build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads
known_tenant := "tenant:platform"
request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "")
so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant
first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been
denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match
no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the
same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other
direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it.
Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of
assuming the values lined up.
- REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a
package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production.
- An empty tenant is refused at build time.
- Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed
open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed
package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open
correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1
decision is refused.
- Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas
asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else
and that a deny legally carries no lifetime.
docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds
them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is
tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is
either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and
picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape
GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as
they are, deliberately not unified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij
Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
Verified the digest join against flex-auth's T03 replay fixtures and found
request_digest was hashing fields docs/canonical-request-digest.md excludes.
The material is tenant, subject, action, resource, context only: id is
correlation, policy_version lives in provenance, caring_context is hashed
separately. This engine included all three when present.
Because the join adopts the served request id, every real production request
would have carried one, so the computed digest would have matched no issued
decision and failed closed against every correct allow. Same unsatisfiable
shape as the removed AUTHORITY constant.
The old pinned constant was computed with the id inside the material, so it
was wrong and its passing proved nothing. Replaced with fixture-driven tests
over two real envelopes (vendored with provenance) plus a structural test
that correlation fields do not move the digest. Both fixtures are needed:
input_claim_digests.context appears only with a non-empty context.
Also stops computing the native claim digest. The claim's binding.action and
binding.target speak approval-engine's vocabulary while ours speaks the
catalog's, and no mapping is published; flex-auth makes no cross-check and
states the correspondence is ours via pdp_digest. A claim recording no
pdp_digest now fails closed naming the missing mapping rather than comparing
two different languages. That mapping is a prerequisite for destroy.
274 tests pass. Production still fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD
Assistant: claude-code
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Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
gate-house resolved APPROVAL-IN-0002. Two changes fell to this repo.
1. Split validate_action_authorization. The claim from approval-engine now
carries the approval fact (issuer, valid_now, consumption, binding digest,
freshness, reason_code) via approval_claim.validate_approval_claim; the
flex-auth DecisionEnvelope carries the decision (effect, binding match,
request digest, lifetime, policy pin) via validate_decision_envelope.
ActionAuthorization is deferred and never ratified (FLEX-DEC-2026-006) and
cannot be served from a step-1 call; nothing validates it now.
2. Dropped AUTHORITY = "state-hub" and the provenance.authority requirement.
State Hub is a read model with no runtime approval authority, so the check
failed closed against every correctly issued record. flex-auth traced the
constant to their own fixture and fixed it at source.
Two consequences recorded rather than buried: there are now two distinct
digests over the same action (approval-engine native over
{action,actor,principal,purpose,target}, and the flex-auth CheckRequest
digest) which are never compared to each other; and the distinct-approver
threshold is no longer checked here, since the claim exposes no approver
entries and approval-engine folds it into valid_now.
The canonical request digest is unchanged and its contract test is preserved
verbatim. Production still fails closed. 251 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M65ovP3eiiPHubibvWs9mD
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 393550@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 4bb359f9-1f12-4410-9e76-079cf23c82e4
