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Author SHA1 Message Date
471465df22 Record the two ops-warden catalog corrections
Accepted ownership of lane key-cape-oidc-login, which their catalog has carried
as asked-and-waiting since 2026-08-28 -- they were blocked on us. Reported the
rapp-qonto-keycape-client blocker as stale against its own source-read date, and
asked for it to be narrowed to the two custody steps rather than cleared, since
the exchange and the step-3 verification now exist but successor generation and
the CAS write deliberately do not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH

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2026-09-08 14:49:01 +02:00
2a8735173b Ship the live-registration check both blocked tasks depend on
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KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay blocked on custody and on ops-warden,
but each contains a KeyCape-owned piece that had been left as prose. T02 requires
proving "live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values";
T04 step 4 requires verifying a rotated secret, refusing its predecessor and
refusing excess scope. Both were describable and neither was runnable, so the
proof would have been improvised by hand against production at the moment custody
lands -- the worst possible time for it.

keycape verify-client does it in one command. Per registration it checks
discovery origin, the client_credentials exchange and its RS256 signature against
the deployed JWKS, exact sub/tenant/roles/principal_type, that every -deny-scope
is refused, and that the token carries no scope that was not requested. That last
check is a real gap: the caller commands prove every requested scope was granted,
never that nothing extra came back. -previous-secret-env additionally requires
the predecessor to be refused, and treats an unchanged secret as a rotation that
did not happen.

Nothing is written to disk and no value is printed. Failures name the claim, not
the observed value, so running this against production cannot turn a verification
into a disclosure. Every check runs before it reports, so one failure does not
hide the rest.

The exact invocation for each approval client is recorded in the verification
block of the provisioning packet, so custody admission hands back a command
rather than a description.

Tests cover the passing case, an over-broad registration, a live predecessor, an
identical rotation and output non-disclosure; neutering mustFail makes the suite
fail, so the checks have teeth.

Also recorded in KEY-WP-0014: read from ops-warden's catalog rather than waiting
for a reply, key-cape-oidc-login is asked-and-waiting on us since 2026-08-28 and
is a pointer lane with no programmatic consumers, and the rapp-qonto-keycape-client
blocker citing an absent native exchange command went stale when service-token
shipped on 2026-09-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH

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2026-09-08 14:30:43 +02:00
7c9ed852ff Close the KEY-WP-0009 handoff gap and deliver the two blocked admissions
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KEY-WP-0009-T04 is done. Re-ran verification on main with an explicit Go 1.23.0
toolchain and a writable build cache: contract validator PASS, build, vet and the
full test suite pass, git diff --check clean. gofmt had drifted on
internal/server/telemetry/events.go and tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both reformatted so the task's
formatting claim holds. The four handoffs to netkingdom, secrets-engine,
ops-warden and railiance-platform were then actually sent -- the 2026-09-05 audit
had shown the earlier claimed delivery had no receipts -- and each receipt id is
recorded in the workplan and readable back from the hub.

KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay in wait. Their remaining work is not
ours to do, so what was owed was the request, and it is now delivered: custody
admission for the two approval clients to railiance-platform, the exact human
client id and callback URI to approval-engine, and the OpenBao-token vs
issuer-JWT split plus Qonto rotation execution authority to ops-warden. Each
message quotes the existing non-secret packet or reviewed sequence and states
what is explicitly not being treated as authorization.

No secret was read, no production resource changed, no route retired.
SCOPE.md updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH

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2026-09-08 10:22:52 +02:00
b989de4e90 Add native verified login and service-token commands
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2026-09-05 01:08:58 +02:00
403904b901 Add bounded resource audiences and enforce browser scope grants
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2026-09-05 00:41:17 +02:00