railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0040-keycape-factor-credential-custody.md

---
id: RPF-WP-0040
type: workplan
title: "Establish KeyCape factor credential custody and renewal"
domain: financials
repo: railiance-platform
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: financials
created: "2026-09-13"
updated: "2026-09-13"
state_hub_workstream_id: "fa606195-422d-5121-be63-38192380b1eb"
---

User authorized establishing custody/delivery on 2026-09-13 and offered attended administrative authentication. Supports USER-WP-0030-T03 and KEY-WP-0035-T02. Existing incident lanes are not silently repurposed.

## Establish exact-path custody and workload delivery metadata

```task
id: RPF-WP-0040-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3faba86f-795b-5140-a1ed-87ce0c3c1616"
```

New KV v2 path platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read, field TOKEN, provider expiry metadata. Reader role binds only sso/keycape-factor-eso, audience openbao, exact-path read policy and fifteen-minute OpenBao tokens. Attended admin metadata apply, exact readback and capability checks. No wildcard secret access or secret value in output.

## Provision a bounded provider identity and renewable credential

```task
id: RPF-WP-0040-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "04cf9de8-0306-595f-af3a-bfa9046a25ea"
```

Create dedicated privacyIDEA keycape-factor-reader with coulomb tokenlist permission. Preserve existing admin rights; baseline has no admin policies. Store renewable issuer credential separately from the delivered JWT. Use protected stdin and in-memory handling, provider-issued JWT with expiry, positive cross-user scope and negative admin policy-read checks. No personal admin password in runtime.

## Activate and verify renewal and consumer delivery

```task
id: RPF-WP-0040-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b60dc6dc-628b-5ffa-9e5c-e897365cd90f"
```

Deliver via namespace-scoped ESO, activate KeyCape adminTokenFile with byte-preserving config CAS, schedule renewal before expiry and verify mounted reload and native scope. Predecessor expiry/revocation and recovery drills remain T04. Verify effective scope and real factor acceptance before optional client policy. Preserve existing incident residuals in NK-WP-0033.

Live implementation and evidence: docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md.
Fourteen offline tests pass; native renewal, exact-path ESO delivery, negative
scope checks, provider per-user lookup and mounted rotation passed. KeyCape
rolled out Ready 1/1 without changing MFA policy or signing/client secrets.

## Verify provider expiry and revocation recovery

```task
id: RPF-WP-0040-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c7803984-e96d-5503-9214-6dc2a1a84fbe"
```

Exercise genuine JWT expiry, provider-side permission withdrawal and recovery
with an isolated fixture, preserving real users' factors and admin access.
Verify rejected predecessor handling independently of OpenBao token revocation.
Include provider interruption/retry evidence and maintain visible failed-Job /
ExternalSecret failure signals. This is remaining acceptance, not another owner
handoff. Historical resolver incident NK-WP-0033 remains separately open.


2026-09-13 T04 completed: KeyCape installed-provider isolated Job
`provider-p05-contract-01` passed genuine provider JWT expiry, fresh-session
recovery, continued expired-predecessor denial and actual permission withdrawal /
recovery. Existing Go tests cover provider interruption, missing credential and
mounted replacement recovery with no stale fallback. Native proof
`keycape-factor-proof-91ea82cd` passed all eight scope/rotation/revocation checks;
renewal `keycape-factor-rotate-91ea82cd` succeeded. CronJob retains three failed
Jobs; ExternalSecret reports Ready/SecretSynced. Full receipts and test boundaries
are recorded in user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-09-13-p05-service-operations.md.

Residual ownership: historical resolver incident remains the existing live
NK-WP-0033; client policy/optional onboarding is live KEY-WP-0035 and
USER-WP-0030-T03/P06. No residual is parked only in this completion note. Renewal
is not predecessor revocation: the fixture independently proves expired JWTs
stay denied after a new session is issued. Production credentials/factors were
not deliberately revoked to simulate outage.