risk-nexus/findings/RISK-F-0010-embedded-backup-webdav-credential.md

id	type	title	status	owner	reported_by	reported_via	routed_by	date_reported	date_filed	system	environment	fix_owner	fix_tracking	closure_condition	verification	severity	severity_at_production	impact	likelihood	fidelity_modifier	production_rescore	disclosure	publication	publication_id	publication_path	publication_subtitle	revision	embargo_was_condition	embargo_lifted	embargo_was_since	date_fixed	escalation	last_checked	next_check	cadence	clean_streak	graded_by	ruling	checked_by
RISK-F-0010	finding	Forgejo backup source embeds a WebDAV credential default	fixed	risk-nexus	railiance-platform	railiance-platform	risk-nexus	2026-08-23	2026-08-23	railiance-platform	production	railiance-platform	RPF-WP-0029-T02 (done 2026-09-15)	provider invalidation plus governed ciphertext upload and restore receipts; source fallback removal alone does not lift the embargo	RISK-V-0003	low	low	I2	L2	false	false	public	pending-handover	risk-f-0010-embedded-backup-webdav-credential	findings/embedded-backup-webdav-credential/v1/index.html	A backup script carried a literal file-drop credential default; the default is gone, the share is invalidated, and governed upload and restore are proven.	fixed-1	the provider credential is revoked or invalidated and the literal source default is removed	2026-09-22 — literal default removed (observed) and predecessor share invalidated (owner attestation, no probe by design)	2026-09-01	2026-09-15	none	2026-09-22T06:01:01Z	2026-09-22T07:01:01Z	1h	1	risk-nexus	RISK-RULING-2026-09-22-A	worsch

RISK-F-0010 — Forgejo backup source embeds a WebDAV credential default

What is true, as reported

railiance-platform/tools/cmd/forgejo-backup line 13 assigns a literal default to RAILIANCE_BACKUP_NC_TOKEN. The credential value is deliberately omitted from this finding, along with any fingerprint, length, or copy.

The literal is in repository history and can be recovered by anyone with access to affected clones or history. It was also surfaced in captured agent command output during an attended review on 2026-08-23, which expands the set of places that must be treated as potentially exposed.

The value was not used in that operation and its current validity was not tested. The configured Nextcloud endpoint was independently observed to be a write-only file drop: metadata listing and reads were denied while the approved OpenBao-sourced credential could upload ciphertext. Therefore, the established risk is an embedded credential and possible unauthorized write or storage injection if it remains live; read access to existing backups is not established. The age recovery private key is separate and was not found in the script.

How it was found

Found by source inspection while selecting the approved encrypted off-host snapshot lane for preparation-only scenario WARDEN-WP-0027-T02-DRILL-20260822-01. No attempt was made to authenticate with or probe the embedded value.

Suggested direction

Suggestion, owned by railiance-platform:

1. Revoke and regenerate the Nextcloud file-drop credential at the provider.
2. Write the replacement only to the governed OpenBao lane platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane through a mode-0600 input file, then securely remove the input.
3. Remove the source-code default so backup execution fails closed unless the value arrives through OpenBao or an explicit sanctioned environment.
4. Review reachable Git history, CI and agent logs, and clones under the applicable retention policy; do not reproduce the credential while doing so.
5. Verify a ciphertext upload and restore after rotation, then clear any exposure taint only with evidence.

Risk Nexus owns severity, disclosure, escalation, and review cadence. This report intentionally does not assign them.

Register ruling — 2026-09-01

low (I2 × L2), embargoed, no escalation.

I2: limited to one backup lane on the facts established. If the embedded value remains valid, it can authorize an ungoverned write or storage injection at the Nextcloud file-drop endpoint. Metadata listing and reads were denied, backup content is ciphertext, and the age recovery private key is separate. Nothing here establishes disclosure of an existing backup or estate-wide credential reach.

L2: recoverable through access the estate does grant. The value is in Git history and appeared in captured agent output, so a repository clone or retained log is a sufficient foothold. Current validity is unknown and is not tested by this register; unknown is not treated as either live or revoked.

Embargoed. While the source default remains and validity is unresolved, publishing that a recoverable provider credential exists materially shortens the path beyond reading the private repository. The hold lifts only when revocation or invalidation and removal of the literal are both observable. The credential value, fingerprint, and shape remain excluded from every record and message.

No escalation. There is no evidence of a read, loss, real-person data exposure, legal notification duty, new spend, ownership dispute, or a stalled remediation yet. Railiance Platform owns both the source and provider action. Silence defaults on 2026-09-15 to the existing grade and a recorded stall; it does not soften the assessment.

Reasoning: docs/rulings/2026-09-01-inbox-sweep.md.

Source remediation reconciled — 2026-09-05

RPF-WP-0029-T01 records source fallback removal and fail-closed input checks. This register confirmed the named fallback is absent in the current script without displaying or testing any credential. RPF-WP-0029-T02 remains wait for provider invalidation and governed encrypted upload/restore receipts.

RISK-V-0003 records the boundary: source removal does not establish invalidation of the predecessor. Open, low, embargoed and no escalation remain appropriate on the available evidence. The 2026-09-15 review/default is unchanged. The historical source-default statements above describe the earlier assessments.

Closure ruling — 2026-09-22

Fixed; embargo lifted; no escalation. All four closure legs are evidenced: the source default is removed, governed ciphertext upload and restore have receipts (2026-09-06), and the predecessor share was invalidated on 2026-09-15. The invalidation rests on owner attestation because probing it would mean reconstructing the credential. Age-key taint is outside this finding and has been referred to railiance-platform. Reasoning: docs/rulings/2026-09-22-f0010-closure.md.

Reviews

• 2026-09-01 — graded from the filed report and a redacted current-source check. The literal default remains; no fix record was found. Cadence starts at instant.
• 2026-09-02 — clean check: literal source default remains; no fix tracking; embargo and 2026-09-15 wait unchanged. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-09-02 09:11Z.
• 2026-09-05 — not clean: Confirmed source fallback removal and RPF-WP-0029 tracking; provider invalidation and encrypted upload/restore receipts remain pending. Low grade and embargo retained; see RISK-V-0003. Cadence 1h → instant; checked again immediately.
• 2026-09-22 — clean check: Closed under RISK-RULING-2026-09-22-A: source default absent, upload/restore receipts, predecessor share invalidated by owner attestation; embargo lifted. Cadence instant → 1h (1 clean in a row); next check 2026-09-22 07:01Z.