secrets-engine/tests/test_action_authorization.py
tegwick 80eafafe5b fix: send the tenant the policy package scopes us to, and adopt v2
build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads

  known_tenant   := "tenant:platform"
  request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "")

so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant
first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been
denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match
no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the
same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other
direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it.

Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of
assuming the values lined up.

- REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a
  package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production.
- An empty tenant is refused at build time.
- Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed
  open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed
  package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open
  correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1
  decision is refused.
- Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas
  asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else
  and that a deny legally carries no lifetime.

docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds
them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is
tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is
either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and
picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape
GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as
they are, deliberately not unified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
2026-09-06 22:32:54 +02:00

195 lines
7.2 KiB
Python

"""flex-auth DecisionEnvelope consumer (step 2 of GH-DEC-2026-003).
The ActionAuthorization envelope these tests used to cover is deferred and was
never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006); the approval fact moved to
tests/test_approval_claim.py. The canonical request digest is unchanged and its
contract test below is preserved verbatim -- flex-auth confirmed only the
envelope went away, not the digest join.
"""
import copy
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import pytest
from secrets_engine.authorization import (
build_action_request,
request_digest,
validate_decision_envelope,
)
from secrets_engine.catalog import validate_entry
from secrets_engine.errors import DecisionError
from tests.test_catalog import VALID
def _request():
entry = validate_entry(copy.deepcopy(VALID))
return build_action_request(
entry,
"deactivate",
subject_id="user:alice",
subject_type="Human",
purpose="contract-test",
fields=["api_token"],
policy_targets=[entry.policy_name],
auth_targets=[entry.role_name],
request_id="check:test-lane-deactivate",
)
def _envelope(request=None):
"""A flex-auth DecisionEnvelope shaped by schemas/decision_envelope.schema.json."""
request = request or _request()
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
return {
"id": "decision:test-lane-deactivate",
"contract_version": "flex-auth.decision-record.v1",
"request_id": request["id"],
"effect": "allow",
"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
"binding": {
"tenant": request["tenant"],
"subject": copy.deepcopy(request["subject"]),
"action": request["action"],
"resource": copy.deepcopy(request["resource"]),
"context": copy.deepcopy(request["context"]),
"request_digest": request_digest(request),
},
"lifetime": {
"kind": "bounded",
"not_before": (now - timedelta(minutes=1)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
"expires_at": (now + timedelta(minutes=10)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
},
"provenance": {
"evaluator": "flex-auth/secrets-engine",
"mode": "cluster-local",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_version": "v2",
},
}
def _validate(envelope, expected=None):
return validate_decision_envelope(
envelope,
expected or _request(),
accepted_policy_packages={"secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle"},
accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
def test_digest_is_stable_and_ignores_correlation_fields():
"""The pinned digest contract now lives in tests/test_decision_replay.py.
That file verifies against two real DecisionEnvelopes issued by the
published package. The constant previously pinned here was computed with
the request `id` inside the hashed material, which
docs/canonical-request-digest.md excludes -- it matched no issued decision.
Kept here: the structural property, checked without a hand-maintained pin.
"""
request = {
"id": "check:secrets-engine-destroy-example",
"subject": {"id": "user:alice", "type": "Human"},
"action": "destroy",
"resource": {
"id": "catalog:example-build-test-token",
"type": "secret-catalog-lane",
"system": "secrets-engine",
"attributes": {
"stage": "build",
"fields": ["token"],
"policy_targets": [],
"auth_targets": [],
},
},
"context": {"purpose": "contract-test"},
}
baseline = request_digest(request)
assert baseline.startswith("sha256:") and len(baseline) == 71
assert request_digest({k: v for k, v in request.items() if k != "id"}) == baseline
assert request_digest({**request, "action": "deactivate"}) != baseline
def test_valid_allow_envelope_passes():
result = _validate(_envelope())
assert result.decision_id == "decision:test-lane-deactivate"
assert result.action == "deactivate"
assert result.subject_id == "user:alice"
def test_state_hub_authority_is_no_longer_required():
"""GH-DEC-2026-005: State Hub holds no runtime approval authority.
A correctly issued record naming any other authority (or none) must pass;
the old AUTHORITY constant failed closed against every real record.
"""
env = _envelope()
env["provenance"]["authority"] = "approval-engine"
assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"
env["provenance"].pop("authority")
assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("mutation", "match"),
[
(lambda d: d.update(effect="deny"), "effect is not allow"),
(lambda d: d.update(effect="audit_only"), "effect is not allow"),
(lambda d: d["binding"].update(action="destroy"), "binding does not match"),
(lambda d: d["binding"].update(request_digest="sha256:" + "0" * 64),
"request digest does not match"),
(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_package="other.package"),
"policy package is not accepted"),
(lambda d: d["provenance"].update(policy_version="v1"),
"policy version is not accepted"),
(lambda d: d.update(contract_version="flex-auth.decision-record.v2"),
"contract version"),
(lambda d: d["subject"].update(id="user:mallory"), "subject does not match"),
],
)
def test_invalid_envelopes_fail_closed(mutation, match):
env = _envelope()
mutation(env)
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match=match):
_validate(env)
def test_expired_lifetime_fails_closed():
env = _envelope()
past = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=1)
env["lifetime"]["expires_at"] = past.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="lifetime has expired"):
_validate(env)
def test_lifetime_not_yet_started_fails_closed():
env = _envelope()
future = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=5)
env["lifetime"]["not_before"] = future.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="has not started"):
_validate(env)
def test_unaccepted_policy_pin_is_required():
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="package/version is required"):
validate_decision_envelope(
_envelope(), _request(),
accepted_policy_packages=set(), accepted_policy_versions={"v2"},
)
def test_unsorted_or_duplicate_target_sets_are_rejected():
request = _request()
request["resource"]["attributes"]["policy_targets"] = ["b", "a"]
with pytest.raises(DecisionError, match="sorted and unique"):
_validate(_envelope(), request)
def test_approval_fact_is_not_rechecked_here():
"""GH-DEC-2026-005: a PIP must not republish the PDP's decision, and the
decision layer must not restate the approval fact. Consumption, supersession
and approver counts belong to the claim; adding them here would fail closed
against a valid envelope that simply does not carry them."""
env = _envelope()
assert "approvals" not in env and "status" not in env
assert _validate(env).action == "deactivate"