Closes gap G07. The tenant-engine client and TokenHandler.TenantEngine were
implemented and tested, but main.go supplied no client and exposed no
configuration, so the stock executable left the field nil and the capability
existed at library level only.
A tenantEngine block with baseURL and an optional timeout now wires it. An empty
baseURL leaves the stock server's behaviour exactly as it was, so enabling the
claim is a deliberate act. Validation treats a configured source as one that must
work: http/https with a host, and a timeout in (0, 10s] since it sits on the
synchronous token-issuance path. A timeout set without a baseURL is rejected
rather than ignored -- it means someone expected the claim to be on.
Verified in the built executable, which is what G07 asks for, rather than at the
wiring: against a stub source a real token carries tenant_roles; with no block
the claim is absent; with the source configured but down, issuance succeeds
without it, confirming the documented fail-open path end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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keycape-to-keycloak called Transform, which passes no clients, so it wrote a
realm with an empty clients array and nothing said the service-identity contract
had not been migrated. Where clients were supplied, mapClient hardcoded
standardFlowEnabled — silently giving every client_credentials registration the
browser flow — and dropped audience, service subject, tenant, roles, lifetime,
MFA policy, secret reference and handoff URLs. Realm roles and client scopes were
emitted as empty containers.
The defect was not the missing mapping but that a dropped field and an
inapplicable one looked identical in the output.
Add -clients, reading registrations through a new config.Registrations() that
converts without resolving secrets, so migration tooling cannot load material it
has no business holding. Derive flows from the declared grants. Carry the profile
claims as protocol mappers, since Keycloak has no native concept for them, and
lifetime, handoff URLs and the secret reference as attributes — the reference,
never a value. Derive realm roles and client scopes from what is present.
Report what cannot be carried, in UnpreservedReport, kept deliberately separate
from ValidationReport: consistency with the snapshot and completeness of the
migration are different questions and one list cannot answer both. It names the
unmigrated secret, the unenforceable MFA policy, passwords and factor enrolment,
and subject continuity. An incomplete transform emits partial telemetry.
Closes the semantic-preservation half of G03; proof against a live provider is
G04 and stays open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
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The exporter discovered groups by walking each user's memberships, so a group
nobody belongs to never reached the snapshot, and a failed lookup was skipped by
a `continue` under a comment claiming it was recorded in the incompatibility
report. The run then emitted `result: "success"`.
Add an optional `domain.GroupLister` capability and implement `ListGroups` on
the LLDAP adapter as a direct group-subtree search, kept off `UserRepository`
because the OIDC layer never enumerates the directory. Record `groupEnumeration`
on every result and a `Complete()` predicate over it; abort rather than write a
smaller snapshot when the enumeration fails; report a failed per-user lookup on
the fallback path; emit `partial` telemetry and name the mode from the CLI.
Reading the adapter to write this surfaced a defect the assessment had not
listed: `LookupGroups` never populated `Group.Members`, and the exporter built
every membership from that field, so against a real directory the `memberships`
block was always empty while the fixture-backed tests passed. Memberships on the
fallback path now come from the user/group pair actually observed.
Sort users, groups and memberships so an unchanged directory exports
identically. Closes G05 of the scope/intent assessment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
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Closes gap G02 of the scope assessment for the client-registration and discovery
surface. spec/canonical-model.yaml and domain/model.go both claimed to be the
source of truth and disagreed: the spec restricted grants to authorization_code,
required redirect URIs of every client, and omitted the audience, service
subject, tenant, role, MFA and handoff fields the runtime reads.
The durable part is the link, not the edit. A two-way conformance test compares
the spec against the Go model by reflection and fails when a runtime field has
no spec entry or a spec entry is not read by the runtime, the latter unless
marked runtime: false. It found drift beyond the assessment's list on its first
run -- User.tenant was undeclared -- which is the argument for the check over a
one-time reconciliation.
Discovery now advertises the core profile claims that appear on every token and
derives scopes_supported from the registered clients rather than a fixed list.
The Go model is stated as the runtime authority and the YAML as the reviewed
contract, in both files. This covers client registration and discovery, not
schema enforcement in general, which remains G06.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Operator decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6 accepts tenant:platform
as the platform management tenant for the Glas approval chain, requiring exact
spelling across the approval store, the service-client JWT claim and the
lifecycle CheckRequest.
Changes the tenant field on secrets-engine-approval and approval-engine-operator
only, in the registration fixture and the provisioning packet. Unrelated clients
and the human directory default keep tenant:coulomb, and no audience, scope,
subject, role, lifetime or MFA grant changes.
Adds issuance evidence that the approval shape emits tenant:platform exactly and
never an alias the caller requests, that the OpenBao client gains no
cross-tenant reach, and a fixture guard pinning every reviewed client's tenant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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Add signed registration/enrollment handoffs, per-request assurance
policy with login-session isolation, and /logout. coulomb-social
stays AAL1 unless acr_values or another client raises the bar.
Allow coulomb-social ordinary login at AAL1 via mfaRequired: false while
keeping provider requireForAll for clients without an override. Preserve
explicit acr_values=aal2 for step-up.
- T22: docker-compose.dev.yml dev stack, Dockerfile, root Makefile
- T18: Profile test suite (Scenario A) — 8 integration tests with real handlers
- T23: Server binary wiring all components, config validation, /healthz
- Config: ValidateConfig with startup validation
14 test packages pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- T09: /userinfo with RS256 JWT validation, scope-filtered claims
- T15: LLDAP→canonical export tool with validation, migration_event telemetry
- T21: Negative test suite (Scenario D) — all 7 unsupported features verified
All go tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
