Operator ruling: no external determination in build mode, but keep the
set of legal policies for reuse when a work context needs one in place.
docs/regulatory/policies/ catalogues thirteen, keyed by activation
condition rather than by regime, with a retrieval table so a context
pulls a slice: first real user account pulls six of them; a
consumer-facing product in Germany pulls those plus accessibility. Two
are already active and nobody had noticed — commercial and tax retention,
and the e-invoicing receiving obligation that has been live since 2025
with no named owner in the estate. Four written in full; the rest carry
their trigger now and get their text when a context approaches, which is
the point.
RISK-POL-0011 is the argument for the whole catalogue: accessibility
cannot be retrofitted cheaply, so a policy retrieved at launch is a
rebuild while one read at design time is just a constraint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adopting a rule is nobody's finding; neither is registering a canon kind
or publishing a document. Each obligation that lived outside the
mechanism was invisible to it. RISK-WP-0001 now carries both of its
custodian waits, and the escalation-rule one has the register's most
uncomfortable default pointed inward: unadopted by 2026-09-17 means
recorded as de facto in force but unratified, said on the face of every
escalation sent under it. A draft that quietly governs is exactly what
this register exists to notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Workplan status blocked rather than active: the only remaining task is a
custodian decision, and calling that 'active' would be the register
claiming progress it is not making.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T02 applies the dependency rule to this repo's own work: rather than wait
on audit-core's co-residency horizon, RISK-REG-0001 now states target
periods per category with the reasoning — 12 months for operator and
agent security records, 3 years to year-end for counterparty transaction
evidence, 8 years for accounting vouchers (shortened by BEG IV, flagged
as worth confirming), 10 years for books, 6 for commercial letters,
delete for anything with no ground. Targets, not achievements: the estate
cannot demonstrate any of them while the real horizon is the maximum
across every co-resident on platform-pg, and that gap is stated so the
table cannot be read as a compliance claim.
T03 writes the intake route from what audit-core did correctly without
one: the question as a question, what already depends on it, what becomes
expensive if the answer is no, and what you are not asking for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator ruled both. Findings publish as the file a reader gets —
including RISK-F-0001's record that this register graded it critical
while its fix notice sat unread. A summary would be a second document per
finding kept in sync by hand, and drift is the failure this repo most
distrusts; and a published register containing only other repos' defects
reads as an accusation, while one containing its own reads as a record.
Method docs public except escalation, which is restricted because it
names spend thresholds and describes when the operator personally is
interrupted — a map of where attention is scarce, needed by nobody
judging a finding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Written now rather than at the first lift, because publication arrives in
a trickle and a route improvised each time is one that eventually is not
taken. Also settles a T01 input: policy-nexus publishes a file from the
source repo, so whole-versus-summary is a question about what a finding
file contains, not about rendering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous commit shipped the activity definitions but a script error
left the workplan file unedited, so the task states are recorded here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T02 inbox check, wired into make check and verified against the actual
2026-08-19 failure — replayed at that moment it surfaces all three
messages that were already waiting. T03 sweeps the rest of the
quietly-tolerated class: bad dates, cadence off the ladder, undefined
disclosure states, dangling constraint_on and related refs, embargoes
without conditions, escalations without triggers. T04 requests
verification of user-engine's tenant boundary — the first walk down the
on-request path, chosen as a consumer not already known to fail it. T05
established by trying what this register can verify: cluster yes, OpenBao
403. T06 puts regulatory records on the findings ladder.
T01 stays in progress: the procedure, make due and make checked exist,
but arming something that runs them on schedule is a standing compute
commitment and the operator's to make.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cluster reads work from this host; OpenBao returns 403, the same wall
ops-warden hit. So the register can check what the cluster admits and
cannot check what the secret store permits, and every grade touching an
OpenBao policy is a grade on a document. That asymmetry is recorded
rather than closed: a risk register holding production secret-store
access would have traded a verification problem for a worse one.
RISK-V-0001 is the first verification. It confirms RISK-F-0001's ingress
claim against the live cluster — the first grade here standing on
evidence this repo gathered — contradicts the 'egress: []' claim, which
live shows as 443/6443 to anywhere, and surfaces a third policy created
the day of the fix whose Ingress policyType carries no rules, which bears
on whether enabling ops-warden's gate would fail closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Publication handover (two findings ready, three tasks, one of which is a
paragraph); regulatory intake as a working remit rather than one record,
carrying RISK-REG-0001's open items; and running the register, where
every task traces to something that actually went wrong in week one —
grading before reading the inbox, a status the tooling did not know, an
id collision, two gradings resting on file comparison because a token
expired, and an on-request path nobody has walked.
All three are status: proposed. The custodian decides which become active
and in what order.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T01, T02, T04-T08 done. T03 stays in progress: the escalation rule is
written and proposed, and it is not adopted until the custodian rules on
it — an unadopted rule is worse than an unwritten one because it looks
like coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
work-record-types_v0.1 pins workplan ids to ^[A-Z]+-WP-[0-9]{4}$ and tasks
to that plus -TNN; a hyphenated RISK-NEXUS prefix trips the sidetrack
detector. RISK-WP also matches the register's existing RISK-F finding
prefix. Renamed before the workplan was indexed anywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The three open findings all leave severity, disclosure and escalation
unset, correctly: those are this repo's to set and the instruments to set
them with do not exist yet. The workplan writes the severity scale, the
disclosure states (re-taking the deferral with RISK-F-0001 in hand), the
escalation rule INTENT.md says is unwritten, and the review/expiry rule —
then grades the three findings and rules on what is waiting outside the
register.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
