railiance-platform/workplans/RPF-WP-0040-keycape-factor-credential-custody.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
RPF-WP-0040	workplan	Establish KeyCape factor credential custody and renewal	financials	railiance-platform	finished	codex	financials	2026-09-13	2026-09-13	fa606195-422d-5121-be63-38192380b1eb

User authorized establishing custody/delivery on 2026-09-13 and offered attended administrative authentication. Supports USER-WP-0030-T03 and KEY-WP-0035-T02. Existing incident lanes are not silently repurposed.

Establish exact-path custody and workload delivery metadata

id: RPF-WP-0040-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3faba86f-795b-5140-a1ed-87ce0c3c1616"

New KV v2 path platform/workloads/net-kingdom/keycape-factor-read, field TOKEN, provider expiry metadata. Reader role binds only sso/keycape-factor-eso, audience openbao, exact-path read policy and fifteen-minute OpenBao tokens. Attended admin metadata apply, exact readback and capability checks. No wildcard secret access or secret value in output.

Provision a bounded provider identity and renewable credential

id: RPF-WP-0040-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "04cf9de8-0306-595f-af3a-bfa9046a25ea"

Create dedicated privacyIDEA keycape-factor-reader with coulomb tokenlist permission. Preserve existing admin rights; baseline has no admin policies. Store renewable issuer credential separately from the delivered JWT. Use protected stdin and in-memory handling, provider-issued JWT with expiry, positive cross-user scope and negative admin policy-read checks. No personal admin password in runtime.

Activate and verify renewal and consumer delivery

id: RPF-WP-0040-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b60dc6dc-628b-5ffa-9e5c-e897365cd90f"

Deliver via namespace-scoped ESO, activate KeyCape adminTokenFile with byte-preserving config CAS, schedule renewal before expiry and verify mounted reload and native scope. Predecessor expiry/revocation and recovery drills remain T04. Verify effective scope and real factor acceptance before optional client policy. Preserve existing incident residuals in NK-WP-0033.

Live implementation and evidence: docs/evidence/2026-09-13-keycape-factor-custody.md. Fourteen offline tests pass; native renewal, exact-path ESO delivery, negative scope checks, provider per-user lookup and mounted rotation passed. KeyCape rolled out Ready 1/1 without changing MFA policy or signing/client secrets.

Verify provider expiry and revocation recovery

id: RPF-WP-0040-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c7803984-e96d-5503-9214-6dc2a1a84fbe"

Exercise genuine JWT expiry, provider-side permission withdrawal and recovery with an isolated fixture, preserving real users' factors and admin access. Verify rejected predecessor handling independently of OpenBao token revocation. Include provider interruption/retry evidence and maintain visible failed-Job / ExternalSecret failure signals. This is remaining acceptance, not another owner handoff. Historical resolver incident NK-WP-0033 remains separately open.

2026-09-13 T04 completed: KeyCape installed-provider isolated Job provider-p05-contract-01 passed genuine provider JWT expiry, fresh-session recovery, continued expired-predecessor denial and actual permission withdrawal / recovery. Existing Go tests cover provider interruption, missing credential and mounted replacement recovery with no stale fallback. Native proof keycape-factor-proof-91ea82cd passed all eight scope/rotation/revocation checks; renewal keycape-factor-rotate-91ea82cd succeeded. CronJob retains three failed Jobs; ExternalSecret reports Ready/SecretSynced. Full receipts and test boundaries are recorded in user-engine/docs/evidence/2026-09-13-p05-service-operations.md.

Residual ownership: historical resolver incident remains the existing live NK-WP-0033; client policy/optional onboarding is live KEY-WP-0035 and USER-WP-0030-T03/P06. No residual is parked only in this completion note. Renewal is not predecessor revocation: the fixture independently proves expired JWTs stay denied after a new session is issued. Production credentials/factors were not deliberately revoked to simulate outage.