build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads known_tenant := "tenant:platform" request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it. Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of assuming the values lined up. - REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production. - An empty tenant is refused at build time. - Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1 decision is refused. - Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else and that a deny legally carries no lifetime. docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as they are, deliberately not unified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
2.6 KiB
flex-auth T03 replay fixtures
Copied verbatim from flex-auth/examples/secrets-engine/replay/ (commit
9e10d1c, FLEX-WP-0021-T03). Real DecisionEnvelopes emitted by the
published secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 package via
go run ./cmd/flex-auth check, from flex-auth/local in standalone mode.
Vendored so the digest contract test is hermetic. Regenerate upstream and re-copy if the contract version changes.
Re-copied 2026-09-06 (twice, both upstream regenerations):
-
commit
9f3e7e3completed the approval-claim oncontext.approval. Becausecontextis hashed material, completing the claim moved the request digest. -
commit
dd3ce4c(FLEX-DEC-2026-007) publishedbinding.approval_binding_digestand set the embedded claim'sbinding.pdp_digestto it withbinding.pdp_pathtrue. The request digest moved once more with the claim's contents; the approval-binding digest did not, which is the property the fixture now demonstrates rather than asserts. -
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d98323bpublished v2, which adds theinput.tenantrule v1 never had, and a third fixture:decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json. The request digests did not move — every allow fixture already carriedtenant: tenant:platform— butprovenance.policy_versionis nowv2andpolicy_package_digestmoved tosha256:bd11c5fe….
decision_rotate.json carries no approval_binding_digest — the field is
omitted on claim-free decisions rather than duplicated onto them, and a test
pins that omission.
decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json is an effect: deny envelope and carries no
lifetime, which is legal: the schema requires lifetime only for an allow.
It is the wrong-tenant denial evidence GLAS-WP-0015 asked for. Do not
lifetime-refresh it in tests.
v1 must not be pinned. It had no tenant rule and failed open; flex-auth
superseded rather than amended it so the change is visible in the version
string. See docs/tenant-alignment.md.
Pinned here (stable across runs, per the upstream README):
binding.request_digest, binding.approval_binding_digest,
provenance.policy_package_digest, provenance.registry_snapshot_digest, and
the presence/absence of provenance.input_claim_digests.context.
approval_binding_digest is not only pinned but rederived by
test_pdp_digest_equals_the_published_approval_binding_digest: our canonical
implementation must reproduce it from the fixture's own request. A pin asserts
the constant; rederiving it proves we hash the same material flex-auth does.
Never pin: id, provenance.decision_time, lifetime.not_before,
lifetime.expires_at — all move with the clock.