target-revenue/workplans/TREV-WP-0005-enforcement-network-research.md

---
id: TREV-WP-0005
type: workplan
title: "Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research"
domain: infotech
repo: target-revenue
status: finished
owner: claude
topic_slug: infotech
created: "2026-07-29"
updated: "2026-07-29"
state_hub_workstream_id: "456470f5-85ef-490d-ab38-06116e6bb3a8"
---

# Enforcement Network — legal feasibility and design research

Researches the legal feasibility of `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`'s
core mechanism: independent Enforcement Partners pursuing unauthorized
Commercial Use in their home jurisdiction for a Contingency Share of
Recovery. This is a **distinct research axis from** `workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md`:
WP-0004 asks whether the License/Commercial Use Agreement's own terms
(liability caps, data protection, choice of law) hold up per jurisdiction;
this workplan asks whether the *enforcement mechanism itself* — lawyers or
funders being paid a percentage of what they recover — is even legal in
each jurisdiction, which is a legal-services/professional-ethics question,
not a contract-enforceability question.

**This workplan produces research artifacts, not final legal text or a
final Contingency Share percentage.** Per `SCOPE.md` and `CONTRIBUTING.md`,
no output may be treated as legal advice or as resolving an open question
in `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` without specialist counsel review
and the same human-accept gate already applied elsewhere in this repository.

**Known central risk (already flagged in the concept doc, §8):**
contingency fees for lawyers are banned or tightly restricted in several
major jurisdictions (Germany foremost). Every jurisdiction task below must
explicitly answer: (a) can a lawyer in this jurisdiction be paid a
percentage of recovery directly; (b) if not, is a Litigation Funder /
Local Counsel split (concept §8) a viable workaround under this
jurisdiction's law; (c) what percentage or fee-structure limits apply
either way.

**Deliverable convention:** same as WP-0004 — dated artifacts under
`history/`, only the synthesis task (T10) proposes edits to
`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` directly, gated behind human accept.

## Germany and EU-wide

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "67f0be48-2e3f-464f-bb61-954e5b5b343f"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md` produced.
Confirmed via search: RVG §4a permits contingency fees only in three narrow
gates (≤€2,000 claims, debt collection, or client-would-be-deterred), none
fitting TREN's likely fact pattern well — single-role Enforcement Partner
is very likely not viable in Germany, confirming concept §8's hypothesis.
France (second data point) permits a fixed-fee-plus-uncapped-result-fee
structure instead. EU-level litigation funding regulation is proposed
(2022 EP resolution) but not yet adopted; March 2025 Commission mapping
study found funding remains largely unregulated at EU level.

Research German RVG §4a's narrow conditional-fee exception in detail
(exact conditions under which *Erfolgshonorar* is permitted); the
*pactum de quota litis* restriction's status and any liberalization trend
across major EU civil-law jurisdictions (at least France as a second
data point); EU-level third-party litigation funding regulation (the
2022 European Parliament resolution/proposed directive on responsible
private funding of litigation, if adopted or advanced); and practical
procedural routes for pursuing unauthorized Commercial Use as copyright/
contract infringement in Germany (injunctive relief availability, typical
timeline, cost-shifting "loser pays" exposure).

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Germany-EU.md`.

## United States

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "def4ab73-bd64-4742-ac2a-d8f055ccec13"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md` produced.
Confirmed contingency fees are broadly permitted (single-role Enforcement
Partner viable), subject to state-bar reasonableness rules. Surfaced a
practical (not legal) precondition: contingent-fee copyright counsel
generally need timely copyright registration of the Milestone Release to
unlock statutory damages ($750-$30,000/work, up to $150,000 for willful
infringement) and fee-shifting — otherwise cases are hard to value.
Identified the Copyright Claims Board as a lower-cost venue option for
smaller Enforcement Actions. Litigation funding is permitted; the live
regulatory topic is disclosure, not prohibition.

Research US contingency-fee availability (broadly permitted, subject to
state-bar reasonableness rules and some matter-type restrictions e.g.
family law/criminal defense); state-level litigation funding disclosure
and regulation trends; the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's
much-reduced modern relevance; and typical US copyright/software-license
infringement procedure (statutory damages availability under the Copyright
Act where registration applies, injunctive relief, small-claims-adjacent
options such as the Copyright Claims Board for lower-value disputes).

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-US.md`.

## United Kingdom

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6bee5575-11c8-4540-9abc-2c7412bf474b"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md` produced.
Confirmed the Damages-Based Agreement Regulations 2013 cap fee percentages
at 25% (personal injury), 35% (employment), and **50% for all other
cases** — the concept doc's proposed 50% Contingency Share lands exactly
on this real statutory ceiling for the case category an unauthorized-
Commercial-Use claim would fall into, the first jurisdiction where the
original figure is precisely validated rather than arbitrary. Conditional
Fee Agreements (fee-plus-uplift) are a second, more flexible option.
Litigation funding is a mature, self-regulated market (ALF Code of
Conduct); champerty/maintenance doctrines are largely set aside for
commercial funding.

Research Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) and Damages-Based Agreements
(DBAs) as the UK's structured alternative to a plain contingency fee,
including their statutory caps; the UK's well-established, self-regulated
third-party litigation funding market (Association of Litigation Funders
Code of Conduct); the historical champerty/maintenance doctrine's current
near-abolition for funded commercial litigation; and typical UK IP/breach
enforcement procedure.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-UK.md`.

## Latin America (Argentina anchor)

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T04
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "b40fef09-f2a4-4fb4-9743-57de96b9b30f"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md`
produced. Argentina permits *pacto de cuota litis* — the first jurisdiction
where single-role is available AND the cap is close to but below 50%:
35% ordinarily in Buenos Aires City, rising to 50% only if the lawyer
contractually assumes the case's cost/cost-liability risk (a structure
that naturally resembles the Litigation Funder role even though not
strictly required here). ~33% in other provinces, 20% in labor matters.
No dedicated litigation-funding regime confirmed in this pass.

Research *pacto de cuota litis* availability for Argentine abogados
(generally more permissive than continental Europe, often with statutory
caps) and the broader Latin American pattern this represents or diverges
from; local litigation-funding market maturity; and enforcement procedure
for unauthorized commercial software use.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Argentina.md`.

## India

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T05
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "cb8ec312-4afa-4812-b5fd-5193c6c57140"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md` produced.
**Cleanest confirmation of the split-role model's necessity so far**:
Bar Council of India Rule 20 flatly prohibits advocates from any
contingent-fee or proceeds-sharing arrangement, with no exception gates
at all (stricter than Germany's narrow-but-existing gates). Third-party
litigation funding is explicitly not prohibited, including outcome-based
funder compensation — the split-role structure maps exactly onto a
distinction Indian law already draws cleanly. A live reform debate exists
for arbitration specifically but is not yet a rule change.

Research the Bar Council of India Rules' prohibition on advocates
charging contingency fees, whether a Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split
(concept §8) is viable under Indian law and professional-conduct rules
given that prohibition, third-party litigation funding's legal status in
India (historically permitted for funders who are not the advocate
themselves, subject to some uncertainty), and IP enforcement procedure.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-India.md`.

## China

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T06
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "e83722de-de3e-4a2b-ba8f-7f5d16ac5dae"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md` produced.
Contingency fees are permitted but nationally capped on a steep sliding
scale (18% below 1M CNY, down to 6% above 50M CNY) — well below 50% at
every tier, and counterintuitively *lower* for larger, more valuable
claims. Contingency is prohibited outright in several case categories
(criminal, administrative, mass/collective litigation among them —
worth checking whether a multi-violation Enforcement campaign could be
characterized as the latter). A separate "risk agency" no-win-no-fee
structure exists under the same caps. Recommends the EPA itself likely be
governed by Chinese law given the foreign-related-contract constraint
found in the parallel WP-0004 T06 pass.

Research Chinese lawyers' contingency-fee rules (permitted in specified
case types, typically capped, under Ministry of Justice regulation),
litigation funding's presence and regulatory treatment in China, and the
practical constraints a foreign copyright holder faces retaining local
counsel and pursuing enforcement in Chinese courts — building on
`workplans/TREV-WP-0004-global-jurisdiction-research.md` T06's finding
(if completed first) regarding foreign governing-law/venue enforceability.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-China.md`.

## Africa (representative jurisdictions)

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T07
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c84f991f-34cc-42e0-acfd-4a5822a35f56"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md` produced.
South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 confirms single-role is
available but capped at 25% (including VAT) of the capital sum, or double
the attorney's normal fee if lower — a hard statutory cap well below 50%,
confirmed via the Act itself, and courts have invalidated non-compliant
agreements. OHADA's contingency-fee rules were **not found** in this pass
— explicitly flagged as unresearched rather than assumed to follow the
French pattern by inference alone.

Research South Africa's Contingency Fees Act 1997 (a statutory framework
explicitly permitting capped contingency fees for attorneys — likely the
most permissive African anchor jurisdiction) and the OHADA zone's
French-derived restriction on *pacte de quota litis* as the civil-law
anchor, consistent with the representative-jurisdiction approach used in
WP-0004 T07.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-Africa.md`.

## Asia-Pacific (beyond India and China)

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T08
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "35c7f74e-f70b-4c4b-9445-03c8dde53bb7"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md`
produced. Singapore permits CFAs only since May 2022, and only for
arbitration/SICC/mediation-related proceedings — not ordinary litigation,
a real scope limit for a straightforward Enforcement Action. Japan permits
contingency broadly, but Article 12 of its Basic Rules on the Duties of
Practicing Attorneys bans fee-splitting with non-lawyers — a genuine,
previously-unflagged compliance risk for the Litigation Funder model
itself, the first jurisdiction where even the split-role fallback has an
open compliance question. Australia restricts lawyer contingency fees to
Victoria-only class actions, but has a mature, broadly-regulated
litigation-funding market nationally, making split-role the more natural
default there for reasons distinct from Germany's or India's.

Research Singapore's recent liberalization permitting Conditional Fee
Agreements for certain proceedings (a change from its historical
prohibition), Japan's customary success-fee arrangements under bar-
association guidelines, and Australia's mature, heavily-regulated
litigation funding market (a global hub for funded litigation) alongside
its state-variable rules on lawyer contingency/uplift fees.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Jurisdiction-AsiaPacific.md`.

## Cross-cutting mechanism design

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "5ac16b53-3229-409b-8ddd-7ff9eed6c4db"
```

Result 2026-07-29: `history/260729-TREN-MechanismDesign.md` produced.
Synthesizes T01-T03 into a single Enforcement Partner Agreement template
with jurisdiction-conditional role structure: single-role (Local Counsel
receives Contingency Share directly — US, likely UK/France) vs. split-role
(Litigation Funder receives Contingency Share, pays Local Counsel under a
locally-compliant fee — Germany, likely much of continental Europe).
Platform Share and the Development Credit allocation rule (concept §6)
are unaffected by which structure applies — only the Contingency Share's
internal routing varies. Produced a payment-flow diagram and a six-clause
EPA outline. Explicitly notes the feasibility matrix is incomplete pending
T04-T08.

Independent of any single jurisdiction: design the Litigation Funder /
Local Counsel split-role structure (concept §8) in enough concrete detail
to serve as an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline — who contracts with
whom, how the Contingency Share flows from Recovery to the Funder and from
the Funder (or Licensor) to Local Counsel, how standing/power-of-attorney
works for a foreign Licensor engaging local counsel, and what the
Enforcement Registry (Trust Service component) needs to record to keep
this auditable without the Trust Service making any of the underlying
legal decisions (concept §3.2, §10).

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-MechanismDesign.md`.

## Synthesis: feasibility matrix and concept resolution

```task
id: TREV-WP-0005-T10
status: done
priority: high
human_accept_required: true
human_accepted_by: Bernd
human_accepted_at: "2026-07-29"
state_hub_task_id: "cdd3ca93-2ec0-4326-959b-2c88de11b41b"
```

**Result:** Synthesis produced at `history/260729-TREN-Synthesis.md`.
Human acceptance (Bernd, 2026-07-29): same alpha/beta risk-acceptance basis
as `TREV-WP-0004-T10` (see that task's Result). The synthesis's five
proposed resolutions to `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §13.5 are
adopted and applied: funding source (Licensor direct), FX methodology
(announcement-date rate), reimbursement of advanced financing from Recovery
before Development Credit, the 18-month trailing look-back window, and
tier-3 split-role collapse to a single non-contingent Local Counsel
engagement by default. §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap table (12
jurisdictions/families) is applied as the authoritative reference. Japan's
Article 12 fee-splitting risk is explicitly **not** resolved by this
acceptance and remains flagged — no Enforcement Action should be pursued in
Japan without specific counsel review, even during alpha/beta.

Using T01–T09, produce a consolidated feasibility matrix (one row per
jurisdiction/family: direct lawyer contingency permitted? statutory cap?
litigation funding regulatory status? recommended structural variant) and
propose (but do not unilaterally apply) resolutions to
`specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §11's open questions, particularly
question 2 (is 50% viable, and where) and question 5 (foreign-Licensor
standing). Draft an Enforcement Partner Agreement outline (not full legal
text) reflecting T09's mechanism design plus the per-jurisdiction variants
this task identifies.

**Human accept gate:** per the policy already applied to every other
candidate legal document in this repository. Agents may prepare the
synthesis and proposed concept-doc edits and leave this task `todo` —
"ready for review," not done.

**Deliverable:** `history/<date>-TREN-Synthesis.md`, plus proposed (not yet
applied) edits to `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md`.

---

**Added 2026-07-29 (maintainer request), revised 2026-07-29 (same day,
maintainer correction):** `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §13 defines
a sequential funding rule, not a "higher of two comparable numbers"
calculation: (1) 50% Contingency Share where an outcome-contingent fee is
lawful at that level; (2) else the jurisdiction's own lower lawful
outcome-contingent cap; (3) else — where **no** outcome-contingent fee is
lawful at all (Germany, India) — **no Contingency Share**, and instead a
non-contingent **Standard Financing Amount** (renamed from "Standard
Bounty Amount," precisely because a bounty paid only on success is still
outcome-contingent and would not escape the prohibitions tier 3 exists to
route around). The Standard Financing Amount is paid/available regardless
of outcome, defaults to US $1,000 local-currency-equivalent, recalculates
annually from a >10-case sample where available, is announced by 31 July,
and takes effect the following 1 January. §13.0 additionally makes explicit
that none of this creates any right to initiate a case — pressing charges
remains exclusively the Licensor's decision; the rule only makes a
ready default available once that decision is made.

This task's synthesis must additionally:

- Populate §13.2's Jurisdiction Percentage Cap for all 8 researched
  jurisdictions/families from the T01–T08 findings (values are already in
  each jurisdiction's `history/260729-TREN-Jurisdiction-*.md` file and the
  consolidated table in `specs/EnforcementNetworkConcept.md` §8.1).
- Resolve §13.5's five open questions: funding source for the Standard
  Financing Amount (item 1); FX reference methodology (item 2); whether an
  advanced Standard Financing Amount should be reimbursed from Recovery on
  success (item 3, now a funding-recoupment question, no longer a
  legal-compliance question since the fee itself is non-contingent either
  way); the exact 18-month window definition (item 4); and how tier 3
  interacts with the Litigation Funder/Local Counsel split-role structure
  (item 5) — or state plainly which remain open pending counsel.
- Confirm the renamed Standard Financing Amount's non-contingent framing
  actually holds up under India's Rule 20 ("a fee contingent on the results
  of litigation") and Germany's §4a: the fee/financing must not, in
  substance, depend on whether the case succeeds, only on whether it is
  brought at all — this is now a design property to verify, not an open
  question about the mechanism's basic viability the way the original
  "fixed bounty" framing left unresolved.