Headless multi-application, multi-tenant secrets mangement engine.
tegwick
80eafafe5b
build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads known_tenant := "tenant:platform" request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it. Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of assuming the values lined up. - REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production. - An empty tenant is refused at build time. - Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1 decision is refused. - Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else and that a deny legally carries no lifetime. docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as they are, deliberately not unified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092 |
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|---|---|---|
| .claude/rules | ||
| .decisions | ||
| .forgejo/workflows | ||
| catalog | ||
| docs | ||
| history | ||
| intakes | ||
| policies | ||
| registry | ||
| scripts | ||
| src/secrets_engine | ||
| tests | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| evidence-classification.yaml | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| layer.yaml | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| pep-stance.yaml | ||
| ProductRequirementsDocument.md | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| uv.lock | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
secrets-engine
Headless, multi-application, multi-tenant secrets workflow and automation layer for approved secret custody, delivery, and lifecycle work across build, test, and production stages.
Layer: Engine / Lifecycle under the accepted NetKingdom Security Layer
Model (layer.yaml). OpenBao remains the custody and enforcement backend.
secrets-engine is the deterministic API over it: catalog, decision
consumption, plan/apply, guarded provisioning, verification, delivery,
evidence, lifecycle metadata, and native-access deactivation. It does not
render authorization decisions. Local evidence can be inspected through an
allowlisted per-lane audit summary without exposing record detail.
Start Here
- INTENT.md - why this repository exists, including the Engine / Lifecycle declaration.
- layer.yaml - machine-readable layer declaration and proposed surfaces.
- ProductRequirementsDocument.md - product requirements and MVP scope.
- NetKingdom security infrastructure boundary pointer
- points to the canonical document in
net-kingdom/docs/, covering responsibilities and interactions with OpenBao, flex-auth, user-engine, ops-warden, ops-bridge, info-tech-canon, State Hub, and agents.
- points to the canonical document in
- Bootstrap MVP workplan - first implementation plan after State Hub bootstrap.
Core Direction
The MVP proves the whynot-design-npm-publish lane end to end:
- describe the lane in a non-secret catalog (
catalog/); - verify an approved decision (State Hub or local fixture);
- apply OpenBao policy/auth metadata through a stage-aware role;
- provision and verify the value without printing it;
- run a workload command through safe exec-time delivery.
Target command shape:
secrets-engine exec --catalog whynot-design-npm-publish -- npm publish
Quickstart
uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
source .venv/bin/activate
secrets-engine catalog list
# Run the whole pilot chain live against a throwaway OpenBao dev server:
SECRETS_ENGINE_HUB_URL="" bash scripts/demo-e2e.sh
- CLI reference: docs/cli.md
- Publication-scope policy (maturity → token scope): docs/publication-scope-policy.md
- Stage roles & bootstrap tokens: docs/openbao-stage-roles.md
- warden-sign auth-capability lane: docs/warden-sign-auth-capability.md
- whynot-design real publish closeout: docs/whynot-design-real-publish-closeout.md
- ops-warden routing contract: docs/ops-warden-routing-contract.md
- Hardening backlog (exit bootstrap mode): docs/hardening-backlog.md
- Existing-lane catalog admission: docs/catalog-admission.md
- Native lane cutover (WP-0006 T05/T06): docs/native-lane-cutover.md
- KeyCape service-auth consumer boundary: docs/service-auth.md
- Approval consume-before-OpenBao (GH-DEC-2026-003): docs/approval-consumption.md
- OpenBao JWT login contract (engine consumer): docs/openbao-jwt-login.md
- Secret-use evidence surface: docs/secret-use-evidence-contract.md
The implementation is a Python package (src/secrets_engine/). OpenBao is
reached only through the bao CLI adapter (openbao.py); the rest of the code
speaks in lanes and guarded plans.
Security Rules
- Do not put raw secret values in Git, State Hub, chat, prompts, issue comments, workplans, or normal logs.
- OpenBao is the backend custody and audit authority.
- Build, test, and production have separate policy boundaries.
- Production live actions fail closed until the durable State Hub action-authorization endpoint is available; local approval mirrors are throwaway-demo material only.
- A privileged production OpenBao call also requires a successful approval-engine CAS consume first. Conflict or unavailability means do not write.
- Temporary bootstrap OpenBao credentials must live outside repos, use mode 0600, be revocable, and be removed after narrower auth is working.