AUDIT-WP-0005-T01, built and verified against PostgreSQL 16 locally in
Docker; the Railiance cluster was not needed.
tests/test_backend_conformance.py is one suite run against every backend, so
"the Postgres backend is done" means it satisfies the same contract SQLite
already does rather than having its own green tests. It skips cleanly with no
server reachable; make pg-test-up and make test-pg run it. Suite 50 -> 71.
RetentionPolicy declares immutable=True and earns it: migration 0002 installs
a trigger rejecting UPDATE and DELETE on the events table, so a leaked runtime
credential can append but cannot rewrite or erase the trail. That materially
narrows the residual risk ADR-0001 section 5 called out. tamper_evidence stays
False because nothing here would prove a database owner had dropped the
trigger - hash-chaining or external anchoring would be needed and is not
implemented.
Idempotency is one statement (INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING),
verified to behave identically to the SQLite backend under 12 concurrent
submissions of the same event. Migrations are ordered, recorded and
idempotent. Replay reconciles rather than duplicating - the piece deferred out
of WP-0004-T05 - and is tested to leave exactly one custody record.
Backend selection is by AUDIT_CORE_DATABASE_URL; the SQLite fallback logs a
warning so a deployment that lost its URL is visible rather than quietly
running on the wrong store.
Also fixed: ingestion had no __main__ guard, so python -m audit_core.ingestion
silently did nothing. Found during end-to-end smoke.
Counting semantics documented: occurrences counts transmissions, not stored
events, so a retry of a secret-shaped field increments it again. That is the
sender behaviour being optimized away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AUDIT-WP-0004-T04, closing the workplan.
Decision (Bernd): default to redaction, allow rejection per sender. Losing an
audit record over one field is worse than storing it masked, but a
higher-assurance channel must be able to refuse rather than mask. secret_policy
is set per sender identity in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS and defaults to redact.
Detection now covers the whole payload at any depth, including lists, rather
than only the top level of data. Under redaction the value is masked and the
key is preserved: dropping the key would hide that the sender transmitted the
field at all, which is exactly what an operator needs in order to stop it. The
stored record carries details.redaction with policy and affected paths, so a
reader never has to infer whether what they see is what was sent.
Idempotency is unaffected - the payload hash is taken over the original request
body, so redaction is deterministic and a resubmission still reconciles as a
duplicate.
Both outcomes are counted durably by sender, source, action and field path,
exposed at GET /v1/secret-findings. Per-path aggregation is the point: the
actionable unit is "stop emitting data.auth.token on membership.added", not
"there were 47 redactions". Counters survive restart because the fix they drive
lives in another service.
Contract doc updated to match. Tests 46 -> 50. WP-0004 is finished.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AUDIT-WP-0004 T03, T05, T06.
T03 - the receiver accepted whatever tenant and source a caller sent as long
as it held the one shared token, despite WP-0003 recording tenant isolation as
delivered. audit_core.senders binds each credential to the sources and tenants
it may assert, driven by AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS rather than literals. Identities
hold a list of tokens so rotation publishes the replacement alongside the
incumbent and needs no delivery gap. Read is a separate privilege from write,
so a sender credential cannot read the audit trail back.
T05 - lookup by event id, lookup by correlation id, and a dead-letter view.
Rejections are recorded rather than silently dropped. An event rejected for
carrying secret-shaped material has its payload withheld: storing it would
write that material into the audit store, which is what the rejection exists
to prevent. Reason and payload hash are kept so it stays traceable.
Replay is deliberately not built here. Idempotent replay is a property of the
durable store and building it against SQLite would produce a second
implementation to throw away; it lands with the Postgres backend in
AUDIT-WP-0005-T01.
T06 - serving moves to waitress with configurable threads and channel timeout,
installed in the image via the serve extra. Without it the entrypoint falls
back to a threaded wsgiref server with a socket timeout and graceful shutdown
on SIGTERM, and logs a warning so a deployment cannot quietly land on the
fallback. Metric counters deferred to WP-0005-T03 to be designed against the
real scrape path.
Tests 36 -> 46, covering cross-tenant and cross-source refusal, token
rotation, read/write privilege separation, correlation lookup, and payload
withholding on secret rejection.
Remaining in WP-0004: T04 redaction policy, which needs a decision on whether
a secret-shaped field is a rejection or a redaction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AUDIT-WP-0004 T01, T02, T07.
T01 - ingestion wrote to SQLite directly and never called the AuditBackend
contract, so a 202 meant a row existed rather than that a backend with a
declared retention policy had accepted the event. Adds IdempotentAuditBackend
to the contract: duplicate detection lives inside the backend so custody and
idempotency state share a transaction and cannot diverge. SQLiteAuditBackend
implements it with WAL, synchronous=FULL and a busy timeout. Ingestion now
refuses any backend declaring durable=False, so the development file backend
cannot silently become the production sink.
The atomicity claim was tested rather than asserted, and the first attempt
failed: with a single shared connection, 16 racing submissions of one event
told two callers they were first. Storage was correct but the response was
not. Fixed with per-thread connections and BEGIN IMMEDIATE around the
insert/read pair, and locked in by a test.
T02 - storage errors previously escaped the handler with start_response never
called, and the auth check sat outside the try block so a non-ASCII
Authorization header crashed the request. Adds a catch-all, maps conflict to
409, backend unavailability to 503 and unexpected faults to 500, and
documents the full response contract with the retry semantics each status
implies, since senders key their behaviour off it.
T07 - ingestion tests 2 -> 23, suite 15 -> 36. accepted_at is now UTC rather
than local time, and naive timestamps are rejected instead of silently
assumed.
Remaining in WP-0004: T03 tenant/source binding, T04 redaction policy,
T05 operator read surface, T06 production serving layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
