The exporter discovered groups by walking each user's memberships, so a group
nobody belongs to never reached the snapshot, and a failed lookup was skipped by
a `continue` under a comment claiming it was recorded in the incompatibility
report. The run then emitted `result: "success"`.
Add an optional `domain.GroupLister` capability and implement `ListGroups` on
the LLDAP adapter as a direct group-subtree search, kept off `UserRepository`
because the OIDC layer never enumerates the directory. Record `groupEnumeration`
on every result and a `Complete()` predicate over it; abort rather than write a
smaller snapshot when the enumeration fails; report a failed per-user lookup on
the fallback path; emit `partial` telemetry and name the mode from the CLI.
Reading the adapter to write this surfaced a defect the assessment had not
listed: `LookupGroups` never populated `Group.Members`, and the exporter built
every membership from that field, so against a real directory the `memberships`
block was always empty while the fixture-backed tests passed. Memberships on the
fallback path now come from the user/group pair actually observed.
Sort users, groups and memberships so an unchanged directory exports
identically. Closes G05 of the scope/intent assessment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 867844@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3d45905e-0016-4b49-b828-231406881f7b
Closes gap G02 of the scope assessment for the client-registration and discovery
surface. spec/canonical-model.yaml and domain/model.go both claimed to be the
source of truth and disagreed: the spec restricted grants to authorization_code,
required redirect URIs of every client, and omitted the audience, service
subject, tenant, role, MFA and handoff fields the runtime reads.
The durable part is the link, not the edit. A two-way conformance test compares
the spec against the Go model by reflection and fails when a runtime field has
no spec entry or a spec entry is not read by the runtime, the latter unless
marked runtime: false. It found drift beyond the assessment's list on its first
run -- User.tenant was undeclared -- which is the argument for the check over a
one-time reconciliation.
Discovery now advertises the core profile claims that appear on every token and
derives scopes_supported from the registered clients rather than a fixed list.
The Go model is stated as the runtime authority and the YAML as the reviewed
contract, in both files. This covers client registration and discovery, not
schema enforcement in general, which remains G06.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
Add signed registration/enrollment handoffs, per-request assurance
policy with login-session isolation, and /logout. coulomb-social
stays AAL1 unless acr_values or another client raises the bar.
Allow coulomb-social ordinary login at AAL1 via mfaRequired: false while
keeping provider requireForAll for clients without an override. Preserve
explicit acr_values=aal2 for step-up.
Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in
discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no
service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is
materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not
attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done.
What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow:
- domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant():
falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006)
when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment.
- principal_type: "human", unconditional.
- groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims,
always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old
scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional
behavior, not left failing or reverted.
- assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded
through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) --
whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment
state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise.
go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go
cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's
TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended
with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks.
Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full
Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round
trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- T09: /userinfo with RS256 JWT validation, scope-filtered claims
- T15: LLDAP→canonical export tool with validation, migration_event telemetry
- T21: Negative test suite (Scenario D) — all 7 unsupported features verified
All go tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
