Both changes on main that postdate the deployed image affect startup or issuance
and both fail closed, so a mistake in either presents as a refusal rather than a
warning. That fact currently lives only in a State Hub message to the deployment
owner; messages age out of attention, and the repo is what the next session
reads, so operations.md is where it belongs.
Records what was actually checked rather than what is assumed: the deployed image
digest and the commit it was built from, that the live config's three browser
clients carry neither newly-rejected field, and that no deployed client declares
a tenant on a browser grant so the refusal is not yet reachable. Also states
plainly that neither change has been exercised against a running issuer, and that
the proof belongs to the attended window rather than to a session running against
production on its own.
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A message to railiance-platform listed the upstream issuer pin as outstanding
when the committed receipt showed it done ten hours earlier. Corrected to them
directly; recorded here with the other two instances because the pattern is the
point, not the individual slip. docs/evidence/ is the authoritative artifact for
live proofs in this repository, and reading it is cheaper than the corrections
it prevents.
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A peer session recorded that T02's claim contract is unproven and waits on an
attended keycape verify-client run. The restraint behind that was right -- it
declined to read a client secret, which the provisioning packet does not admit --
but the conclusion was not: the attended run had already happened at
2026-09-09T00:10Z and its receipt is committed in this repo.
docs/evidence/2026-09-09-keycape-verifier-admission.json records, per client:
live_jwks_signature_verified, exact_claims_verified, excess_scope_denied and
wrong_secret_denied all true, lifetime 900s, run by a pinned verifier in an
attended owner process, with credential_values_emitted and
client_side_read_admitted both false. So it was run, and run the admitted way.
T02's status: done is correct and does not revert to wait.
The peer's paragraph is kept rather than deleted, with the correction appended
after it, so the record shows what was concluded and why it was wrong. The error
was reading "not admitted for me" as "not done by anyone" without checking
docs/evidence/ -- the third instance in two days of inferring repository state
from a partial view instead of reading it.
Also records what the receipt itself declines to claim, which nobody should
overstate later: real predecessor rotation and wall-clock expiry were not
exercised. Predecessor rejection is implemented and unit-tested in verify-client
but has never run against a real rotation, which remains KEY-WP-0014-T04 and
still has no admitted execution authority.
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Read-only inspection shows KEY-WP-0013-T02's custody gate has moved since
yesterday: both approval clients are registered in sso/keycape-config, both
secrets exist in the namespace and are wired into the pod, and the image is
pinned to the digest T06 published. The live issuer passes every conformance
check that needs no credential.
That does not establish the claim contract. Subject, tenant, roles, scopes,
lifetime and excess-scope denial are what keycape verify-client proves, and it
needs the client secret in the environment. Reading either secret is client-side
retrieval, which the provisioning packet records as not admitted, so that run is
an attended operator action. T02 now waits on the run, not on custody.
Also re-verified the KEY-WP-0028 rule against the deployed config, after a peer
noted it fails closed at startup with a rollout imminent. The three browser
clients there carry neither serviceSubject nor roles; the three service clients
carry both legitimately. Kept as errors rather than warnings on that evidence.
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serviceSubject and roles are read only on the client_credentials path. On a
browser client they are accepted and then ignored, since subject and roles come
from the directory user -- so a registration that looks effective fails later as
a downstream rejection rather than as a registration defect. tokenLifetime was
already rejected this way, so the rule existed and was incomplete.
Nothing in dev-config, the example fixture or the live deployment sets either
field on a browser client, checked against all three rather than assumed, so this
breaks no existing configuration.
tenant is deliberately excluded, and a test pins that: a browser client may
declare one, and humanTenant resolves it against the directory, refusing issuance
when they disagree (KEY-WP-0013-T05). An earlier version of this change rejected
tenant too and would have made that feature unusable. It started from T05's
blocker paragraph, which was accurate when written and already fixed by the time
this task began -- blocker prose ages faster than the code it describes.
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KEY-WP-0013-T05's tenant blocker did not need the decision it was waiting on. The
two proposed resolutions differ in where a human's tenant comes from -- the
directory record, or the client registration -- and an implementation exists that
is correct under either, so the choice can be made later without another
migration.
A client registration may now declare a tenant. humanTenant() resolves it by four
rules: no declaration keeps the directory answer unchanged; a declared zone
applies where the directory has placed the user nowhere; agreement passes; and a
declared zone conflicting with a directory assignment refuses issuance rather
than relabelling the user.
The refusal is the design, not an edge case. A registration can bind a zone for
unplaced users and can never move a placed one, so this gets the approval chain
its tenant:platform without writing a general cross-tenant override into the
issuer. It fails closed rather than picking a winner, because either answer would
be a silent cross-tenant assertion, and it reports 403 with
error_type: tenant_binding so an operator can tell a misconfigured registration
from a rejected login. If the owners later populate directory tenants, the same
code stops supplying the zone and starts enforcing agreement with it.
Safe only because client registrations are static and deployment-owned. The
tenant contract records that this rule must be revisited if dynamic client
registration is ever admitted.
Tests cover all four rules; neutering the conflict check fails the relabel test
rather than passing silently.
T05 now waits on one thing only: the client_id and callback URI from
informed-decision once it has a deployed origin.
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informed-decision and approval-engine both asked to hear problems with the human
approver registration now rather than at handover. Checking their requested shape
against the source rather than agreeing it on paper turned up three things.
Scope gap, accepted: [openid, approval:approve] cannot render a decision, since
GET /v1/approvals/{id} and /claim both need approval:read -- the surface could
submit an entry it was never able to display. Published
[openid, approval:read, approval:approve]. Reading through a service identity was
the alternative and is worse: it weakens the evidence-of-what-this-person-saw
claim the component exists to make. approval:consume stays excluded.
Assurance shape, published and a defect fixed. Both asked for a documented shape
and KeyCape already emitted one, so it is written down rather than renegotiated.
Writing it down surfaced that `at` was the token mint time rather than the
authentication time. Those differ by hours whenever a browser session is reused,
and approval-engine persists this object verbatim as the only downstream record
that MFA happened -- so a stored approval could have evidenced MFA at a moment
the person proved nothing. PKCESession.AuthTime now carries the original login
instant through session reuse, with mint time as the fallback.
Blocker found before anyone built on it: a human token cannot carry
tenant:platform. effectiveTenant resolves the human tenant from the directory
user, no adapter populates User.Tenant, and the per-client tenant field is read
only on the client_credentials path -- so every human token defaults to
tenant:coulomb, which approval-engine refuses by exact string equality. It would
have presented as a failed approval rather than a registration defect. Two
resolutions sent to the owners and neither implemented here: the choice decides
whether a human's tenant is a property of the person or of the registration, and
that is not KeyCape's alone to make.
Also recorded ops-warden's answers to KEY-WP-0014-T04, including their finding
that `warden plan` returns `autonomous` for a need containing generate and
CAS-write, because it has no read-versus-mutate intent. Their standing
instruction -- treat a warden plan verdict on any write, rotate or provision need
as unreliable until WARDEN-WP-0038 lands -- is recorded in the workplan rather
than left in an inbox.
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Accepted ownership of lane key-cape-oidc-login, which their catalog has carried
as asked-and-waiting since 2026-08-28 -- they were blocked on us. Reported the
rapp-qonto-keycape-client blocker as stale against its own source-read date, and
asked for it to be narrowed to the two custody steps rather than cleared, since
the exchange and the step-3 verification now exist but successor generation and
the CAS write deliberately do not.
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KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay blocked on custody and on ops-warden,
but each contains a KeyCape-owned piece that had been left as prose. T02 requires
proving "live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values";
T04 step 4 requires verifying a rotated secret, refusing its predecessor and
refusing excess scope. Both were describable and neither was runnable, so the
proof would have been improvised by hand against production at the moment custody
lands -- the worst possible time for it.
keycape verify-client does it in one command. Per registration it checks
discovery origin, the client_credentials exchange and its RS256 signature against
the deployed JWKS, exact sub/tenant/roles/principal_type, that every -deny-scope
is refused, and that the token carries no scope that was not requested. That last
check is a real gap: the caller commands prove every requested scope was granted,
never that nothing extra came back. -previous-secret-env additionally requires
the predecessor to be refused, and treats an unchanged secret as a rotation that
did not happen.
Nothing is written to disk and no value is printed. Failures name the claim, not
the observed value, so running this against production cannot turn a verification
into a disclosure. Every check runs before it reports, so one failure does not
hide the rest.
The exact invocation for each approval client is recorded in the verification
block of the provisioning packet, so custody admission hands back a command
rather than a description.
Tests cover the passing case, an over-broad registration, a live predecessor, an
identical rotation and output non-disclosure; neutering mustFail makes the suite
fail, so the checks have teeth.
Also recorded in KEY-WP-0014: read from ops-warden's catalog rather than waiting
for a reply, key-cape-oidc-login is asked-and-waiting on us since 2026-08-28 and
is a pointer lane with no programmatic consumers, and the rapp-qonto-keycape-client
blocker citing an absent native exchange command went stale when service-token
shipped on 2026-09-05.
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Sends the issuer-pinning precondition to the deployment owner with the exact
check, the config keys to pin and the error_type to watch for, and confirms by
inspection that the two approval clients are still unprovisioned.
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G10 waits on custody and platform owners and cannot close from here. What was
doable: verify the handoffs actually went out, replace a remembered live state
with an observed one, and find out whether main is safe to deploy. The last
question found a defect in this repository's own recent work.
Handoffs verified independently rather than trusted: all seven messages are in
the hub with receipt ids. This gap was reopened once for claimed-but-unsent
delivery, so the claim deserved the same scrutiny.
Live state read from the cluster read-only: image main-153258b, only the Qonto
secret materialized so the approval clients remain unprovisioned, four registered
clients, no tenantEngine block. That also corrects an earlier claim of mine --
the deployed config sets userOU explicitly, so the KEY-WP-0023 default fix was
never a production issue.
The precondition: KEY-WP-0019 discovers the expected issuer from
authelia.tokenBaseURL, and the deployed Authelia derives its advertised issuer
from the request Host, advertising the in-cluster address to KeyCape and the
browser-facing one to browsers. Verification fails closed, so a mismatch breaks
every human login and looks like a broken login rather than a misconfiguration.
Which value the token carries needs a real login against production to settle and
was not determined here.
Two mitigations: docs/operations.md documents pinning authelia.issuer and
jwksUrl, with the curl that reveals what the provider advertises for a given
Host; and the authentication failure event now carries a specific reason, so
id_token_issuer_mismatch is distinguishable from a signature failure or an
unreachable key set. The browser still learns nothing.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-08:
- update .custodian-brief.md for key-cape
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KEY-WP-0009-T04 is done. Re-ran verification on main with an explicit Go 1.23.0
toolchain and a writable build cache: contract validator PASS, build, vet and the
full test suite pass, git diff --check clean. gofmt had drifted on
internal/server/telemetry/events.go and tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both reformatted so the task's
formatting claim holds. The four handoffs to netkingdom, secrets-engine,
ops-warden and railiance-platform were then actually sent -- the 2026-09-05 audit
had shown the earlier claimed delivery had no receipts -- and each receipt id is
recorded in the workplan and readable back from the hub.
KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay in wait. Their remaining work is not
ours to do, so what was owed was the request, and it is now delivered: custody
admission for the two approval clients to railiance-platform, the exact human
client id and callback URI to approval-engine, and the OpenBao-token vs
issuer-JWT split plus Qonto rotation execution authority to ops-warden. Each
message quotes the existing non-secret packet or reviewed sequence and states
what is explicitly not being treated as authorization.
No secret was read, no production resource changed, no route retired.
SCOPE.md updated to match.
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Closes gap G09: five loosely related defects.
lldap-export took the service account password on argv, where ps exposes it to
any local user and shell history and process accounting capture it. It now
prefers KEYCAPE_LLDAP_BIND_PW or --bind-pw-file; --bind-pw still works but warns,
deprecated rather than removed because existing runbooks use it and breaking them
silently would be worse than one more cycle of exposure. Conflicting sources are
rejected instead of silently ranked, since an operator otherwise cannot tell
which bind was attempted. Both migration scripts pass the password by
environment now.
The canonical export, generated LDIF and Keycloak realm were written 0644. None
carries credential material, but the snapshot is every username, display name,
email and group membership in the estate, and it tends to land in /tmp. All three
are 0600.
The image packaged keycape alone, so the validator and migration binaries needed
a Go toolchain on the host -- which defeats shipping an image for the cutover
work they exist to support. All five ship; the issuer stays the entrypoint.
Verified by building the image and running each binary inside it.
The publish workflow named 92.205.130.254:32166 while the cluster runs
forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape. It now defaults to the recorded name and
stays overridable by a repository variable. This repository cannot verify that
the runner resolves that hostname or that the registry credentials are valid for
it; if the next publish fails, set the REGISTRY variable back to the address.
docker-compose.dev.yml mounts a private key and Authelia material that are
correctly absent from the checkout. scripts/bootstrap-dev.sh generates them
locally under a restrictive umask rather than chmodding afterwards, so the key is
never briefly world-readable. Everything it writes is git-ignored.
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Closes gap G08. /healthz returned a constant without probing anything, the server
called ListenAndServe with no signal handling, and the operational limits of
in-memory state, startup-loaded keys and local-only logout lived in code comments
rather than anywhere an operator would look.
/readyz probes LLDAP, Authelia and privacyIDEA; /healthz stays liveness and
probes nothing. Keeping them distinct matters: wiring liveness to dependency
health means an orchestrator restarts KeyCape when a dependency blinks, and a
restart also discards every in-flight login, so the reaction is worse than the
condition it reacts to.
LLDAP is probed with a bind rather than a dial, since a rotated or revoked
service password leaves the port open and every lookup failing -- exactly what
readiness should catch and exactly what a dial would miss. The response names the
failing check but never the reason: the endpoint is unauthenticated and upstream
error text carries hostnames and sometimes credentials-in-URLs. Results are
cached for 2s so an unauthenticated endpoint cannot be used to drive unbounded
upstream traffic, and probes run concurrently under a 3s bound so a hung
dependency makes the endpoint answer rather than hang with it.
SIGTERM and SIGINT now drain in-flight requests for 15s, under the 30s read/write
timeouts so a stuck request cannot outlive the window before SIGKILL.
docs/operations.md states the single-replica topology and why, and three limits
easy to get wrong: the constant key-1 key ID makes same-kid rotation a trap for
consumers caching JWKS, removing a client does not revoke its issued tokens, and
/logout is local only. No throughput figures are given, since nothing here
benchmarks KeyCape. Shared storage and refresh tokens stay excluded, as G08
allows.
Verified in the running executable: 503 naming all three checks failed while
/healthz returned 200, the LLDAP check flipping to ok once started, and 40/40
requests succeeding across a SIGTERM.
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Closes gap G07. The tenant-engine client and TokenHandler.TenantEngine were
implemented and tested, but main.go supplied no client and exposed no
configuration, so the stock executable left the field nil and the capability
existed at library level only.
A tenantEngine block with baseURL and an optional timeout now wires it. An empty
baseURL leaves the stock server's behaviour exactly as it was, so enabling the
claim is a deliberate act. Validation treats a configured source as one that must
work: http/https with a host, and a timeout in (0, 10s] since it sits on the
synchronous token-issuance path. A timeout set without a baseURL is rejected
rather than ignored -- it means someone expected the claim to be on.
Verified in the built executable, which is what G07 asks for, rather than at the
wiring: against a stub source a real token carries tenant_roles; with no block
the claim is absent; with the source configured but down, issuance succeeds
without it, confirming the documented fail-open path end to end.
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Finishes the unproven half of gap G04. Running the harness against real LLDAP,
OpenLDAP and Keycloak found four defects that the full unit suite passed over.
Every LLDAP user search pointed at a branch that does not exist. Config.userOU()
defaulted to ou=users while LLDAP stores users under ou=people, and nothing set
UserOU. LookupUser, ListUsers and ValidatePassword all derive from it, so all
three silently found nothing against a stock LLDAP -- human login included, not
only the export. Exposed by an export returning zero users while still emitting a
membership referencing uid=admin, a snapshot the repo's own validator rejects.
raw_attributes_well_formed, added one workplan earlier, rejected the LLDAP
adapter's own _validation_warning annotation, so the exporter's output failed its
own validation. Tooling annotations are exempt now, and a test proves the
exemption does not weaken the rule.
Migrated group memberships were dangling: resolveMemberDN passed a source DN
through unchanged while entries were written to the target branch, so groups
named entries the migrated directory does not contain. And empty groups could
not load at all, since groupOfNames makes member a MUST -- they reference a
placeholder entry the LDIF creates, an organizationalRole rather than a person,
emitted only when some group needs it.
The scenario-c compose file could not start: bitnami/openldap:2.6 does not
exist, though it passed docker compose config. Pinned to the image the scenario
was proved against.
Proof: LLDAP -> export -> validate -> LDIF -> ldapadd into OpenLDAP 1.5.0, every
entry added and every member resolving; a realm from the same export imports into
Keycloak and serves discovery. KeyCape passes 5/5 conformance checks, a migrated
Keycloak 4/5.
Relying-party behaviour and MFA against a migrated realm remain unexercised, and
credential/MFA migration is not supplied at all, so no harness can establish it.
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Closes the runnable half of gap G04. The Scenario B and C scripts could not
execute: absent compose files, binaries sought at src/bin where the Makefile
builds to bin/, --base-dn passed to a generator whose flag is --basedn, and a
hardcoded workstation Go path invoked from outside the module.
Repairing the shell alone would have proved nothing. Both scripts set
KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER while the profile suite built its own httptest server and
never read it, so they passed identically whether or not a provider was running.
A harness that cannot fail for the reason it exists is worse than a missing one.
src/tests/conformance targets the issuer named by KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER over HTTP:
discovery, the profile authorization surface, published keys parsed under the
runtime's own rules, excluded grants, and -- with credentials -- a real token
exchange verified against those keys. It skips when the variable is unset, so
make test is unchanged.
Run against Keycloak 26.0 rather than asserted to work. Discovery, authorization
surface and key checks passed, and a client_credentials exchange produced a token
that verified against Keycloak's published JWKS through internal/jose.
It also failed, correctly: stock Keycloak advertises the excluded implicit and
password grants, and in Keycloak those are server capabilities rather than
per-client toggles, so no emitted realm removes them. A migrated Keycloak has a
wider grant surface than KeyCape, which substantiates with evidence what SCOPE
previously asserted without it. Scenario B legitimately reports failure today.
Directory migration, credential and MFA preservation and relying-party behaviour
remain unexercised, and Scenario C has never been run end to end, so G04 does not
fully close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Closes gap G06. checkNoUnknownAttributes was named for a rule it did not
implement: it rejected blank keys, which is not an allow-list, so a snapshot
carrying malformed or shadowing attribute names passed a check whose name said
otherwise. A rule that passes for the wrong reason is worse than an absent one,
because the report is read as evidence.
raw_attributes_well_formed requires each key to be a valid LDAP attribute
descriptor, forbids shadowing an attribute the canonical model owns (uid, cn,
mail) in any casing, and rejects keys differing only by case, which LDAP treats
as one attribute. spec/ldap-schema.yaml carries the same wording.
Two corrections to the gap's description rather than implementations of it. An
allow-list is not derivable: ldapAttributes is defined as what the canonical
model does not cover, so the schema cannot enumerate what may appear there. And
the reference constraint already existed -- checkValidGroupMemberships only
checks emptiness, but the semantic rule checkReferencedUsersExist resolves every
member against the user set.
Neutering the rule fails four of the five new tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
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keycape-to-keycloak called Transform, which passes no clients, so it wrote a
realm with an empty clients array and nothing said the service-identity contract
had not been migrated. Where clients were supplied, mapClient hardcoded
standardFlowEnabled — silently giving every client_credentials registration the
browser flow — and dropped audience, service subject, tenant, roles, lifetime,
MFA policy, secret reference and handoff URLs. Realm roles and client scopes were
emitted as empty containers.
The defect was not the missing mapping but that a dropped field and an
inapplicable one looked identical in the output.
Add -clients, reading registrations through a new config.Registrations() that
converts without resolving secrets, so migration tooling cannot load material it
has no business holding. Derive flows from the declared grants. Carry the profile
claims as protocol mappers, since Keycloak has no native concept for them, and
lifetime, handoff URLs and the secret reference as attributes — the reference,
never a value. Derive realm roles and client scopes from what is present.
Report what cannot be carried, in UnpreservedReport, kept deliberately separate
from ValidationReport: consistency with the snapshot and completeness of the
migration are different questions and one list cannot answer both. It names the
unmigrated secret, the unenforceable MFA policy, passwords and factor enrolment,
and subject continuity. An incomplete transform emits partial telemetry.
Closes the semantic-preservation half of G03; proof against a live provider is
G04 and stays open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
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KEY-WP-0019-T05 rested on "existing tests pass unchanged", which shows the move
onto internal/jose preserved behaviour but not that the behaviour is checked.
Disabling the RSA comparison in jose.Verify fails both callers' suites, so the
shared verifier is load-bearing on each path.
Correct the comment on the caller-side cases added with the move. It claimed the
existing tamper case fails on the signature segment's shape before any key is
used; it does not — appending eight characters leaves a decodable segment, so
that case does reach and does check the signature. The two new cases are still
worth their place for what a byte-level tamper cannot reach: a structurally valid
token signed by an unpublished key under a published kid tests that key selection
is bound to the key set, and an undersized modulus in the published set tests
that ParseJWKS strictness denies rather than falling through to the claims.
Record both in the workplan and in G01's status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-07:
- update .custodian-brief.md for key-cape
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Completes KEY-WP-0019. Client.Verify now delegates JWK-set parsing and RS256
signature checking to internal/jose, so the caller path and upstream provider
verification share one implementation rather than two copies that drift. Its
claim policy stays put: audience and nonce bindings belong to the caller.
The existing authclient tests pass unchanged, which is the evidence the
migration preserved behaviour. One deliberate strictness increase: a key set
containing any malformed RSA signing key is refused outright rather than used
alongside a good key. KeyCape's /jwks publishes a single key, so no current
deployment is affected.
Adds direct tests for internal/jose. It is now the single verifier behind both
paths, and testing it only through its callers would leave duplicate key ids,
crit headers, even exponents and undersized moduli covered by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-09-07:
- update .custodian-brief.md for key-cape
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