fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce
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The live proof in 03c0569 showed validate_decision_envelope rejecting every
real allow. The evaluator normalizes before hashing -- the request tenant is
copied onto subject and resource, and a registry hit copies type, tenant and
selected attributes onto the refs -- so binding.request_digest covers
material we never sent. Byte-equality against our unenriched request was
unsatisfiable, not merely mismatched.

THE RULE WAS ALREADY PUBLISHED. flex-auth's canonical-request-digest.md
section "Normalization" states the enrichment and tells consumers what to do
instead: compare structured binding fields to the proposed action, treat
request_digest as the evaluator's statement of what it hashed, and recompute
independently over the tuple the binding carries. I raised this with them as
an unpublished gap and asked them to pick between three shapes; it was in
their contract already and the answer was the first of the three. Nothing
was blocked on them, and this follows the published rule rather than one I
inferred.

- _require_binding_corresponds: everything we proposed must survive
  unchanged -- tenant, action, context, subject.id/type,
  resource.id/type/system, and every attribute we sent.
- Enrichment may add only type, tenant, attributes. Any other added field is
  refused, and an enriched tenant must be the request tenant, so a
  cross-tenant binding cannot arrive wearing our request's clothes.
- request_digest is still verified, now against binding_tuple(binding) for
  self-consistency rather than against material we never sent.
- The envelope's top-level subject/resource get the same rule; they are
  enriched too.

Proved against the artifact: the real decision:0f9c98f14545c42d now
validates, and the unrefreshed envelope is refused on lifetime -- reaching
the lifetime check at all is the evidence the binding checks pass on a real
decision. Negatives cover a restated resource.attributes.stage, a foreign
subject.tenant, and an unexpected enrichment field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
parent 03c0569820
commit 10baad914e
6 changed files with 283 additions and 62 deletions

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@ -76,21 +76,40 @@ v1 shipped and was deployed with no `input.tenant` rule at all; a `rotate` under
change is visible in the version string, and this engine refuses a v1 decision
outright. See `docs/tenant-alignment.md`.
## Known gap: the digest join does not hold against a real request
## The digest join, and why it is not a digest comparison
Proved live on 2026-09-07 and **not yet fixed**; the engine currently rejects
every real allow, which is fail-closed and therefore safe to leave standing
while the rule is published.
Proved live on 2026-09-07, fixed the same day.
The evaluator enriches the request from its registry before hashing — `subject`
gains `attributes` and `tenant`, `resource` gains `tenant` — so
`binding.request_digest` is a digest of material we did not send and cannot
reproduce. `validate_decision_envelope` compares the binding against our
unenriched request and fails with *"decision binding does not match request"*.
The evaluator normalizes before hashing: the request tenant is copied onto
`subject` and `resource`, and a registry hit copies `type`, `tenant` and
selected `attributes` onto the refs. So `binding.request_digest` is over
material we did not send and cannot reproduce, and the validator's original
byte-equality check against our unenriched request rejected every real allow.
Which fields the evaluator may enrich is flex-auth's contract to publish, not
ours to infer. Guessing it would mean accepting a binding that differs from what
we proposed in some way we decided was benign — the same fail-open shape as a
guessed digest exclusion or a guessed vocabulary mapping. Raised with flex-auth;
staying fail-closed and naming the missing rule is the correct posture until
they answer.
flex-auth's `canonical-request-digest.md` already published the consumer rule,
and the fix follows it rather than inventing one:
> A consumer that re-hashes the **original** unenriched request will not match a
> decision that turned on registry attributes. Compare structured `binding`
> fields to the proposed action, and treat `request_digest` as the evaluator's
> statement of what it hashed. To recompute independently, hash the same
> normalized tuple the binding carries.
`validate_decision_envelope` now does exactly that:
- **Structured correspondence.** Everything we proposed — tenant, action,
context, `subject.id`/`type`, `resource.id`/`type`/`system` and every
attribute we sent — must survive unchanged in the binding.
- **Enrichment only where the contract permits it.** A ref may gain `type`,
`tenant` and `attributes`; any other added field is refused. An enriched
`tenant` must be the request's tenant, so a cross-tenant binding cannot arrive
wearing our request's clothes.
- **Digest self-consistency.** `request_digest` is recomputed over the
normalized tuple the binding carries, per the contract's own instruction. It
is still checked — just for coherence of the binding rather than against
material we never sent.
The lesson worth keeping: the replay fixtures could not catch this, because
`_request_from()` rebuilds the request from the binding, so the tests hashed the
evaluator's output and compared it to the evaluator's output. Only a real
request through this access path exposed it.

View file

@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ alone.
port-forward` plus a bounded `TokenRequest` token; see
`docs/pdp-access-path.md`. Adopted and enforced in
`decision_check.require_supported_pdp_address`.
- The evaluator's **enrichment rule**: `binding` carries registry-enriched
`subject.attributes`, `subject.tenant` and `resource.tenant` that we did not
send, so the digest join fails against a real request. flex-auth's to publish.
- ~~The evaluator's enrichment rule~~**already published** in flex-auth's
`canonical-request-digest.md` ("Normalization"), and now implemented. See
`docs/pdp-access-path.md`.
## Hazard: the Service DNS name resolves here, to the wrong host