tegwick
80eafafe5b
build_action_request emitted no tenant field at all. The deployed secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v2 package reads known_tenant := "tenant:platform" request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") so an absent tenant is not an ignored field, it matches the wrong_tenant first-denial branch. Every gated action this engine sent would have been denied -- and the omission also produced a request_digest that could match no correctly issued decision, since tenant is hashed material. That is the same class of defect as hashing excluded fields, arriving from the other direction, and again only a real artifact exposed it. Found by answering the GLAS-WP-0015 tenant-alignment question instead of assuming the values lined up. - REQUEST_TENANT is pinned against the vendored allow envelopes, so a package retenanting fails a test rather than denying production. - An empty tenant is refused at build time. - Accepted policy version moves v1 -> v2. v1 had no tenant rule and failed open: a rotate under tenant:coulomb returned allow against the deployed package. flex-auth superseded rather than amended it, because a fail-open correction has to be visible as a version change. A test pins that a v1 decision is refused. - Vendored decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json as the denial evidence glas asked for, with tests that we refuse it on effect before anything else and that a deny legally carries no lifetime. docs/tenant-alignment.md states the three tenant values as this repo holds them. It does not resolve the JWT/store mapping: service_auth.TENANT is tenant:coulomb, which is exactly the value the package denies. That is either two layers sharing a namespace format or one wrong constant, and picking between them without an owner ruling is the fail-open shape GH-DEC-2026-008 rejected for action vocabularies. Both constants stay as they are, deliberately not unified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E4tNMAYcSQmZWUE4wqP4ij Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715726@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 80a42b32-cba6-4b23-8be0-68819b1a6092
52 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
52 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# flex-auth T03 replay fixtures
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Copied verbatim from `flex-auth/examples/secrets-engine/replay/` (commit
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`9e10d1c`, `FLEX-WP-0021-T03`). Real `DecisionEnvelope`s emitted by the
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published `secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle` v1 package via
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`go run ./cmd/flex-auth check`, from `flex-auth/local` in `standalone` mode.
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Vendored so the digest contract test is hermetic. Regenerate upstream and
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re-copy if the contract version changes.
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Re-copied 2026-09-06 (twice, both upstream regenerations):
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1. commit `9f3e7e3` completed the approval-claim on `context.approval`. Because
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`context` is hashed material, completing the claim moved the request digest.
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2. commit `dd3ce4c` (`FLEX-DEC-2026-007`) published
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`binding.approval_binding_digest` and set the embedded claim's
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`binding.pdp_digest` to it with `binding.pdp_path` true. The request digest
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moved once more with the claim's contents; the approval-binding digest did
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**not**, which is the property the fixture now demonstrates rather than
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asserts.
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3. commit `d98323b` published **v2**, which adds the `input.tenant` rule v1
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never had, and a third fixture: `decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json`. The
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request digests did **not** move — every allow fixture already carried
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`tenant: tenant:platform` — but `provenance.policy_version` is now `v2` and
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`policy_package_digest` moved to `sha256:bd11c5fe…`.
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`decision_rotate.json` carries no `approval_binding_digest` — the field is
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omitted on claim-free decisions rather than duplicated onto them, and a test
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pins that omission.
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`decision_wrong_tenant_deny.json` is an `effect: deny` envelope and carries no
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`lifetime`, which is legal: the schema requires `lifetime` only for an allow.
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It is the wrong-tenant denial evidence `GLAS-WP-0015` asked for. Do not
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lifetime-refresh it in tests.
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**v1 must not be pinned.** It had no tenant rule and failed open; flex-auth
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superseded rather than amended it so the change is visible in the version
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string. See `docs/tenant-alignment.md`.
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**Pinned here** (stable across runs, per the upstream README):
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`binding.request_digest`, `binding.approval_binding_digest`,
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`provenance.policy_package_digest`, `provenance.registry_snapshot_digest`, and
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the presence/absence of `provenance.input_claim_digests.context`.
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`approval_binding_digest` is not only pinned but **rederived** by
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`test_pdp_digest_equals_the_published_approval_binding_digest`: our canonical
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implementation must reproduce it from the fixture's own request. A pin asserts
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the constant; rederiving it proves we hash the same material flex-auth does.
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**Never pin:** `id`, `provenance.decision_time`, `lifetime.not_before`,
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`lifetime.expires_at` — all move with the clock.
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