LANE-KIND accepts an attended step on a login lane, or on an attended-change
lane whose session_lane resolves to an active, reviewed login lane.
keycape-attended-case-change -> session_lane key-cape-oidc-login (OW-1.3-C1).
consumer-owner-deployment and apps-consumer-handover -> pending-owner-confirmation:
no catalog login lane authenticates a railiance-apps operator session.
apps-consumer-handover risk: high (KERNEL-2, change effect).
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nk48 1.3 owner review (owner-review-ops-warden.json):
- KERNEL-2: Executor.admit parses catalog_source and resolves descriptor.lane;
refuses a missing, non-active, undelegated or ungraded lane, an owner outside
owner_repo, and a mint/change effect on a lane not graded risk high.
catalog-routing-acceptance still covers the whole catalog digest.
- KERNEL-3: dispatch mode is read from the type's follow_through step
(warden_executes/attended). The step must declare both booleans and a lane
and agree with the descriptor's lane and owner. Attended: human actor,
WARDEN_AGENT_ID unset, parent-session revocation scope, caller lane equal to
the step lane. Owner: native delegation, owner_repo == descriptor.owner, no
Warden-executed lane and no Warden-brokered mint.
- CATALOG-1: draft entries keycape-attended-case-change (OW-1.3-C1),
platform-secret-delivery, consumer-owner-deployment, apps-consumer-handover.
Not promoted; promotion waits for owner confirmation.
- Fixture catalogs and type steps in tests; published routing_lanes coverage
and the workload-join count follow the four new not-applicable lanes.
PARAMETER_PINS untouched (PIN-1 waits for founder acknowledgment).
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CCR-2026-0044 is applied. Member and non-member receipts passed on
2026-10-14: the member token holds only
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime, and a non-member login is
refused. The catalog auth_method is now that OIDC role. The proxy still
uses the ambient token and does not vend the hub writer value.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a13b2d-0bc1-7a91-ab1d-325bcfb09bf0
reuse-surface-hub-write-token does not select a caller. The data plane
uses the ambient token, which can be the coding-agent role denied by
agent-high-risk-boundary while an attended platform-admin lookup still
shows read. Advisory and proxy output now report that entity, role, and
policies without the token. CCR-2026-0005 still has no OIDC binding for
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a13b2d-0bc1-7a91-ab1d-325bcfb09bf0
Promotion criterion 9 (catalog_rotation_coverage) caught the missing block on
activation.
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- WP-0039-T03: receipts against flex-auth-ops-warden-fetch with ops-warden's
own caller token. Positive forgejo-admin-api-token allow; negatives for
unknown need, wrong owner (403), wrong tenant and anonymous caller (401).
Policy decisions only, no credential read. WP-0039 finished.
- audit-core-senders: active as a pointer on ops-mason's custody check
(message 5a516911). Custody text corrected to OpenBao KV v2 read via ESO;
delegation verified source-read.
- WP-0044: oidc-browser-relying-party 1.1 is plannable; the case-ref is taken
at run time because it covers the case status.
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Activation made the generic generate lane win the reported rapp-qonto rotation
need (test_plan regression). Narrow its keywords and title to case-specific
terms, give rapp-qonto-keycape-client its secret/rotation keywords, and add a
two-way routing regression test.
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railiance-platform's go-ahead (message 20973a9c) after key-cape confirmed the
secret format and the T05 probe passed. Promotion checklist: owner confirmed,
playbook, owner-native exec, probe evidence, rotation and delegation present;
routing test added. The live oidc-browser-relying-party type is now plannable.
CredentialRouting lists the lane and adds fluid-telegram-operator to drafts.
WP-0044-T03 now waits only on the Forgejo case materializing (MASON-WP-0010-T03).
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railiance-platform bound the issuer role (CCR-2026-0043) and passed the T05
probe (21b8af3). The playbook gains the bao login step for that role. The lane
stays draft at the owner's request until key-cape confirms the secret format.
WP-0044 notes net-kingdom's {client_id:env} patch (9a9b8e3) and the Forgejo
case's materialization status.
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Pointer to railiance-platform's credential.py generate for the mint-secret
step of oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0. Draft until the issuer policy is bound
to the operator OIDC role, key-cape confirms the secret format and the
RPF-WP-0054-T05 probe passes. Workload-join not_applicable 17 -> 18.
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- fluid-telegram-operator: pointer-only draft entry and playbook from ops-mason's
MASON-WP-0005-T06 proposal; activation waits for the owner-run member and
non-member checks and the salt create-once probe.
- audit-core-senders: tenant-engine recorded as a verified exact-path consumer
projection (MASON-WP-0007-T06). The registry lane itself stays draft.
- warden case plan: {param:env} format spec (net-kingdom 850907a), other specs
and conversions refused; prints case-ref <case_id>@sha256:<file digest>.
- Workload-join unknown count 21 -> 22 (test and pep-stance.yaml).
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WARDEN-WP-0043-T01: pointer lane and playbook for
platform/suppliers/<supplier>/<account>. railiance-platform owns the write;
warden_executes false.
WARDEN-WP-0044-T01: review of net-kingdom's oidc-browser-relying-party 1.0
follow_through section. Requires a per-step lane, a narrow
warden_executes, and value_handling.
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Configuration intent (policies, auth roles) routes to the attended
openbao-platform-admin-login lane and value provisioning to openbao-api-key
custody; both fail closed when their front door is missing. The survey lane
now points at ops-mason's read-only ops-mason-survey grant (MASON-IN-0004).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pointer-only catalog entry for the ops-mason-built AppRole
inbound-library (plan inbound-library-imap-approle, built 2026-10-05)
reading platform/workloads/inbound-library/imap, plus a pointer
playbook. Routing coverage re-measured: unknown 20 -> 21.
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Pointer-only catalog entry openbao-structure-survey (warden_executes: false,
owner ops-mason, ceremony lane, not exec_capable) pointing at ops-mason's
ops-mason-build grant, scripts/plan-survey.py and construction-plan-format
section 2, plus a short pointer playbook. ops-warden holds no survey code
and no token. Routing-lane coverage re-measured: not_applicable 15 -> 16.
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Five inbox items worked, none of which changed a credential value or moved a
secret.
whynot-design-npm-publish: field reverted npm_token -> NPM_AUTH_TOKEN and the
path confirmed, on railiance-platform's attended, read-only, no-value field
enumeration (their docs/evidence/2026-09-10-npm-lane-field-resolution.json).
Exactly one field is present at the governed path. The 2026-09-09 change was
adopted from a coordination message and would have failed at the WP-0037-T03
rotation. The ungoverned second location is recorded as an explicit non-lane,
not deleted and not tidied away.
pep-stance coverage: published figures were stale by eight lanes (unknown
18->20, not_applicable 12->15) while resolved stayed at 3 — the denominator
moved, the classification did not. Caught by the test that asserts the published
block equals what report_coverage.py measures. tests/test_workload_join.py held
the same stale counts; both now measure the same populations.
rapp-qonto-keycape-client: blocker character updated — authority exists and is
unexercised by owner decision ("not yet", offer open), which is not the same as
no authority existing. Reopen triggers are events, never elapsed time.
flex-auth -> access-engine rename (WARDEN-IN-0003): access-engine added to the
policy-check lane's keywords so routing resolves under both names from today.
owner_repo deliberately not flipped — policy.py sends it as resource.system on
every /v1/check, and FLEX-DEC-2026-013 keeps runtime names as flex-auth.
layer declaration: INTENT.md says Staff, layer.yaml says staff, section 11 does
not say which governs. Neither changed; gate-house holds the ruling. Position in
docs/layer-declaration-precedence.md, wait in WARDEN-WP-0034-T06, and a comment
in layer.yaml telling the next session not to "fix" it — the divergence is the
evidence the ruling is made against.
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Pointer-only, warden_executes false. Shape lives in flex-auth;
OpenBao path is not built yet. Testdata keys are not this lane.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a09dc1-b21e-77e1-919e-fcad2f82b267
Pointer-only catalog entry so warden route find "state hub read
private repository" resolves. ops-warden routes and does not execute.
MASON-WP-0003-T03.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a09dc1-b21e-77e1-919e-fcad2f82b267
railiance-platform answered the routing question (msg 7c7228ac): steps 1-2
are executed by the platform operator attended, through the governed
openbao-platform-admin-login lane with a unique metadata receipt path, under
founder_required attended OIDC via netkingdom role=platform-admin. Nothing
else in that repo carries write authority against platform/workloads/.
The blocker narrows again -- the AUTHORITY is answered, the ARTIFACT is not.
A two-custodian CAS rotation with a service restart is a distinct
version-guarded operation needing its own reviewed CCR, which is theirs to
write once an owner asks for the rotation. That question is now with
key-cape; ops-warden connected the two and did not ask on their behalf.
Their executable precedent for the identical two-custodian shape is cited so
a rapp-qonto rotation script is not built from a bare `bao kv patch` -- the
provider/consumer consistency reason key-cape gave when declining to ship a
wrapper, which railiance-platform endorsed unprompted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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secrets-engine corrected our claim (msg 15f0c0ca): `npm_token` is the KV
field on the whynot-design publish lane; `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` is the environment
variable their publication-scope policy injects. Their doc lists the two as
separate rows and we had copied the env var in as the field name, so our
`fetch_command` named a field that does not exist -- `bao kv get
-field=NPM_AUTH_TOKEN` could only ever have failed.
This is ADR-0001's failure mode, not a typo: a pointer layer restating an
owner's procedure and getting it wrong. Corrected from the owner's statement
rather than re-derived here, and the catalog now records the distinction
inline so the env var does not get copied back in.
The path is a separate and still-open question. secrets-engine declined to
resolve it unilaterally -- which location backs the lane for reads is
railiance-platform's custody state -- so the path is unchanged and routed to
them rather than moved on a coordination message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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key-cape corrected two blockers that had stopped being true after our
2026-08-28 source-read:
- rapp-qonto-keycape-client: `keycape service-token` (2026-09-05) is the
native exchange the blocker recorded as absent, and `keycape verify-client`
(2026-09-08) is rotation step 3 as one command. Narrowed to steps 1-2 --
successor generation and the CAS write -- rather than cleared, as they
asked. rotation.automatable -> false so a future executable driver is not
told a lane with no admitted custody transport is drivable; the per-step
truth moves into the steps.
- key-cape-oidc-login: ownership ACCEPTED by key-cape, so verified moves from
asked-and-waiting to owner-confirmed. Lane stays interim -- acceptance
covers the identity half, while the fetch_command yields an OpenBao token
whose mount, role mapping and enforcement are not key-cape's.
Two tests pinned `key-cape-oidc-login` to sitting `asked-and-waiting`, so
answering the question broke them -- they failed on good news. Both now
assert the property instead: an unverified blocker is stale regardless of
date, over whatever lanes are in that state.
Verifying the routing answer against our own front door turned up a defect:
`warden plan` returns `autonomous` for a custody *write* and answers it with
read transports, because it has no read-versus-mutate intent. Recorded as
WARDEN-WP-0038 (proposed) -- the WP-0033-T06 shape, as a class this time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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T04 was the last open task, waiting on key-cape to accept or refuse ownership of
the coding-agent OpenBao issuance identity. They accepted, in KEY-WP-0009-T03,
on 2026-08-23: codex-railiance-platform is published in their
config/service-clients.example.yaml with subject service:codex:railiance-platform,
role coding-agent, scope openbao:login, 15m lifetime, and the service-auth
semantics in docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md. The split is the one we
routed for — KeyCape issues, railiance-platform binds the OpenBao role, OpenBao
enforces, no secret value in either repo.
We found it by reading their repository. KEY-WP-0009-T04 records replying to
ops-warden; the inbox has zero messages from key-cape, read or unread. The task
sat `wait` on an answer that already existed.
That is T05's own lesson arriving on T04: a blocker is a claim about the world at
a date. So the same pass re-verified the two lanes pointing at key-cape against
their source instead of bumping dates:
- rapp-qonto-keycape-client -> verified: source-read. KEY-WP-0009-T02 did add
bounded service-auth, but that is client_credentials JWT issuance for OpenBao
machine login and does not front this client_secret_basic exchange or its
rotation. Blocker stands, now with evidence rather than memory.
- key-cape-oidc-login -> asked of key-cape today, which the entry had recorded
as still outstanding since 2026-08-21.
Also cleared the inbox that hid this: 9 stale unread, all superseded by shipped
work, with late closes sent to secrets-engine and llm-connect on the two threads
that had asked ops-warden something and never got an answer.
391 tests pass, ruff clean, boundary coverage 0 uncovered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The 90-day --stale-days default on `warden route gaps` was not a loose threshold,
it was an inert one: the delegation register was created 2026-08-15, so it could
not have fired before November. It was inherited from the catalog pointer cadence
and applied to a claim with a completely different half-life.
Two changes. DEFAULT_BLOCKER_STALE_DAYS = 14 now governs interim blockers, while
DEFAULT_STALE_DAYS = 90 keeps governing pointer freshness -- "is this the right
owner and page" is quarterly, "has the owner answered" is not. 14 is calibrated
on blockers that actually cost something: ten days for the secrets-engine lanes,
one for RISK-F-0001, roughly fifty for FLEX-WP-0007.
The second change matters more. `reviewed` records when someone touched an entry,
which is indistinguishable from re-checking it -- six lanes read as freshly
reviewed today because I typed in them. `verified:` now says how the claim was
established, and asked-and-waiting explicitly does NOT count: that is the state
the secrets-engine blocker sat in for ten days while looking current. A lane in
that state is stale at zero days old, and key-cape-oidc-login proves it works.
8 of 14 interim lanes are honestly marked unverified rather than given a fresh
date they did not earn.
--fail-on-stale exits 3 for a cron or gate. No CI test on age: a date-triggered
failure breaks the build for whoever commits next instead of whoever owns the
blocker. The CI test is structural -- every interim lane must record how it was
verified -- so it fails on the commit that introduces the omission.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three fixes, the first of which is my own botched edit from an hour ago.
1. The "six delivery modes" claim was never actually removed. I ran a str.replace
with no assertion on the result, it matched nothing, and the print said "ok".
The wrong claim sat in all seven lanes while I told secrets-engine it was
fixed. This edit asserts 5/1/1 and fails loudly otherwise.
2. Five lanes ACCEPTED (SECRETS-WP-0006, decision ae676382). The blocker now
records that secrets-engine holds the entry and that the interim proxy retires
on approved native verification in T05 -- not on acceptance. Retiring early
would drop the cover before the replacement is proven.
3. Two lanes REFUSED, and both refusals are right:
- key-cape-oidc-login: intended_owner corrected secrets-engine -> key-cape.
Login and identity-token issuance were never secrets-engine's. Not yet asked
of key-cape, and the record says so.
- openbao-api-key: not a delegable lane at all -- a <domain>/<workload>/<bundle>
routing template, not one secret lane, so there is no front door to own.
interim -> native with railiance-platform named: OpenBao is itself the front
door and this entry is a pointer to it, never an interim cover. It should
not have been inflating the interim count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
secrets-engine reviewed our catalog metadata while drafting their five entries
and graded issue-core-ingestion-api-key and reuse-surface-hub-write-token high.
We had both as standard, and had deliberately regraded them DOWN on 2026-08-19.
They are right. Both paths carry a second credential our grade never looked at --
GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN (CCR-2026-0002, a deliberate field-set decision) and a
dual-consumer webhook HMAC (CCR-2026-0005). Neither is recovered by rotating the
credential the lane is named after.
The defect is structural: we graded the lane by its headline field, but a read
returns every field at the path. Worse, the evidence was already in the CCRs we
cite as authoritative -- not missing, unread -- and a test asserted the wrong
answer, so a correct first-pass grade got overruled by it.
ADR-0008 records the rule: a grade covers every field its path discloses.
ADR-0007 is unchanged and still governs; this says what the grade is of.
Six of the remaining standard lanes have no KV path. Two have paths and no field
evidence; per ADR-0008 they are stated as unknown rather than assumed, and left
for operator-sanctioned grading.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The blocker asked whether `secrets-engine exec --catalog` generalizes over
arbitrary OpenBao lanes. Asked 2026-08-11, chased 08-15, never answered. Rather
than chase a third time, read their code.
It generalizes by construction: catalog.py takes mount and path as plain fields,
`kv` is a general kind, and six delivery modes are supported. What exists is two
catalog entries -- warden-sign and whynot-design-npm-publish -- which are exactly
the two lanes this register already marks native.
So the blocker was misframed for ten days. Not "can the engine do this" but "who
authors the entries and who operates them", which is smaller and had never been
put to them. Register now says that, and ops-warden has offered to author all
seven entries against their schema for them to accept or reject.
Applying the rule this repo already had and missed twice this week: re-read a
blocker before trusting it. A blocker is a claim about the world at a date.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
issue-core asked us to drop a CoulombCore/port-18765 bridge topology from
activity-core-issue-sink. That topology was never in this repo — the only address
the playbook carried was a local-dev 127.0.0.1:8765 example. What was actually
stale was step 5, which still told workers to coordinate with railiance-platform
"when the canonical path ships"; it shipped 2026-07-02 and the lane is active.
So: point at issue-core's SCOPE.md for the production address rather than
restating it here (ADR-0001), state plainly that no bridge or forwarded port is
involved so the next reader does not re-derive the retired topology, and route
step 5 through warden route / warden rotate-guide instead of a read.
WP-0032-T01 closes as done. What was owed was inputs, not a design, and
ZONE-WP-0001-T02 is done carrying all of them — including the two that were
corrections to ops-warden's own claims (organization_posture, refused by
net-kingdom; and the workload join key, which this repo wrongly said did not
exist anywhere).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the RISK-F-0003 exposure. All 14 ungraded lanes now carry an explicit
risk grade with its justification in the entry: 17 high, 10 standard, 0
ungraded. The agent read-boundary now fires (exit 7) on lanes that were silently
outside it.
Graded on merit rather than defensively. A first pass marked two ordinary
internal workload secrets high; test_high_risk_lanes_classified asserted the
opposite and was right, so both were regraded down. high means disclosure into a
logged context is damaging beyond what rotation recovers. inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh
is high conservatively, with the reason in the entry so it is regraded with
evidence rather than assumed down.
ADR-0007 records the rule the grading rests on: build-stage permissiveness
applies to controls that gate work, not to controls that prevent credential
disclosure. The test is friction, not severity — the read-boundary blocks nobody,
since --out/--exec/--wrap remain available, so relaxing it buys nothing. A
blocked operation is recovered by retrying; a credential in a logged transcript
is not recovered by rotation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five rules that governed this repo lived in wiki prose, a workplan, and a
comment at the top of catalog.yaml. All were followed; none was addressable.
A reader outside ops-warden could not cite one, could not tell whether it was
current, and — the point of this change — could not tell whether it was ours
to change or someone else's that we merely obey.
ADR-0001 The routing catalog is a pointer layer, never a second copy
ADR-0002 ops-warden is a transparent conduit, never a secret broker
ADR-0003 Cover gaps, but never silently own them
ADR-0004 High-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions
ADR-0005 Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else
Each carries owner: ops-warden, which is the load-bearing field. It says we
follow the rule AND we are responsible for changing it — by superseding ADR,
never an in-place edit. The failure this prevents runs both ways: a rule we own
mistaken for inherited canon never gets fixed, because we wait for an owner who
does not exist; inherited canon mistaken for ours gets quietly bent, and the
drift is invisible until it breaks a repo that trusted the canonical version.
Rules we follow but do not own — NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the
credential-management standard, the-custodian's ADR-001 workplan convention —
are cited, never copied into docs/adr/. Copying them would recreate exactly the
second-source-of-truth failure ADR-0001 exists to prevent. architecture.md also
now flags the three-digit/four-digit ADR-001 vs ADR-0001 collision, which is
itself an ours-versus-inherited confusion waiting to happen.
Publication verified rather than assumed: all five render through policy-nexus
tools/render.py, and owner reaches the reader in three places — the page eyebrow
(render.py:346), the index Owner column (build_site.py:123,137), and the
publication manifest. build_site.py:179 makes title/status/owner required, so
ownership cannot be dropped on the way out. policy-nexus publishes and never
writes back; docs/adr/ stays the source of truth.
Documentation adapted: SCOPE.md gains a Governing rules section and an orientation
entry; .claude/rules/architecture.md replaced its stub with the ADR index, the
owned-versus-inherited rule, and ADR-over-wiki precedence; finding-routing.md's
ADR-gap section closed; catalog.yaml's no-double-source header now cites ADR-0001
rather than the originating workplan.
uv run pytest -q → 338 passed, 4 deselected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inbox triage (ADHOC-2026-08-17), three messages, all answered and marked read.
flex-auth (FLEX-WP-0015 T02) reported that /v1/check and /v1/batch_check
authenticate no caller — any workload with cluster reach can assert any subject
and get an authoritative allow. It lands here because ops-warden owns workload
identity in this estate and its pre-sign gate is a flex-auth PEP.
Recommendation recorded in wiki/NetKingdomSecurityMap.md: Kubernetes
ServiceAccount TokenReview with a projected, audience-scoped token. Rejected the
shared-secret header — it manufactures a risk: high lane with a rotation owner
per caller on the authorization path, the exact interim-proxy debt WP-0030
exists to stop growing. Deferred mTLS pending an owner for a workload X.509 CA.
Bind `system` to the authenticated SA at auth time, but keep the resource-type
allowlist in the policy package rather than the admission layer. Warn-only
rollout; policy.enabled must not flip while /v1/check answers unauthenticated
callers. Recorded as a pattern, not a catalog entry.
Catalog delegation refreshes:
- coulomb-social-runtime-env: USER_ENGINE_PROXY_SECRET ownership settled
(decision 8fe22037, USER-WP-0021) — intended_owner stays railiance-apps,
answered clause dropped from blocked_on, consumers: [user-engine] recorded.
- rapp-qonto-keycape-client: blocked_on no longer implies an in-flight
KEY-WP-0008 dependency; the key-cape-native exchange command is unopened work.
uv run pytest -q → 338 passed, 4 deselected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every execution position is now explicit. Catalog entries carry
delegation.mode (permanent / native / interim) with intended owner and
blocker. warden route gaps lists the interim set. Promotion requires
the ownership question. Doctrine lives in AccessRouting.md; the
register was published to the named owner repos.
The catalog pointed at wiki/CredentialRouting.md#credential-routing-catalog,
which does not exist; the live heading is "Routing catalog index". Restores
tests/test_routing.py to 61/61.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
