Headless multi-application, multi-tenant secrets mangement engine.
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fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce
The live proof in 03c0569 showed validate_decision_envelope rejecting every
real allow. The evaluator normalizes before hashing -- the request tenant is
copied onto subject and resource, and a registry hit copies type, tenant and
selected attributes onto the refs -- so binding.request_digest covers
material we never sent. Byte-equality against our unenriched request was
unsatisfiable, not merely mismatched.

THE RULE WAS ALREADY PUBLISHED. flex-auth's canonical-request-digest.md
section "Normalization" states the enrichment and tells consumers what to do
instead: compare structured binding fields to the proposed action, treat
request_digest as the evaluator's statement of what it hashed, and recompute
independently over the tuple the binding carries. I raised this with them as
an unpublished gap and asked them to pick between three shapes; it was in
their contract already and the answer was the first of the three. Nothing
was blocked on them, and this follows the published rule rather than one I
inferred.

- _require_binding_corresponds: everything we proposed must survive
  unchanged -- tenant, action, context, subject.id/type,
  resource.id/type/system, and every attribute we sent.
- Enrichment may add only type, tenant, attributes. Any other added field is
  refused, and an enriched tenant must be the request tenant, so a
  cross-tenant binding cannot arrive wearing our request's clothes.
- request_digest is still verified, now against binding_tuple(binding) for
  self-consistency rather than against material we never sent.
- The envelope's top-level subject/resource get the same rule; they are
  enriched too.

Proved against the artifact: the real decision:0f9c98f14545c42d now
validates, and the unrefreshed envelope is refused on lifetime -- reaching
the lifetime check at all is the evidence the binding checks pass on a real
decision. Negatives cover a restated resource.attributes.stage, a foreign
subject.tenant, and an unexpected enrichment field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
.claude/rules Declare Engine/Lifecycle against security layer model v0.7 2026-08-29 11:57:47 +02:00
.decisions Document scope alignment and warden-sign readiness 2026-06-30 00:52:05 +02:00
.forgejo/workflows Add Forgejo CI smoke workflow (enablement template) 2026-07-08 12:37:57 +02:00
catalog docs: record whynot-design lane pointer discrepancy from ops-warden 2026-09-06 00:46:02 +02:00
docs fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce 2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
history Declare Engine/Lifecycle against security layer model v0.7 2026-08-29 11:57:47 +02:00
intakes chore(registrar): assign State Hub identifiers 2026-08-29 12:00:51 +02:00
policies Harden secret provisioning and lifecycle controls 2026-08-23 12:05:58 +02:00
registry Initial commit 2026-06-28 09:03:37 +00:00
scripts Implement SECRETS-WP-0008 unblocked layer-model obligations 2026-08-29 12:52:55 +02:00
src/secrets_engine fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce 2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
tests fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce 2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
workplans fix: compare structured binding fields, not a digest we cannot reproduce 2026-09-07 09:04:57 +02:00
.custodian-brief.md chore(consistency): sync task status from DB [auto] 2026-09-06 22:36:34 +02:00
.gitignore Ignore local repo-manager index 2026-08-29 11:59:33 +02:00
.repo-classification.yaml feat(mvp): working secrets-engine CLI for the whynot-design npm publish lane 2026-06-28 12:28:45 +02:00
AGENTS.md Declare Engine/Lifecycle against security layer model v0.7 2026-08-29 11:57:47 +02:00
CLAUDE.md Regenerate agent instructions from state-hub templates (CUST-WP-0055 T01) 2026-07-08 14:50:36 +02:00
evidence-classification.yaml Add native rotate and persistent lane overlay states 2026-09-02 13:09:10 +02:00
INTENT.md Implement GH-DEC-2026-003 consume-before-OpenBao PEP gate 2026-09-02 01:06:50 +02:00
layer.yaml Add native rotate and persistent lane overlay states 2026-09-02 13:09:10 +02:00
LICENSE Adopt Target Revenue Source License V1C1 (org-wide preliminary rollout) 2026-07-30 01:04:47 +02:00
pep-stance.yaml Implement SECRETS-WP-0008 unblocked layer-model obligations 2026-08-29 12:52:55 +02:00
ProductRequirementsDocument.md Add value-safe verification and audit reporting 2026-08-23 12:33:38 +02:00
pyproject.toml feat(mvp): working secrets-engine CLI for the whynot-design npm publish lane 2026-06-28 12:28:45 +02:00
README.md Prepare WP-0006 first-lane native cutover packet 2026-09-03 23:36:42 +02:00
SCOPE.md Add native rotate and persistent lane overlay states 2026-09-02 13:09:10 +02:00
uv.lock Document scope alignment and warden-sign readiness 2026-06-30 00:52:05 +02:00
WORK-RECORDS.md docs: index Glas native credential delivery workplan 2026-09-06 00:30:10 +02:00

secrets-engine

Headless, multi-application, multi-tenant secrets workflow and automation layer for approved secret custody, delivery, and lifecycle work across build, test, and production stages.

Layer: Engine / Lifecycle under the accepted NetKingdom Security Layer Model (layer.yaml). OpenBao remains the custody and enforcement backend. secrets-engine is the deterministic API over it: catalog, decision consumption, plan/apply, guarded provisioning, verification, delivery, evidence, lifecycle metadata, and native-access deactivation. It does not render authorization decisions. Local evidence can be inspected through an allowlisted per-lane audit summary without exposing record detail.

Start Here

Core Direction

The MVP proves the whynot-design-npm-publish lane end to end:

  1. describe the lane in a non-secret catalog (catalog/);
  2. verify an approved decision (State Hub or local fixture);
  3. apply OpenBao policy/auth metadata through a stage-aware role;
  4. provision and verify the value without printing it;
  5. run a workload command through safe exec-time delivery.

Target command shape:

secrets-engine exec --catalog whynot-design-npm-publish -- npm publish

Quickstart

uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
source .venv/bin/activate
secrets-engine catalog list

# Run the whole pilot chain live against a throwaway OpenBao dev server:
SECRETS_ENGINE_HUB_URL="" bash scripts/demo-e2e.sh

The implementation is a Python package (src/secrets_engine/). OpenBao is reached only through the bao CLI adapter (openbao.py); the rest of the code speaks in lanes and guarded plans.

Security Rules

  • Do not put raw secret values in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, issue comments, workplans, or normal logs.
  • OpenBao is the backend custody and audit authority.
  • Build, test, and production have separate policy boundaries.
  • Production live actions fail closed until the durable State Hub action-authorization endpoint is available; local approval mirrors are throwaway-demo material only.
  • A privileged production OpenBao call also requires a successful approval-engine CAS consume first. Conflict or unavailability means do not write.
  • Temporary bootstrap OpenBao credentials must live outside repos, use mode 0600, be revocable, and be removed after narrower auth is working.