The layer model is now published as
net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.1.md (proposed) and
ratified by gate-house GH-DEC-2026-001. The note previously said the
standard was not yet written.
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Records this repository's layer in the NetKingdom IT-security layer model
(Taxonomy / Tooling / Engines / Staff) and what should change in this INTENT
as a result. Links to the review that established the model:
gate-house/history/2026-08-28-security-layer-model-and-gate-house-recut.md
The note flags pending adaptation only; the body is unchanged.
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custody-inventory.py reports 21 paths, 17 undescribed. An undescribed
credential is one nobody can identify without reading it, so orientation
needs the access the store exists to control — and both of the week's
failure modes stay available: no used_by list, so a rotation misses a
consumer; no on_loss line, so recovery is improvised under pressure.
Sequenced so ops-mason does not guess. T01 establishes owners, because a
confidently wrong used_by is worse than an empty one — a rotation will
trust it.
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custody-inventory.py walks operators/ and platform/workloads/, prints
each path's description, owner, consumers and recovery path, and marks
any missing them. Metadata only, never a value, so it runs under
ops-mason-build and can be handed to anyone orienting themselves. First
run: 21 paths, 17 undescribed.
Described the four this session touched, including on_loss — the field
whose absence meant the LLDAP predecessor's recovery path had to be
worked out from first principles while locked out.
ops-mason-build gains create/update on */metadata/*, since a description
is documentation rather than a value. delete stays absent: deleting a
metadata entry destroys every version of the secret beneath it.
It also now denies itself sys/policies/acl/ops-mason-build. Without that
the policy was advisory — a token that can write policies can delete its
own denials, so the claim that OpenBao enforces "never read a value" was
not true as written. An exact path outranks the glob, so changing what
ops-mason may do is now an operator act, visible as one in the audit log.
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operators/ enabled as KV v2; operator-custody grants read/write on it.
Kept separate from platform-admin rather than folded in, though that
would have been one stanza. platform-admin lists the mounts an
administrator operates *on*; operators/ is the one mount an
administrator keeps things *in*. Separating them lets custody move
independently of administration, which is what the S6 trust stage
(two-of-three independent recovery control) requires and which cannot be
retrofitted once the grant is buried inside platform-admin.
Delete is deliberately absent from the policy. A credential is retired
by writing its successor, and KV v2 keeps the prior version — the
history that did not exist when the LLDAP predecessor was overwritten in
a browser password manager on 2026-08-27 and lost for good.
ops-mason-build verified behaviourally, not just by capability strings:
metadata reads succeed, `kv get` on the forge token returns permission
denied, and enabling a mount returns permission denied.
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The OIDC flow reads nothing from stdin — it starts a local callback
listener, prints a URL, and waits for the browser. The guard was copied
from scripts that prompt for secrets, where it belongs, and here it only
blocked the non-interactive invocation the flow supports.
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Handing an agent an operator session gives it everything you have, for
as long as you have it, and every action lands in the audit log as you.
scripts/bao-session.sh grant <task> mints a separate token into
~/.claude-bao-token — your ~/.vault-token is untouched and the two
revoke independently. 45 minutes, max one hour, display_name
claude-<task> so an audited action is attributable to a piece of work.
policies/ops-mason-build.hcl is what makes the scope real. It allows the
phase-2 survey (sys/mounts, sys/auth, policy list), policy and auth-role
creation, KV metadata reads, and short-lived test tokens for positive
and negative capability checks. It denies every read of */data/* on
platform, operators and secret.
That denial is the point: SCOPE.md says ops-mason never touches secret
values, and until now that was a promise kept by whoever was driving.
An explicit deny outranks any grant, including one added to this policy
later by mistake. The one time the line was crossed is recorded in
plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md §8; under this policy it would
have been refused rather than recorded.
sys/mounts/* is deliberately absent — enabling a mount is a
railiance-platform act, and a grant that needed it should be recognised
as a broader thing rather than folded in here.
Also fixes the WSL2 login trap: bao login's browser launch fails under
gio, so the script prints the URL plainly instead of appearing to hang.
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Minted on a dedicated identity rather than a site admin. A PAT on
tegwick would have read every repository on the instance — wider than
the approved organisation-wide breadth and wider than the plan's stated
blast radius. Built as user state-hub-svc in team coulomb/state-hub-read
(read, all repositories, repo.code unit only), following the existing
issue-core-svc precedent. The ceiling is enforced by org membership, not
by a scope string, and clones are attributable to a named identity.
Delivered by warden desk --act paste_once_provision; ops-mason neither
minted nor pasted the value.
Verified: rapp-openbao, rapp-core-hub, rapp-issue-core and
rapp-policy-nexus all read — four of the nine that failed
STATE-WP-0083-T04. Push 403, admin API 403, /api/v1/user 403 (the scope
carries no read:user). Clone test used GIT_ASKPASS, so no credential
entered argv or a clone URL.
Records a deviation rather than glossing it: SCOPE.md puts secret values
out of scope, and that held for minting and delivery but not for
verification — the value was read back to fingerprint it and to run the
clone test, under the build-stage disclosure posture agreed 2026-08-27.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-08-27:
- update .custodian-brief.md for ops-mason
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Policy workload-kv-read-state-hub-forge-derivation and Kubernetes auth
role state-hub-forge-derivation, verified both directions through a
2-minute test token that was revoked after use: read on its own path;
deny on forgejo-admin, on the shared llm-connect provider secrets, and
on the parent metadata path.
Kubernetes auth replaces the approved AppRole. The plan's §2 survey was
written from disk with no OpenBao session and could not see that
kubernetes/ auth is enabled on this cluster; the plan's own phase-4
instruction to re-verify against live state is what surfaced it. Ruled
by the founder at phase 4. No static credential is created, so nothing
has to be delivered into the cluster or rotated.
The live survey also re-checked reuse: workload-kv-read-agent-harness-
forgejo grants one repository deploy key, not organisation-wide read, so
§2's rejection of reuse stands.
ops-mason handled no secret value. The KV path does not exist until
paste_once_provision writes the token.
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Updated by fix-consistency on 2026-08-26:
- update .custodian-brief.md for ops-mason
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Plan approved 2026-08-26, breadth organisation-wide repository read. The
§4 contingency was satisfied first: STATE-WP-0084-T01 landed the same
day, so a missing grant now surfaces as a named unreadable condition
rather than as silence — which is what the breadth argument rested on.
T01 done. T03 drafted in ops-warden on a branch (entry + playbook +
regenerated high-risk artifact). T02 needs an operator: no valid OpenBao
session here, and the token is the forge owner's to mint.
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Trim MASON-WP-0003 to T01-T03 — decide, build the AppRole/policy/KV path
structure, register the catalog entry — and route it through the
four-phase pipeline via plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md, which
supplies the phase-3 executive summary the workplan was bypassing.
T02 no longer mints or holds the token value: SCOPE.md puts secret
values out of scope, so the forge owner mints and ops-warden's
paste_once_provision desk delivers.
Deployment plumbing, derive_from_forge(), and the fleet re-run move to
state-hub/STATE-WP-0084.
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Nine private repositories are invisible to the hub's derivation: the pod clones
Forgejo anonymously, so ADR-012's premise that the forge is the projection
source holds only for repositories central can read.
warden route find returns no lane for this need, and the nearest entry is an
operator admin PAT owned by railiance-platform — more authority than derivation
requires. ops-mason owns AppRoles, policies and KV paths, which is what is
missing.
Six tasks: settle scope and breadth, create the AppRole and KV path, register
the routing entry, deliver the credential to the pod, teach the derivation to
use it, and confirm the nine. Token creation stays operator-executed; this
workplan describes the lane rather than performing it.
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These files carried no type field at all. Selection is by 'type: workplan', so
they were invisible to every projection while the hub held a record for each —
and a forge-derived reset read those correct records as no longer deriving and
queued them for retirement.
Only the type line is added.
Refs STATE-WP-0083-T05
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The remote row pointed at 127.0.0.1:18000, a reverse tunnel back to the
workstation. On railiance01 the State Hub runs in the cluster on that same
machine, so the request left the box and came back to reach a local service.
Refs CUST-WP-0067-T07
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Maintainer decision, 2026-07-29: adopts TRSL V1C1 as this repo's preliminary governing license, per target-revenue's workplans/TREV-WP-0008-governance-and-pilot-rollout.md T05. Full specialist legal review is deferred until out of beta (target-revenue SCOPE.md section 1). No Phase is yet declared for this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
