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glas-harness asked for a supported owner access path with authenticated
caller binding and lifetime, ruling out Service DNS and a permanent
operator token. Both refusals are correct and the answer needs no new
mechanism: a TokenRequest token is short-lived, audience-scoped, and
bound by exact sub to the ServiceAccount the deployed pin already names.
Two findings came out of designing it.
First, for an operator caller the pin's NetworkPolicy is not a partial
control, it is silent: kubectl port-forward is proxied to the pod's own
loopback and no policy selector is consulted. So under warn the operator
path is unauthenticated and unfiltered, and the only reason it is not
reachable is that nobody has forwarded the port. warn was safe for
ops-warden because a workload pin still admitted one pod; here the warn
window protects nothing while it runs. enforce is the deliverable.
Second, the ServiceAccount named by the deployed binding does not exist.
Namespace secrets-engine holds only default, so enforce today would deny
every request rather than authenticate one.
Third, and this is the contract one: the decision record has no caller
field. provenance carries evaluator, mode, policy and registry digests
and decision time; binding carries the normalized request. So the four
negative tests can all pass and no artifact retains that they passed for
the request that mattered. Same seam as FLEX-DEC-2026-008 one layer up —
there a tenant was carried into the digest and never compared, visible
but not enforced; here a caller is authenticated and never recorded,
enforced but not visible.
provenance.caller, not binding.caller: the same request from a different
authenticated caller must decide identically, so the caller is not
replay identity and must not move request_digest. FLEX-DEC-2026-009.
Live receipts are not included. kubectl create token is credential
minting and was refused in this session, correctly; the commands are
exact and the expectations read out of internal/callerauth/auth.go, but
nothing is claimed as verified that was not run.
Also records the operator's tenant:platform decision
(5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6) and verifies that v2 already
enforces exactly it — exact string equality, no alias, no normalisation.
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secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
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secrets-engine confirmed T03, and re-verifying against the regenerated
destroy fixture found something neither repository can fix alone: a
pdp_digest recorded at issue time can never equal the request_digest of a
request that carries the claim in its context, because the claim is part
of the context that is hashed. Embedding the claim changes the very
digest the claim would need to name.
Not fixture staleness. It holds for every dual-control request whose
claim travels in context -- the shape GH-DEC-2026-008 had just ruled
mandatory. Left unresolved that ruling was unimplementable for exactly
the case it was written for, and destroy would have been permanently
un-allowable in production, failing closed forever on a check that could
never pass.
flex-auth owns the canonical request digest, so the fix is ours.
binding.approval_binding_digest is the same material with
context.approval removed, emitted only when a claim was carried. An
approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's
request_digest; the claim-bearing request reproduces it here.
DELIBERATELY ADDITIVE, and the reason matters. The tempting fix is to
drop context.approval from request_digest entirely. That is wrong:
request_digest is the replay identity, and two requests differing only in
which approval was presented must not share one, because their decisions
differ -- one allows, the other denies dual_control_required. Collapsing
them would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a
request carrying none. So request_digest still covers the claim and still
moves; approval_binding_digest deliberately does not, and is documented
as not a replay identity. The tests assert the two functions DISAGREE on
a claim-bearing request, which is approval-engine's formulation of how to
defend a distinction that looks like duplication.
The fixture now demonstrates the property rather than asserting it: its
claim's pdp_digest equals the envelope's approval_binding_digest with
pdp_path true, and changing the claim's contents moved request_digest
while leaving approval_binding_digest untouched. Two files a consumer can
diff.
Also picked up approval-engine's new required binding.pdp_path via the
cross-repo schema test added yesterday -- which is the test doing exactly
what it was built for, one day later.
T03 is done. secrets-engine's own digest-material defect, which our two
real envelopes caught, is recorded in the workplan.
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TWO FINDINGS, BOTH FROM READING OTHER REPOSITORIES RATHER THAN OURS.
The §13.1 stance register has a second row. secrets-engine published
pep-stance.yaml -- total over catalog stage plus unknown, runtime-read
and pinned to SHIPPED_STANCE by test. SCOPE.md claimed ops-warden's was
the estate's only published map and that the register's single row was
itself the finding; that is no longer true and is corrected.
docs/stance-register-review.md is the first exercise of the
aggregate-divergence capability flex-auth claimed on 2026-08-29 and then
recorded as unexercised because one row cannot diverge from anything.
Three findings:
The two maps take opposite stances on unknown -- ops-warden fail_open by
versioned build profile under ADR-0009, secrets-engine fail_closed. Both
conformant, neither a defect, and they disagree about the one case nobody
planned for. Reported as an observation for gate-house's register, not as
a request that either repository change: a PDP does not set a consumer's
stance, and §9.3's two-owner split is our own finding.
The rows are not comparable. ops-warden scopes by security-zone,
secrets-engine by catalog-stage. §6.4 permits both, but the register
cannot then answer what the estate's stance is for a z2 workload. Worth
recording before a third row arrives.
secrets-engine's map defines fail_closed in terms of a durable
ActionAuthorization record, which GH-DEC-2026-005 shelved. The stance is
unaffected -- only the artifact name is stale -- but the file is read at
runtime and pinned by test, so the stale name outlives a comment.
SEPARATELY, T04 IS BLOCKED AND THE REASON IS STRUCTURAL. The task assumed
the ops-warden/tenant-engine/user-engine pattern, where the pin's
default-deny NetworkPolicy admits one approved consumer workload.
secrets-engine has no Kubernetes deployment at all -- it is a CLI. There
is no pod selector to write, and inventing one would repeat the error
corrected in T02. Three possible shapes recorded in the workplan and
raised with them; callerAuth, not the NetworkPolicy, becomes the real
boundary if an operator CLI is the caller, so the FLEX-WP-0016 precedent
does not transfer unexamined.
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Two real DecisionEnvelopes in examples/secrets-engine/replay/ for
secrets-engine to verify its digest join unchanged: a plain allow
(rotate, empty context) and the dual-control allow (destroy with a valid
approval-claim).
Both are included deliberately. input_claim_digests.context appears only
when the request carries a non-empty context, so a consumer asserting the
field is always present would pass on destroy and fail on rotate. One
fixture would have hidden that.
request_digest, policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest and the
context claim digest are verified identical across two runs and are the
fields to pin. id, decision_time and the lifetime bounds move with the
clock; the README says so rather than leaving a consumer to discover it
by flake. lifetime.ttl is 15m from the package allow_ttl.
Emitted from flex-auth/local in standalone mode, not from a cluster pin.
T03 is progress, not done -- it closes when secrets-engine confirms their
validator accepts the records unchanged.
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secrets-engine delivered the action vocabulary T01 asked for: twelve
actions read out of cli.py, not the example vocabulary. The gate earned
its keep -- four would have been inferred wrongly, and revoke, the
obvious thirteenth, does not exist as an action at all. It gates as
deactivate, which is also reached from lifecycle deactivate.
docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md records the list and the four
traps. examples/secrets-engine/ carries the package, both manifests, a
loadable registry snapshot, 26 fixtures, five check requests, and a
README. validate -kind policy is valid with 22/22 Rego tests and 26/26
fixtures.
allow_ttl is 15m, stated in the package rather than inherited from the
engine default: these decisions authorize live secret operations, so the
reliance window belongs where a reviewer sees it. Per FLEX-DEC-2026-004
it is authority to issue, not authority to keep using what the operation
produced.
destroy is the dual-control case, gated on a context.approval claim
marked approved with two distinct approvers, repeated entries counting
once. flex-auth checks what the claim says and deliberately does not
re-derive its temporal validity, signature, or supersession -- those are
approval-engine's to assert and the PEP's to verify against the live
claim, per the split accepted in FLEX-DEC-2026-006. It stays in the
package though its handler raises before the gate, so the rule is
reviewed and fixtured before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 opens the path.
Following the FLEX-WP-0010-T02 precedent the denial ladder has no
action_not_granted branch: one subject holding all twelve actions could
never reach it, and a rule that cannot fail reads as control that is not
there. Registering a second calling identity is the revisit trigger.
Not deployed. No flex-auth-secrets-engine pin exists yet (T04), so their
policy pin stays unset and fail-closed until T05.
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Two cross-repo questions arrived in the flex-auth inbox and both are
answered as decision records rather than as prose in a message.
FLEX-DEC-2026-004 answers ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0034-T05. A decision
lifetime shorter than the SSH certificate TTL is meaningful, but only as
authority to issue, never as authority to use an already-issued
certificate. The pre-sign gate is the only consumer of the shorter
lifetime: no replay past expires_at, fresh Check per sign. The lever that
shortens effective access is the requested TTL as a policy input, which
is already deployed as the ttl_out_of_bounds deny. ops-warden's section
9.7.2 window through certificate TTL is correct as written and correctly
owned by the PEP; flex-auth does not want that residue moved to the PDP.
docs/decision-input-freshness.md gains the same boundary as published
contract text, so the ruling is not only in the decision log.
FLEX-DEC-2026-005 answers secrets-engine. A real policy package is
expected and flex-auth authors it here as it does for every consumer; the
reserved coordinate is secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 and it
does not exist yet. Their choice not to default the pin was correct and
is endorsed explicitly. POST /v1/check is deployed but has no
estate-wide address by design -- per-consumer cluster-local pins with
default-deny ingress -- so their 2026-09-06 probe found the design
working, not an outage.
FLEX-WP-0021 carries that work: obtain the real action vocabulary from
secrets-engine, publish the package with fixtures, confirm the digest
join against a real decision record, then stand up a
flex-auth-secrets-engine pin in warn without moving the other two pins.
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Close the remaining PDP obligations: mechanical layer declaration check,
registry-snapshot digest in provenance, explicit allow TTL, per-input-class
freshness deadlines, and the published decision-record contract. Document
the canonical request digest as the §6.4.2 replay test.
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C-21 flagged the ready workplan as possibly stale: reviewed against 5753b47,
HEAD had moved. Checked rather than assumed — nothing since 5753b47 touches Go
or schemas. Every commit between is documentation or work-record only, and the
last implementation change is d402408 (2026-08-23).
reviewed_against_commit now names the implementation state reviewed rather than
the HEAD at review time, so it moves when the code moves, which is when the
review needs redoing. C-21 compares against HEAD and cannot distinguish a doc
commit from a code one, so it will keep warning softly on this plan; the record
is accurate and that is the trade taken deliberately.
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C-34 flagged status=ready without a DoR assessment. The warning was right: the
plan claimed repo-state review with no review metadata, and work-item-dor.md
prefers DoR-Failed for a ready claim in that state.
Adds reviewed_at, reviewed_against_commit (5753b47 — the code state the
alignment review actually checked each obligation against), the origin pointer
to the review, and quality_dor: DoR-Ok with the criteria walked in the note.
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The standard was accepted at v0.7 on 2026-08-29. Four of flex-auth's review
findings are in the accepted text: 9.3's two-owner split, 6.4.2 scoped to the
decision's own binding with our canonical request digest as its mechanical test,
9.7.2 split by role, and 17 moving the decision-record schema to access-engine.
INTENT.md
- Machine-readable layer declaration in frontmatter (layer: Engine, role: PDP),
which section 11 requires and we did not have. audit-core noted our
declaration was legible only by following the decision trail.
- PDP failure semantics stated: our outage is consumer residue, not input
degradation; fail-open is not expressible by a PDP at all.
- Four owned obligations added: the decision-record schema as our contract, the
request digest as the published replay test, a lifetime on every allow, and
visibility deadlines per input class.
- A Layer Conformance section stating the state honestly: conforming with one
declared gap, no Tooling client, not PEP-shaped.
- Vocabulary correction: earlier text dropped "control plane" as Staff
vocabulary. Section 8 binds it to the Engine layer, which is why kings-guard
was asked to release it. The term is ours; we prefer "decision engine" for
precision, not boundary.
SCOPE.md
- Layer and role in the one-liner; the four obligations In Scope; five
boundaries established in review but never written down Out of Scope.
- Three capability blocks marked planned for workplans completed in May are now
current; two blocks added.
- Superseded ADR-0006 citation corrected to ADR-0009, which retires the global
flag outright rather than deferring it.
history/2026-08-29-layer-model-v0.7-alignment-review.md checks each obligation
against the code and finds six gaps. FLEX-WP-0019 closes them, with T02 before
T04 because a visibility deadline for registry-borne facts is unfalsifiable
until provenance can identify the snapshot a decision read.
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flex-auth answers gate-house's assent request on the three items ratified in
GH-DEC-2026-001, following the estate precedent that a boundary is drawn on
review by the other side.
Assent to all three, with one conformance debt flex-auth accepts as its own and
two conditions on the rename:
- Engine framing and sole decision point: assent. flex-auth cannot hold this
boundary against zone-engine and decline it as a general rule. But standard
section 6 also binds flex-auth: DecisionProvenance carries no registry
snapshot digest, so a decision that turned on registry content cannot be
replayed from its own provenance. Recorded as a known non-conformance rather
than claimed as conformance.
- access-engine rename: assent to the name, not to execution. Repository
identity and runtime identity must rename in separate revertible steps —
since FLEX-WP-0016 the enforcing ops-warden pin binds tokens to the
protected-system name, so a single-step rename 401s every warden sign,
including the certificate the ops-bridge tunnels depend on. FLEX-WP prefix
ownership stays with the repository.
- Authoring/evaluation split: assent, with the section 6 test applied
symmetrically — a gate-house authority ceiling that determines an outcome
reaches the decision as an input claim or as a rule in the versioned policy
package, so its application stays reconstructable from the decision record.
FLEX-WP-0017-T03 stays wait: the design half re-routes to gate-house, the
durable storage half remains unowned and is raised as an engine gap under
section 5.
Decision id follows the canon scheme {PREFIX}-DEC-YYYY-NNN.
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These workplans exist only in the retired local hub. Their random pre-ADR-007
identifiers are refused by C-06 as stale references, so they cannot be
registered. Deriving from the canonical record id takes no identity from
anything: central does not hold them and the old ids die with the cache.
Records central already holds were deliberately left untouched.
Refs CUST-WP-0068-T06
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FLEX-WP-0016 was titled 'so policy.enabled can flip' and the flip is not
coming. ops-warden's ADR-0006 defers it permanently in favour of
zone-scoped enforcement, so this closes rather than stalls: every task
it owned is delivered and enforce is independently verified by both
sides. The pin stays enforce and is not reverted to warn.
SCOPE's account of policy.enabled was stale - it read as a
build-stage timing choice. Replaced with the actual reason and with
flex-auth's boundary as the reviewing PDP: membership compiles to the
registry, stance stays in the policy package, fail-open is not
expressible by a PDP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0031 T04 minted audience-flex-auth tokens as
system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden and held the warn-log count.
Helm rev 2 is enforce. Live probe 200/401/403. policy.enabled is theirs.
policy.enabled cannot flip against the user-engine or tenant-engine
bindings. Helm release flex-auth-ops-warden rev 1 serves the production
registry in warn. Workstation warden sends no caller token; enforce and
the yaml flip stay ops-warden's.
flex-auth-tenant-engine Helm rev 2 is enforce on sha256:138aa347 after
tenant-engine 2063470 started sending a projected caller token
(sha256:7dc9d7bf). Probe 200/401/403. tenancy.current.A is 2. T04
cancelled: AuthZEN waits for a PEP we do not control.
Helm-adopted the kubectl-managed user-engine pin, promoted sha256:138aa347
warn then enforce. Reviewer volume needs fsGroup 65532; reviewer tokens
must use the API default audiences or TokenReview 401s on this k3s.
Live probe from user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px: 200 / 401 / 403. tenant-engine
is unchanged. tenancy.current.A stays 0 until that pin moves.
The sanctioned Helm chart could not promote ADR 0004 at all, and the
emergency manifests selected enforce. That made a FLEX-WP-0011 apply
either a no-op or a global 401. First production pin is now warn, per
consumer, on CI digest sha256:138aa347… . Enforce stays a later
per-consumer flip so USER-WP-0023-T03 can close without waiting on
tenant-engine.
Publishes tenancy.yaml (I1 A0 E2 P n/a R n/a, enables A3), the review
answering rapp-postgres's three asks, and FLEX-WP-0015 to close the gaps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI digest sha256:1bf060e6 (main-f304688) is live. Seven pre-existing
actions still allow; guardrail.read/set match the FLEX-WP-0014 split.
user-engine pin unchanged. Rollback target is sha256:9320df39.
FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries
nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on
resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping.
The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is
denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17
Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real
tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches.
In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin.
FLEX-WP-0013. Production had been rolled back to sha256:c25fc34a
(four actions), so tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate
denied unknown_action. Re-pin and apply the previously-live
sha256:9320df39 image (e9911eb). Live probe after restore: all seven
actions allow; misspelled action and unknown subject still deny.
user-engine pin unchanged. TEN-WP-0006 guardrail actions not added.
