The anonymous JWT login inherited BAO_TOKEN/VAULT_TOKEN and the bao CLI
token helper, so it presented an env/operator token alongside the JWT.
Run that login with no env token and a token helper that returns none,
proven against the real bao CLI. This closes secrets-engine's part of the
CCR-2026-0038 no-fallback check.
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SCOPE, layer.yaml and the custody doc said the platform JWT role was
unpublished. The role is applied, its consumer contract is published
(railiance-platform 21b8af3) and login was proven on 2026-10-10. The role
is login-only, so engine actions still use the named providers.
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Record the founder-run probe-openbao result as non-secret evidence,
finish SECRETS-WP-0012 and point SECRETS-WP-0008-T06 at the remaining
platform negative checks.
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Closes the FLEX-WP-0020-T11 residual: a relative ../flex-auth checkout
path that the absolute-path survey missed.
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The platform JWT mount/role is live, so the only remaining step is the
founder's attended probe. Document the local non-secret login contract
input the probe needs, since the CCR publishes its own copy only after
the proof passes.
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bao.coulomb.social was retired on 2026-09-15. The in-memory source accepts a
loopback address.
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Founder direction 2026-10-06 and ops-mason plan
keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-client-custody (658cdbc): no workstation copy.
service-jwt now gets CLIENT_SECRET from platform/workloads/keycape/
secrets-engine-openbao through one attended OIDC login on
keycape-secrets-engine-openbao-operator-workload-kv-read (-no-store, token from
a pipe, header-only GET, unconditional revoke-self). The consumer file is
refused for this profile and kept for the approval client.
service-auth probe-openbao prints value-free first-use evidence.
SECRETS-WP-0012: T02 cancelled (D1-D4 superseded), T04 done, T03 is the
founder-run first live use. Synthetic tests only; 524 passed, 1 skipped.
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Adds the consumer custody packet for KEY-WP-0037-T02 / RPF-WP-0035-T02,
strict value-free client-secret file checks with a check-secret-file CLI,
synthetic tests, and SECRETS-WP-0012 tracking founder decisions and the
attended delivery as needs_human wait tasks.
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A configured exec owner may receive fields from other consenting kv lanes.
Each lane is gated, consumed and read through its own AppRole; any refusal
starts no child. Companions are part of the owner digest.
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ops-warden and railiance-platform asked, independently, which OpenBao location
`secrets-engine exec --catalog whynot-design-npm-publish` reads. Answered from
this repository's own code and catalog with no OpenBao read and no value.
It reads `secret/coulomb/whynot-design/npm/publish` — the legacy, ungoverned
duplicate. `_fetch_value` concatenates the catalog's `mount` and `path` with no
override or fallback, so the proven pilot published from the duplicate and the
lowercase `npm_token` field is the field there. ops-warden's front door names
this repository as exec_owner, so it currently routes callers at a path no CCR
covers.
Recorded in SECRETS-WP-0006 with what a move to the governed lane requires, and
flagged that the duplicate must not be destroyed until the lane moves. Whether
the two locations hold the same value is a value comparison and is not answered
here.
Also records GH-DEC-2026-017 against SECRETS-WP-0008: INTENT.md governs, the
sidecar is derived, the vocabulary is case-insensitive so nothing is re-spelled,
and standard_version comes out of layer.yaml once ops-warden updates the
reference form this repository copied.
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The live proof in 03c0569 showed validate_decision_envelope rejecting every
real allow. The evaluator normalizes before hashing -- the request tenant is
copied onto subject and resource, and a registry hit copies type, tenant and
selected attributes onto the refs -- so binding.request_digest covers
material we never sent. Byte-equality against our unenriched request was
unsatisfiable, not merely mismatched.
THE RULE WAS ALREADY PUBLISHED. flex-auth's canonical-request-digest.md
section "Normalization" states the enrichment and tells consumers what to do
instead: compare structured binding fields to the proposed action, treat
request_digest as the evaluator's statement of what it hashed, and recompute
independently over the tuple the binding carries. I raised this with them as
an unpublished gap and asked them to pick between three shapes; it was in
their contract already and the answer was the first of the three. Nothing
was blocked on them, and this follows the published rule rather than one I
inferred.
- _require_binding_corresponds: everything we proposed must survive
unchanged -- tenant, action, context, subject.id/type,
resource.id/type/system, and every attribute we sent.
- Enrichment may add only type, tenant, attributes. Any other added field is
refused, and an enriched tenant must be the request tenant, so a
cross-tenant binding cannot arrive wearing our request's clothes.
- request_digest is still verified, now against binding_tuple(binding) for
self-consistency rather than against material we never sent.
- The envelope's top-level subject/resource get the same rule; they are
enriched too.
Proved against the artifact: the real decision:0f9c98f14545c42d now
validates, and the unrefreshed envelope is refused on lifetime -- reaching
the lifetime check at all is the evidence the binding checks pass on a real
decision. Negatives cover a restated resource.attributes.stage, a foreign
subject.tenant, and an unexpected enrichment field.
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