target-revenue/workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
TREV-WP-0005	workplan	Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research	infotech	target-revenue	finished	claude	infotech	2026-07-29	2026-07-29	456470f5-85ef-490d-ab38-06116e6bb3a8

Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research

Researches the legal feasibility of specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md's core mechanism: independent Enforcement Partners pursuing unauthorized Commercial Use in their home jurisdiction for a Contingency Share of Recovery. This is a distinct research axis from workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md: WP-0004 asks whether the License/Commercial Use Agreement's own terms (liability caps, data protection, choice of law) hold up per jurisdiction; this workplan asks whether the enforcement mechanism itself — lawyers or funders being paid a percentage of what they recover — is even legal in each jurisdiction, which is a legal-services/professional-ethics question, not a contract-enforceability question.

This workplan produces research artifacts, not final legal text or a final Contingency Share percentage. Per SCOPE.md and CONTRIBUTING.md, no output may be treated as legal advice or as resolving an open question in specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md without specialist counsel review and the same human-accept gate already applied elsewhere in this repository.

Known central risk (already flagged in the concept doc, §8): contingency fees for lawyers are banned or tightly restricted in several major jurisdictions (Germany foremost). Every jurisdiction task below must explicitly answer: (a) can a lawyer in this jurisdiction be paid a percentage of recovery directly; (b) if not, is a Litigation Funder / Local Counsel split (concept §8) a viable workaround under this jurisdiction's law; (c) what percentage or fee-structure limits apply either way.

Deliverable convention: same as WP-0004 — dated artifacts under history/, only the synthesis task (T10) proposes edits to specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md directly, gated behind human accept.

Germany and EU-wide

id: TREV-WP-0005-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "67f0be48-2e3f-464f-bb61-954e5b5b343f"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md produced. Confirmed via search: RVG §4a permits contingency fees only in three narrow gates (≤€2,000 claims, debt collection, or client-would-be-deterred), none fitting TREN's likely fact pattern well — single-role Enforcement Partner is very likely not viable in Germany, confirming concept §8's hypothesis. France (second data point) permits a fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee structure instead. EU-level litigation funding regulation is proposed (2022 EP resolution) but not yet adopted; March 2025 Commission mapping study found funding remains largely unregulated at EU level.

Research German RVG §4a's narrow conditional-fee exception in detail (exact conditions under which Erfolgshonorar is permitted); the pactum de quota litis restriction's status and any liberalization trend across major EU civil-law jurisdictions (at least France as a second data point); EU-level third-party litigation funding regulation (the 2022 European Parliament resolution/proposed directive on responsible private funding of litigation, if adopted or advanced); and practical procedural routes for pursuing unauthorized Commercial Use as copyright/ contract infringement in Germany (injunctive relief availability, typical timeline, cost-shifting "loser pays" exposure).

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md.

United States

id: TREV-WP-0005-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "def4ab73-bd64-4742-ac2a-d8f055ccec13"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md produced. Confirmed contingency fees are broadly permitted (single-role Enforcement Partner viable), subject to state-bar reasonableness rules. Surfaced a practical (not legal) precondition: contingent-fee copyright counsel generally need timely copyright registration of the Milestone Release to unlock statutory damages ($750-$30,000/work, up to $150,000 for willful infringement) and fee-shifting — otherwise cases are hard to value. Identified the Copyright Claims Board as a lower-cost venue option for smaller Enforcement Actions. Litigation funding is permitted; the live regulatory topic is disclosure, not prohibition.

Research US contingency-fee availability (broadly permitted, subject to state-bar reasonableness rules and some matter-type restrictions e.g. family law/criminal defense); state-level litigation funding disclosure and regulation trends; the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's much-reduced modern relevance; and typical US copyright/software-license infringement procedure (statutory damages availability under the Copyright Act where registration applies, injunctive relief, small-claims-adjacent options such as the Copyright Claims Board for lower-value disputes).

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md.

United Kingdom

id: TREV-WP-0005-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6bee5575-11c8-4540-9abc-2c7412bf474b"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md produced. Confirmed the Damages-Based Agreement Regulations 2013 cap fee percentages at 25% (personal injury), 35% (employment), and 50% for all other cases — the concept doc's proposed 50% Contingency Share lands exactly on this real statutory ceiling for the case category an unauthorized- Commercial-Use claim would fall into, the first jurisdiction where the original figure is precisely validated rather than arbitrary. Conditional Fee Agreements (fee-plus-uplift) are a second, more flexible option. Litigation funding is a mature, self-regulated market (ALF Code of Conduct); champerty/maintenance doctrines are largely set aside for commercial funding.

Research Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) and Damages-Based Agreements (DBAs) as the UK's structured alternative to a plain contingency fee, including their statutory caps; the UK's well-established, self-regulated third-party litigation funding market (Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct); the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's current near-abolition for funded commercial litigation; and typical UK IP/breach enforcement procedure.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md.

Latin America (Argentina anchor)

id: TREV-WP-0005-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "b40fef09-f2a4-4fb4-9743-57de96b9b30f"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md produced. Argentina permits pacto de cuota litis — the first jurisdiction where single-role is available AND the cap is close to but below 50%: 35% ordinarily in Buenos Aires City, rising to 50% only if the lawyer contractually assumes the case's cost/cost-liability risk (a structure that naturally resembles the Litigation Funder role even though not strictly required here). ~33% in other provinces, 20% in labor matters. No dedicated litigation-funding regime confirmed in this pass.

Research pacto de cuota litis availability for Argentine abogados (generally more permissive than continental Europe, often with statutory caps) and the broader Latin American pattern this represents or diverges from; local litigation-funding market maturity; and enforcement procedure for unauthorized commercial software use.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md.

India

id: TREV-WP-0005-T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "cb8ec312-4afa-4812-b5fd-5193c6c57140"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md produced. Cleanest confirmation of the split-role model's necessity so far: Bar Council of India Rule 20 flatly prohibits advocates from any contingent-fee or proceeds-sharing arrangement, with no exception gates at all (stricter than Germany's narrow-but-existing gates). Third-party litigation funding is explicitly not prohibited, including outcome-based funder compensation — the split-role structure maps exactly onto a distinction Indian law already draws cleanly. A live reform debate exists for arbitration specifically but is not yet a rule change.

Research the Bar Council of India Rules' prohibition on advocates charging contingency fees, whether a Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split (concept §8) is viable under Indian law and professional-conduct rules given that prohibition, third-party litigation funding's legal status in India (historically permitted for funders who are not the advocate themselves, subject to some uncertainty), and IP enforcement procedure.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md.

China

id: TREV-WP-0005-T06
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "e83722de-de3e-4a2b-ba8f-7f5d16ac5dae"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md produced. Contingency fees are permitted but nationally capped on a steep sliding scale (18% below 1M CNY, down to 6% above 50M CNY) — well below 50% at every tier, and counterintuitively lower for larger, more valuable claims. Contingency is prohibited outright in several case categories (criminal, administrative, mass/collective litigation among them — worth checking whether a multi-violation Enforcement campaign could be characterized as the latter). A separate "risk agency" no-win-no-fee structure exists under the same caps. Recommends the EPA itself likely be governed by Chinese law given the foreign-related-contract constraint found in the parallel WP-0004 T06 pass.

Research Chinese lawyers' contingency-fee rules (permitted in specified case types, typically capped, under Ministry of Justice regulation), litigation funding's presence and regulatory treatment in China, and the practical constraints a foreign copyright holder faces retaining local counsel and pursuing enforcement in Chinese courts — building on workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md T06's finding (if completed first) regarding foreign governing-law/venue enforceability.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md.

Africa (representative jurisdictions)

id: TREV-WP-0005-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c84f991f-34cc-42e0-acfd-4a5822a35f56"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md produced. South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 confirms single-role is available but capped at 25% (including VAT) of the capital sum, or double the attorney's normal fee if lower — a hard statutory cap well below 50%, confirmed via the Act itself, and courts have invalidated non-compliant agreements. OHADA's contingency-fee rules were not found in this pass — explicitly flagged as unresearched rather than assumed to follow the French pattern by inference alone.

Research South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 1997 (a statutory framework explicitly permitting capped contingency fees for attorneys — likely the most permissive African anchor jurisdiction) and the OHADA zone's French-derived restriction on pacte de quota litis as the civil-law anchor, consistent with the representative-jurisdiction approach used in WP-0004 T07.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md.

Asia-Pacific (beyond India and China)

id: TREV-WP-0005-T08
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "35c7f74e-f70b-4c4b-9445-03c8dde53bb7"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md produced. Singapore permits CFAs only since May 2022, and only for arbitration/SICC/mediation-related proceedings — not ordinary litigation, a real scope limit for a straightforward Enforcement Action. Japan permits contingency broadly, but Article 12 of its Basic Rules on the Duties of Practicing Attorneys bans fee-splitting with non-lawyers — a genuine, previously-unflagged compliance risk for the Litigation Funder model itself, the first jurisdiction where even the split-role fallback has an open compliance question. Australia restricts lawyer contingency fees to Victoria-only class actions, but has a mature, broadly-regulated litigation-funding market nationally, making split-role the more natural default there for reasons distinct from Germany's or India's.

Research Singapore's recent liberalization permitting Conditional Fee Agreements for certain proceedings (a change from its historical prohibition), Japan's customary success-fee arrangements under bar- association guidelines, and Australia's mature, heavily-regulated litigation funding market (a global hub for funded litigation) alongside its state-variable rules on lawyer contingency/uplift fees.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md.

Cross-cutting mechanism design

id: TREV-WP-0005-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "5ac16b53-3229-409b-8ddd-7ff9eed6c4db"

Result 2026-07-29: history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md produced. Synthesizes T01-T03 into a single Enforcement Partner Agreement template with jurisdiction-conditional role structure: single-role (Local Counsel receives Contingency Share directly — US, likely UK/France) vs. split-role (Litigation Funder receives Contingency Share, pays Local Counsel under a locally-compliant fee — Germany, likely much of continental Europe). Platform Share and the Development Credit allocation rule (concept §6) are unaffected by which structure applies — only the Contingency Share's internal routing varies. Produced a payment-flow diagram and a six-clause EPA outline. Explicitly notes the feasibility matrix is incomplete pending T04-T08.

Independent of any single jurisdiction: design the Litigation Funder / Local Counsel split-role structure (concept §8) in enough concrete detail to serve as an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline — who contracts with whom, how the Contingency Share flows from Recovery to the Funder and from the Funder (or Licensor) to Local Counsel, how standing/power-of-attorney works for a foreign Licensor engaging local counsel, and what the Enforcement Registry (Trust Service component) needs to record to keep this auditable without the Trust Service making any of the underlying legal decisions (concept §3.2, §10).

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-MechanismDesign.md.

Synthesis: feasibility matrix and concept resolution

id: TREV-WP-0005-T10
status: done
priority: high
human_accept_required: true
human_accepted_by: Bernd
human_accepted_at: "2026-07-29"
state_hub_task_id: "cdd3ca93-2ec0-4326-959b-2c88de11b41b"

Result: Synthesis produced at history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md. Human acceptance (Bernd, 2026-07-29): same alpha/beta risk-acceptance basis as TREV-WP-0004-T10 (see that task's Result). The synthesis's five proposed resolutions to specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13.5 are adopted and applied: funding source (Licensor direct), FX methodology (announcement-date rate), reimbursement of advanced financing from Recovery before Development Credit, the 18-month trailing look-back window, and tier-3 split-role collapse to a single non-contingent Local Counsel engagement by default. §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap table (12 jurisdictions/families) is applied as the authoritative reference. Japan's Article 12 fee-splitting risk is explicitly not resolved by this acceptance and remains flagged — no Enforcement Action should be pursued in Japan without specific counsel review, even during alpha/beta.

Using T01–T09, produce a consolidated feasibility matrix (one row per jurisdiction/family: direct lawyer contingency permitted? statutory cap? litigation funding regulatory status? recommended structural variant) and propose (but do not unilaterally apply) resolutions to specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §11's open questions, particularly question 2 (is 50% viable, and where) and question 5 (foreign-Licensor standing). Draft an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline (not full legal text) reflecting T09's mechanism design plus the per-jurisdiction variants this task identifies.

Human accept gate: per the policy already applied to every other candidate legal document in this repository. Agents may prepare the synthesis and proposed concept-doc edits and leave this task todo — "ready for review," not done.

Deliverable: history/<date>-TREN-Synthesis.md, plus proposed (not yet applied) edits to specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md.

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Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request), revised 2026-07-29 (same day, maintainer correction): specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §13 defines a sequential funding rule, not a "higher of two comparable numbers" calculation: (1) 50% Contingency Share where an outcome-contingent fee is lawful at that level; (2) else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful outcome-contingent cap; (3) else — where no outcome-contingent fee is lawful at all (Germany, India) — no Contingency Share, and instead a non-contingent Standard Financing Amount (renamed from "Standard Bounty Amount," precisely because a bounty paid only on success is still outcome-contingent and would not escape the prohibitions tier 3 exists to route around). The Standard Financing Amount is paid/available regardless of outcome, defaults to US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculates annually from a >10-case sample where available, is announced by 31 July, and takes effect the following 1 January. §13.0 additionally makes explicit that none of this creates any right to initiate a case — pressing charges remains exclusively the Licensor's decision; the rule only makes a ready default available once that decision is made.

This task's synthesis must additionally:

• Populate §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for all 8 researched jurisdictions/families from the T01–T08 findings (values are already in each jurisdiction's history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-*.md file and the consolidated table in specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md §8.1).
• Resolve §13.5's five open questions: funding source for the Standard Financing Amount (item 1); FX reference methodology (item 2); whether an advanced Standard Financing Amount should be reimbursed from Recovery on success (item 3, now a funding-recoupment question, no longer a legal-compliance question since the fee itself is non-contingent either way); the exact 18-month window definition (item 4); and how tier 3 interacts with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure (item 5) — or state plainly which remain open pending counsel.
• Confirm the renamed Standard Financing Amount's non-contingent framing actually holds up under India's Rule 20 ("a fee contingent on the results of litigation") and Germany's §4a: the fee/financing must not, in substance, depend on whether the case succeeds, only on whether it is brought at all — this is now a design property to verify, not an open question about the mechanism's basic viability the way the original "fixed bounty" framing left unresolved.