net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0025-public-self-registration-and-application-jit.md

---
id: NK-WP-0025
type: workplan
title: "Provide NetKingdom self-registration and application first-login provisioning"
domain: infotech
repo: net-kingdom
status: active
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-08-09"
updated: "2026-08-09"
depends_on:
  - NK-WP-0024
  - USER-WP-0022
  - KEY-WP-0008
  - CSOC-WP-0003
state_hub_workstream_id: "1638183b-e2cb-4da2-92b8-d39592d62e86"
---

# NK-WP-0025 - public registration and application JIT provisioning

Provide two safe entry paths for ordinary users of NetKingdom-enabled
applications, beginning with coulomb.social:

1. an existing LLDAP user signs in through KeyCape and receives an
   application-local profile on first successful login; and
2. a new person self-registers through a NetKingdom-owned flow, verifies the
   address, establishes an LLDAP login, then continues through the same
   application first-login path.

The design is additive to coulomb.social's local-account model. NetKingdom
owns authentication and identity lifecycle; coulomb.social/helix-forge owns
its application profile, preferences, content, and application authorization.
An OIDC subject is linked to an application profile, not merged with an
unverified email-only local account.

## T01 - Ratify identity and account-linking semantics

```task
id: NK-WP-0025-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "523d5894-6ab6-4097-a28c-0f77880744b1"
```

Record the source-of-truth split, stable key `(issuer, subject)`, optional
verified-email matching rules, explicit-link requirements for pre-existing
local accounts, unlink/recovery behavior, username/display-name handling, and
collision policy for `tegwick` and `bernd.worsch@gmail.com`.

Done when email alone cannot silently take over an existing application
account and the standalone application-account decision remains intact.

Implemented by coulomb.social's unique `(issuer, subject)` Member binding and
idempotent first-login creation. Email and username remain mutable profile
attributes and are not account-link keys.

## T02 - Provide secure LLDAP self-registration orchestration

```task
id: NK-WP-0025-T02
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "bc220e2b-4cd1-4dcf-b107-12ef3595fe14"
```

Expose a NetKingdom registration service behind user-engine. Validate and
normalize username/email, verify mailbox control, create the LLDAP identity
through the existing privileged provisioning adapter, establish password via
a one-time provider-owned handoff, assign only the ordinary baseline group,
and support idempotent resume/expiry/cleanup. Browsers and user-engine must
never receive LLDAP admin credentials.

Done when an unknown user can reach a normal KeyCape login without operator
provisioning and without acquiring tenant-admin or platform authority.

Implementation resumed with
`docs/public-registration-orchestration-contract.md`. The contract fixes the
anonymous/verified actor boundary, non-enumerating start response, durable
verification request, digest-only single-use verification state, baseline
group provisioning, provider-owned password setup, and fresh OIDC handoff.
The user-engine registration domain already requires verified factors and
uses the privileged provisioning adapter; the next implementation slice is
the persisted intent and verification-port API. Source implementation now
includes allow-listed, non-enumerating anonymous start and purpose-bound
verification consumption. Verification attaches an email factor only after
client/tenant/username binding checks and deliberately stops before user or
LLDAP creation. The remaining slice is resumable completion, baseline
provisioning, provider-subject linking, and password-setup handoff.

## T03 - Integrate registration entry points and return flow

```task
id: NK-WP-0025-T03
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3ec4a9a0-cbce-4c63-8ed8-db36f4cae0fb"
```

Publish a NetKingdom registration URL and allow applications to provide
`return_to`, client, and tenant hints through a signed/allow-listed state
envelope. Add "Create account" beside "Sign in" on the coulomb.social landing
page. After registration, start a fresh OIDC authorization-code/PKCE flow;
never treat the registration browser session as application authentication.

Done when direct NetKingdom registration and coulomb.social-initiated
registration converge on the same verified identity flow without open
redirects or client confusion.

## T04 - Apply optional MFA policy safely

```task
id: NK-WP-0025-T04
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "cf2e4d05-fd07-4bc3-92ff-b2a5ade97846"
```

Replace global mandatory MFA for this consumer with the KeyCape policy from
KEY-WP-0008. Ordinary coulomb.social login is password-only unless the
application profile, requested action, tenant policy, or risk/assurance rule
requires step-up. Platform administration and other existing high-assurance
clients remain MFA protected.

Done when lowering assurance for this application cannot lower assurance for
OpenBao, platform administration, or another client.

Source implementation adds a per-client minimum override and honors explicit
`acr_values=aal2`; only the coulomb-social static registration selects AAL1.
Other clients retain provider-driven mandatory MFA. Live rollout remains.

## T05 - Prove both cases end to end

```task
id: NK-WP-0025-T05
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "5d13f9f6-16b1-44c9-8e1d-4630cfe60a7b"
```

Test an existing LLDAP identity with no coulomb.social profile, a completely
new registrant, repeated callback/JIT, existing-email collision, expired and
replayed verification, duplicate username, provider outage and compensation,
cross-tenant attempts, optional MFA, profile-requested step-up, unlink, and
offboarding. Use `tegwick` only for the attended positive acceptance test;
automated tests use disposable identities.

Done when both user journeys work on railiance01 and all negative cases leave
no orphaned privileged identity or duplicate application profile.