fix: send the tenant the policy package scopes us to, and adopt v2

build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads

  known_tenant   := "tenant:platform"
  request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "")

so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant
first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been
denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match
no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the
same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other
direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it.

Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of
assuming the values lined up.

- REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a
  package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production.
- An empty tenant is refused at build time.
- Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed
  open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed
  package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open
  correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1
  decision is refused.
- Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas
  asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else
  and that a deny legally carries no lifetime.

docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds
them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is
tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is
either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and
picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape
GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as
they are, deliberately not unified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-06 22:32:54 +02:00
parent c44306b1b2
commit 80eafafe5b
8 changed files with 418 additions and 27 deletions

View file

@ -19,8 +19,24 @@ Re-copied 2026-09-06 (twice, both upstream regenerations):
**not**, which is the property the fixture now demonstrates rather than
asserts.
`decision_rotate.json` is unchanged and carries no `approval_binding_digest`
the field is omitted on claim-free decisions rather than duplicated onto them.
3. commit `d98323b` published **v2**, which adds the `input.tenant` rule v1
never had, and a third fixture: `decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json`. The
request digests did **not** move — every allow fixture already carried
`tenant: tenant:platform` — but `provenance.policy_version` is now `v2` and
`policy_package_digest` moved to `sha256:bd11c5fe…`.
`decision_rotate.json` carries no `approval_binding_digest` — the field is
omitted on claim-free decisions rather than duplicated onto them, and a test
pins that omission.
`decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json` is an `effect: deny` envelope and carries no
`lifetime`, which is legal: the schema requires `lifetime` only for an allow.
It is the wrong-tenant denial evidence `GLAS-WP-0015` asked for. Do not
lifetime-refresh it in tests.
**v1 must not be pinned.** It had no tenant rule and failed open; flex-auth
superseded rather than amended it so the change is visible in the version
string. See `docs/tenant-alignment.md`.
**Pinned here** (stable across runs, per the upstream README):
`binding.request_digest`, `binding.approval_binding_digest`,

View file

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
{
"id": "decision:44a40c339a020772",
"id": "decision:4e327202e2aee41c",
"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
"request_id": "check:secrets-engine-destroy",
"effect": "allow",
"reason": "catalog_lane_policy_matched",
"matched_policy_version": "v1",
"matched_policy_version": "v2",
"matched_rule": "catalog_lane_policy_matched",
"resource": {
"id": "lane:glas-primary",
@ -105,8 +105,8 @@
"lifetime": {
"kind": "ttl",
"ttl": "15m",
"not_before": "2026-09-06T12:51:16Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T13:06:16Z"
"not_before": "2026-09-06T18:35:19Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T18:50:19Z"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "destroy",
@ -120,13 +120,13 @@
"evaluator": "flex-auth/local",
"mode": "standalone",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_version": "v1",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:fe0070b79f66442ae6c218697a49c470c6c8f670aa57a30c078a5284d097bd8c",
"policy_version": "v2",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4",
"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb",
"input_claim_digests": {
"context": "sha256:8b73d29ecef286d42e03d2420531d6c45219f325a7ae004c1ecfc781203a2800"
},
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T12:51:16Z"
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:19Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",

View file

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
{
"id": "decision:49309356905a2ad3",
"id": "decision:414734bb30381ff7",
"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
"request_id": "check:secrets-engine-rotate",
"effect": "allow",
"reason": "catalog_lane_policy_matched",
"matched_policy_version": "v1",
"matched_policy_version": "v2",
"matched_rule": "catalog_lane_policy_matched",
"resource": {
"id": "lane:glas-primary",
@ -74,8 +74,8 @@
"lifetime": {
"kind": "ttl",
"ttl": "15m",
"not_before": "2026-09-06T06:13:21Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T06:28:21Z"
"not_before": "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T18:50:18Z"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "rotate",
@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
"evaluator": "flex-auth/local",
"mode": "standalone",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_version": "v1",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:fe0070b79f66442ae6c218697a49c470c6c8f670aa57a30c078a5284d097bd8c",
"policy_version": "v2",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4",
"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb",
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T06:13:21Z"
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",

View file

@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
{
"id": "decision:7d56b7fc274ddfd6",
"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
"request_id": "check:secrets-engine-wrong-tenant",
"effect": "deny",
"reason": "wrong_tenant",
"matched_policy_version": "v2",
"matched_rule": "wrong_tenant",
"resource": {
"id": "lane:glas-primary",
"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
"system": "secrets-engine",
"tenant": "tenant:coulomb",
"attributes": {
"auth_targets": [],
"fields": [
"password"
],
"policy_targets": [],
"stage": "prod"
}
},
"subject": {
"id": "secrets-engine",
"type": "service",
"tenant": "tenant:platform",
"attributes": {
"description": "secrets-engine's own service identity, the single calling identity for the twelve gated catalog-lane actions it sends to POST /v1/check. Because it is the only subject, the package has no action_not_granted branch (FLEX-WP-0021-T02); registering a second identity is the revisit trigger.",
"display_name": "secrets-engine service principal",
"groups": [
"group:secrets-engine-lane-operators"
],
"organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
"roles": [
"Operator"
]
}
},
"binding": {
"tenant": "tenant:coulomb",
"subject": {
"id": "secrets-engine",
"type": "service",
"tenant": "tenant:platform",
"attributes": {
"description": "secrets-engine's own service identity, the single calling identity for the twelve gated catalog-lane actions it sends to POST /v1/check. Because it is the only subject, the package has no action_not_granted branch (FLEX-WP-0021-T02); registering a second identity is the revisit trigger.",
"display_name": "secrets-engine service principal",
"groups": [
"group:secrets-engine-lane-operators"
],
"organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
"roles": [
"Operator"
]
}
},
"action": "rotate",
"resource": {
"id": "lane:glas-primary",
"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
"system": "secrets-engine",
"tenant": "tenant:coulomb",
"attributes": {
"auth_targets": [],
"fields": [
"password"
],
"policy_targets": [],
"stage": "prod"
}
},
"request_digest": "sha256:c9c6e6f8713266e9e95ae1443a395a3a1f965ba95469dea747645f0437bb0d20"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "rotate",
"matched_relationship": "",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_status": "ready",
"registry_resource": false,
"registry_subject": true
},
"provenance": {
"evaluator": "flex-auth/local",
"mode": "standalone",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_version": "v2",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4",
"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb",
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:20Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",
"conformance_findings": [
{
"code": "CARING-DESCRIPTOR-MISSING",
"severity": "warning",
"message": "no CARING descriptor matched the request",
"fields": [
"caring_context"
]
}
]
}
}

View file

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ def _envelope(request=None):
"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
"binding": {
"tenant": request["tenant"],
"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
"action": request["action"],
"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ def _envelope(request=None):
"evaluator": "flex-auth/secrets-engine",
"mode": "cluster-local",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_version": "v1",
"policy_version": "v2",
},
}
@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ def _validate(envelope, expected=None):
envelope,
expected or _request(),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ def test_state_hub_authority_is_no_longer_required():
"request digest does not match"),
(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_package="other.package"),
"policy package is not accepted"),
(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_version="v2"),
(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_version="v1"),
"policy version is not accepted"),
(lambda d: d.update(contract_version="flex-auth.decision-record.v2"),
"contract version"),
@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ def test_unaccepted_policy_pin_is_required():
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="package/version is required"):
validate_decision_envelope(
_envelope(), _request(),
accepted_policy_packages=set(), accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_packages=set(), accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)

View file

@ -16,8 +16,13 @@ from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from types import SimpleNamespace
from secrets_engine.authorization import (
REQUEST_TENANT,
approval_binding_digest,
build_action_request,
digest_material,
digest_material,
request_digest,
validate_decision_envelope,
@ -26,7 +31,7 @@ from secrets_engine.errors import DecisionError
FIXTURES = Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "flex-auth-replay"
PACKAGE_DIGEST = "sha256:fe0070b79f66442ae6c218697a49c470c6c8f670aa57a30c078a5284d097bd8c"
PACKAGE_DIGEST = "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4"
SNAPSHOT_DIGEST = "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb"
CASES = {
@ -116,7 +121,7 @@ def test_real_envelope_validates_against_the_published_package(name):
envelope,
_request_from(envelope),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
assert result.action == CASES[name]["action"]
assert result.subject_id == "secrets-engine"
@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ def test_expired_real_envelope_fails_closed():
envelope,
_request_from(envelope),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
@ -264,7 +269,7 @@ def test_decision_validation_ties_the_claim_to_the_approval_binding_digest():
envelope,
request,
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
expected_approval_binding_digest=APPROVAL_BINDING_DIGEST,
)
assert result.action == "destroy"
@ -274,7 +279,7 @@ def test_decision_validation_ties_the_claim_to_the_approval_binding_digest():
envelope,
request,
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
expected_approval_binding_digest="sha256:" + "c" * 64,
)
@ -293,7 +298,7 @@ def test_claim_bearing_request_without_a_binding_digest_fails_closed():
envelope,
request,
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
expected_approval_binding_digest=APPROVAL_BINDING_DIGEST,
)
@ -308,5 +313,119 @@ def test_a_forged_binding_digest_is_recomputed_not_trusted():
envelope,
request,
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
# --- tenant scoping (v2) -----------------------------------------------------
#
# GLAS-WP-0015 asked for the exact CheckRequest tenant and wrong-tenant denial
# evidence. These are that evidence, taken from a real deny envelope rather than
# asserted, plus the pin that stops our request tenant drifting from the package
# it is scoped by.
WRONG_TENANT_FIXTURE = "decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json"
def test_our_request_tenant_is_the_package_known_tenant():
"""The tenant we send must be the one the package allows.
v2 reads request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") and allows only
known_tenant := "tenant:platform". Pinning our constant against the real
allow envelopes means a package retenanting shows up here rather than as a
wrong_tenant denial in production.
"""
for name in ("rotate", "destroy"):
assert _envelope(name)["binding"]["tenant"] == REQUEST_TENANT
def test_built_request_carries_the_tenant_and_hashes_it():
"""An absent tenant is a denial, not an ignored field, so it must be sent.
tenant is part of the digest material, so omitting it also produces a digest
that matches no correctly issued decision -- the same class of defect as
hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other direction.
"""
entry = SimpleNamespace(id="glas-primary", stage="prod")
request = build_action_request(
entry,
"rotate",
subject_id="secrets-engine",
subject_type="service",
purpose="rotate-exposed-key",
fields=["password"],
)
assert request["tenant"] == REQUEST_TENANT
assert "tenant" in digest_material(request)
untenanted = dict(request)
del untenanted["tenant"]
assert request_digest(untenanted) != request_digest(request)
def test_build_action_request_refuses_an_empty_tenant():
entry = SimpleNamespace(id="glas-primary", stage="prod")
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="requires a tenant"):
build_action_request(
entry,
"rotate",
subject_id="secrets-engine",
subject_type="service",
purpose="rotate-exposed-key",
tenant="",
)
def test_wrong_tenant_deny_envelope_fails_closed():
"""Wrong-tenant denial evidence, from a real v2 deny envelope.
flex-auth sent tenant:coulomb on an otherwise-valid rotate and the package
denied it with matched_rule wrong_tenant, so the tenant alone carried the
denial. Our consumer must refuse it on effect before anything else -- a deny
is not a decision we may act on, whatever else it validates.
"""
# Not lifetime-refreshed: a deny carries no lifetime at all, which is the
# property test_wrong_tenant_deny_carries_no_lifetime pins.
envelope = json.loads((FIXTURES / WRONG_TENANT_FIXTURE).read_text())
assert envelope["effect"] == "deny"
assert envelope["reason"] == "wrong_tenant"
assert envelope["matched_rule"] == "wrong_tenant"
assert envelope["binding"]["tenant"] == "tenant:coulomb"
assert envelope["binding"]["tenant"] != REQUEST_TENANT
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="effect is not allow"):
validate_decision_envelope(
envelope,
_request_from(envelope),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
def test_wrong_tenant_deny_carries_no_lifetime():
"""A deny has no lifetime, which is why effect must be checked first.
DecisionEnvelope requires lifetime only when effect is allow. A consumer
that validated lifetime before effect would raise a confusing missing-field
error on a perfectly well-formed denial.
"""
envelope = json.loads((FIXTURES / WRONG_TENANT_FIXTURE).read_text())
assert envelope.get("lifetime") is None
def test_the_superseded_v1_package_is_not_accepted():
"""v1 had no tenant rule and failed open; pinning it must not be possible.
A consumer still pinned to v1 would keep getting allows it should never
have had and could not tell from the version string that the rule changed
underneath it, which is exactly why flex-auth superseded v1 rather than
amending it.
"""
envelope = _refresh_lifetime(_envelope("rotate"))
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="policy version is not accepted"):
validate_decision_envelope(
envelope,
_request_from(envelope),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v1"},
)