCape-owned piece that had been left as prose. T02 requires proving "live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values"; T04 step 4 requires verifying a rotated secret, refusing its predecessor and refusing excess scope. Both were describable and neither was runnable, so the proof would have been improvised by hand against production at the moment custody lands -- the worst possible time for it. keycape verify-client does it in one command. Per registration it checks discovery origin, the client_credentials exchange and its RS256 signature against the deployed JWKS, exact sub/tenant/roles/principal_type, that every -deny-scope is refused, and that the token carries no scope that was not requested. That last check is a real gap: the caller commands prove every requested scope was granted, never that nothing extra came back. -previous-secret-env additionally requires the predecessor to be refused, and treats an unchanged secret as a rotation that did not happen. Nothing is written to disk and no value is printed. Failures name the claim, not the observed value, so running this against production cannot turn a verification into a disclosure. Every check runs before it reports, so one failure does not hide the rest. The exact invocation for each approval client is recorded in the verification block of the provisioning packet, so custody admission hands back a command rather than a description. Tests cover the passing case, an over-broad registration, a live predecessor, an identical rotation and output non-disclosure; neutering mustFail makes the suite fail, so the checks have teeth. Also recorded in KEY-WP-0014: read from ops-warden's catalog rather than waiting for a reply, key-cape-oidc-login is asked-and-waiting on us since 2026-08-28 and is a pointer lane with no programmatic consumers, and the rapp-qonto-keycape-client blocker citing an absent native exchange command went stale when service-token shipped on 2026-09-05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1182213@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 966597b9-ae61-46a4-8b9e-1594ab3ec4ad
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if len(os.Args) > 1 && (os.Args[1] == "login" || os.Args[1] == "service-token" || os.Args[1] == "verify-client") {
if err := authclient.Run(context.Background(), os.Args[1:], os.Stderr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
return
}
log := zerolog.New(os.Stdout).With().Timestamp().Logger()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 1. Parse flags and load config.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
var cfgPath string
flag.StringVar(&cfgPath, "config", "", "path to YAML config file (env: KEYCAPE_CONFIG)")
flag.Parse()
cfg, err := config.Load(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to load config")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 2. Validate config.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
errs := config.ValidateConfig(cfg)
if len(errs) > 0 {
log.Error().Strs("errors", errs).Msg("config validation failed")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 3. Load RSA private key.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
privateKey, err := loadPrivateKey(cfg.PrivateKeyPEM)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("path", cfg.PrivateKeyPEM).Msg("failed to load private key")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 4. Build JWKS from public key.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
ks := oidc.NewKeySet()
ks.AddKey("key-1", &privateKey.PublicKey)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 5. Build client registry.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
clients, err := buildClientRegistry(cfg.Clients)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("failed to build client registry")
os.Exit(1)
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 6. Create adapters.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
lldapAdapter := lldap.New(cfg.LLDAP)
autheliaAdapter := authelia.New(cfg.Authelia, nil)
privacyIDEAAdapter := privacyidea.New(cfg.PrivacyIDEA, nil)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 7. Create telemetry emitter.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
emitter := telemetry.NewLogEmitter(log)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 8. Create enforcement registry.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
enforcement := servererrors.DefaultRegistry()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 9. Create session store.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 10. Parse token lifetime.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
tokenLifetime := 15 * time.Minute
if cfg.TokenLifetime != "" {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.TokenLifetime)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("tokenLifetime", cfg.TokenLifetime).Msg("invalid tokenLifetime")
os.Exit(1)
}
tokenLifetime = d
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 11. Build issuer base URL.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
issuer := strings.TrimRight(cfg.Issuer, "/")
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 12. Register HTTP handlers.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
mux := http.NewServeMux()
// Discovery.
mux.Handle("/.well-known/openid-configuration", oidc.NewDiscoveryHandler(oidc.DiscoveryConfig{
Issuer: issuer,
AuthorizationEndpoint: issuer + "/authorize",
TokenEndpoint: issuer + "/token",
JWKSUri: issuer + "/jwks",
UserinfoEndpoint: issuer + "/userinfo",
EndSessionEndpoint: issuer + "/logout",
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Clients: clients,
}))
// JWKS.
mux.Handle("/jwks", oidc.NewJWKSHandler(ks))
// Authorize handler (with enforcement middleware).
logins := oidc.NewLoginSessionStore()
authorizeHandler := &oidc.AuthorizeHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Auth: autheliaAdapter,
MFA: privacyIDEAAdapter,
Sessions: sessions,
Logins: logins,
Handoffs: oidc.NewHandoffStore(),
Issuer: issuer,
Emitter: emitter,
}
mux.Handle("/authorize", enforcement.Middleware(authorizeHandler))
mux.Handle("/authorize/callback", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/authorize/return", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/authorize/register", authorizeHandler)
mux.Handle("/logout", &oidc.LogoutHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Logins: logins,
SecureCookie: strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(issuer), "https://"),
})
// Token handler (with enforcement middleware).
tokenHandler := &oidc.TokenHandler{
ClientConfig: clients,
Sessions: sessions,
Users: lldapAdapter,
SigningKey: privateKey,
Issuer: issuer,
TokenLifetime: tokenLifetime,
Emitter: emitter,
// Opt-in: nil unless tenantEngine.baseURL is configured, which is what
// leaves tenant_roles off the stock server (KEY-WP-0024). The adapter
// fails open, so a configured-but-unreachable cache omits the claim
// rather than failing issuance.
TenantEngine: buildTenantEngine(cfg.TenantEngine),
}
mux.Handle("/token", enforcement.Middleware(tokenHandler))
// Userinfo handler.
mux.Handle("/userinfo", &oidc.UserinfoHandler{
Users: lldapAdapter,
SigningKey: &privateKey.PublicKey,
Issuer: issuer,
Emitter: emitter,
})
// Healthz.
Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 09:43:49 +02:00
// /readyz gates traffic on the dependencies a login needs; /healthz stays a
// liveness signal (KEY-WP-0025). Restarting KeyCape because LLDAP blinked
// would convert a dependency blip into an outage of our own, so the two must
// not be the same endpoint.
mux.Handle("/readyz", readiness.New(2*time.Second, 3*time.Second,
readiness.Check{Name: "lldap", Probe: func(ctx context.Context) error {
return lldapAdapter.Ping(ctx)
}},
readiness.Check{Name: "authelia", Probe: httpReachable(cfg.Authelia.TokenBaseURL, cfg.Authelia.BaseURL)},
readiness.Check{Name: "privacyidea", Probe: httpReachable(cfg.PrivacyIDEA.BaseURL)},
))
// Liveness only: this says the process is up, and deliberately probes
// nothing. See /readyz.
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
"status": "ok",
"version": version,
})
})
// Inject emitter into request context.
handler := withEmitter(mux, emitter)
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
// 13. Start HTTP server.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", cfg.Port)
if cfg.Port == 0 {
addr = ":8080"
}
log.Info().
Str("issuer", issuer).
Str("addr", addr).
Str("environment", cfg.Environment).
Str("version", version).
Msg("starting keycape server")
srv := &http.Server{
Addr: addr,
Handler: handler,
ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
}
Give the runtime real readiness, graceful shutdown and stated limits Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments rather than anywhere an operator would look. /readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the condition it reacts to. LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it. SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL. docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and /logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08 allows. Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while /healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40 requests succeeding across a SIGTERM. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 09:43:49 +02:00
// Serve in the background so shutdown can be driven by a signal. Without
// this the process died on SIGTERM mid-request, so every rolling restart
// returned errors to whoever was logging in at that moment.
serveErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
serveErr <- err
return
}
serveErr <- nil
}()
signals := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(signals, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
select {
case err := <-serveErr:
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("server error")
os.Exit(1)
}
case sig := <-signals:
log.Info().Str("signal", sig.String()).Msg("shutting down")
// In-flight requests get a bounded window to finish. In-memory login and
// authorization state does not survive this and is not meant to: a
// browser mid-login must start again after a restart. That is a
// documented limit of the single-replica topology, not a bug to paper
// over here -- see docs/operations.md.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), shutdownGrace)
defer cancel()
if err := srv.Shutdown(ctx); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("graceful shutdown failed; exiting anyway")
os.Exit(1)
}
log.Info().Msg("shutdown complete")
}
}
// shutdownGrace bounds how long in-flight requests may finish after a signal.
// Kept under the 30s read/write timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the
// window an orchestrator typically allows before sending SIGKILL.
const shutdownGrace = 15 * time.Second
// httpReachable probes the first non-empty URL with a GET, reporting whether the
// dependency answered at all. It is a reachability check, not a functional one:
// any HTTP response means something is listening and speaking HTTP there.
func httpReachable(candidates ...string) func(context.Context) error {
target := ""
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if candidate != "" {
target = candidate
break
}
}
return func(ctx context.Context) error {
if target == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("no endpoint configured")
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, target, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
return nil
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// loadPrivateKey reads a PEM file and parses the RSA private key.
// Supports both PKCS#1 ("RSA PRIVATE KEY") and PKCS#8 ("PRIVATE KEY") PEM blocks.
func loadPrivateKey(path string) (*rsa.PrivateKey, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read key file: %w", err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
if block == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no PEM block found in %q", path)
}
switch block.Type {
case "RSA PRIVATE KEY":
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse PKCS1 private key: %w", err)
}
return key, nil
case "PRIVATE KEY":
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse PKCS8 private key: %w", err)
}
rsaKey, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("private key is not an RSA key")
}
return rsaKey, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected PEM block type %q; expected RSA PRIVATE KEY or PRIVATE KEY", block.Type)
}
}
// buildClientRegistry converts []ClientConfig into the map used by handlers.
func buildClientRegistry(cfgClients []config.ClientConfig) (map[string]*domain.Client, error) {
m := make(map[string]*domain.Client, len(cfgClients))
for i := range cfgClients {
c := &cfgClients[i]
clientSecret := ""
var clientTokenLifetime time.Duration
if strings.HasPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:") {
envName := strings.TrimPrefix(c.SecretRef, "env:")
clientSecret = os.Getenv(envName)
if clientSecret == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q secret environment variable %q is empty", c.ClientID, envName)
}
}
if c.TokenLifetime != "" {
parsedLifetime, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(c.TokenLifetime)
if parseErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("client %q tokenLifetime is invalid: %w", c.ClientID, parseErr)
}
clientTokenLifetime = parsedLifetime
}
m[c.ClientID] = &domain.Client{
ClientID: c.ClientID,
DisplayName: c.DisplayName,
RedirectURIs: c.RedirectURIs,
AllowedScopes: c.AllowedScopes,
GrantTypes: c.GrantTypes,
ClientType: c.ClientType,
SecretRef: c.SecretRef,
ClientSecret: clientSecret,
Audience: c.Audience,
ServiceSubject: c.ServiceSubject,
Tenant: c.Tenant,
Roles: c.Roles,
TokenLifetime: clientTokenLifetime,
MFARequired: c.MFARequired,
RegistrationURL: c.RegistrationURL,
EnrollmentURL: c.EnrollmentURL,
}
}
return m, nil
}
// withEmitter wraps a handler to inject the telemetry emitter into every request context.
func withEmitter(next http.Handler, e telemetry.Emitter) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := telemetry.WithEmitter(context.Background(), e)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
// buildTenantEngine returns the tenant_roles cache client, or nil when the
// claim is not configured. Validation has already accepted the URL and timeout.
func buildTenantEngine(cfg config.TenantEngineConfig) *tenantengine.Client {
if cfg.BaseURL == "" {
return nil
}
var httpClient *http.Client
if cfg.Timeout != "" {
if timeout, err := time.ParseDuration(cfg.Timeout); err == nil {
httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: timeout}
}
}
return tenantengine.New(cfg.BaseURL, httpClient)
}