Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two cross-repo questions arrived in the flex-auth inbox and both are
answered as decision records rather than as prose in a message.
FLEX-DEC-2026-004 answers ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0034-T05. A decision
lifetime shorter than the SSH certificate TTL is meaningful, but only as
authority to issue, never as authority to use an already-issued
certificate. The pre-sign gate is the only consumer of the shorter
lifetime: no replay past expires_at, fresh Check per sign. The lever that
shortens effective access is the requested TTL as a policy input, which
is already deployed as the ttl_out_of_bounds deny. ops-warden's section
9.7.2 window through certificate TTL is correct as written and correctly
owned by the PEP; flex-auth does not want that residue moved to the PDP.
docs/decision-input-freshness.md gains the same boundary as published
contract text, so the ruling is not only in the decision log.
FLEX-DEC-2026-005 answers secrets-engine. A real policy package is
expected and flex-auth authors it here as it does for every consumer; the
reserved coordinate is secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 and it
does not exist yet. Their choice not to default the pin was correct and
is endorsed explicitly. POST /v1/check is deployed but has no
estate-wide address by design -- per-consumer cluster-local pins with
default-deny ingress -- so their 2026-09-06 probe found the design
working, not an outage.
FLEX-WP-0021 carries that work: obtain the real action vocabulary from
secrets-engine, publish the package with fixtures, confirm the digest
join against a real decision record, then stand up a
flex-auth-secrets-engine pin in warn without moving the other two pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Close the remaining PDP obligations: mechanical layer declaration check,
registry-snapshot digest in provenance, explicit allow TTL, per-input-class
freshness deadlines, and the published decision-record contract. Document
the canonical request digest as the §6.4.2 replay test.
Assistant: grok
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C-21 flagged the ready workplan as possibly stale: reviewed against 5753b47,
HEAD had moved. Checked rather than assumed — nothing since 5753b47 touches Go
or schemas. Every commit between is documentation or work-record only, and the
last implementation change is d402408 (2026-08-23).
reviewed_against_commit now names the implementation state reviewed rather than
the HEAD at review time, so it moves when the code moves, which is when the
review needs redoing. C-21 compares against HEAD and cannot distinguish a doc
commit from a code one, so it will keep warning softly on this plan; the record
is accurate and that is the trade taken deliberately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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C-34 flagged status=ready without a DoR assessment. The warning was right: the
plan claimed repo-state review with no review metadata, and work-item-dor.md
prefers DoR-Failed for a ready claim in that state.
Adds reviewed_at, reviewed_against_commit (5753b47 — the code state the
alignment review actually checked each obligation against), the origin pointer
to the review, and quality_dor: DoR-Ok with the criteria walked in the note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The standard was accepted at v0.7 on 2026-08-29. Four of flex-auth's review
findings are in the accepted text: 9.3's two-owner split, 6.4.2 scoped to the
decision's own binding with our canonical request digest as its mechanical test,
9.7.2 split by role, and 17 moving the decision-record schema to access-engine.
INTENT.md
- Machine-readable layer declaration in frontmatter (layer: Engine, role: PDP),
which section 11 requires and we did not have. audit-core noted our
declaration was legible only by following the decision trail.
- PDP failure semantics stated: our outage is consumer residue, not input
degradation; fail-open is not expressible by a PDP at all.
- Four owned obligations added: the decision-record schema as our contract, the
request digest as the published replay test, a lifetime on every allow, and
visibility deadlines per input class.
- A Layer Conformance section stating the state honestly: conforming with one
declared gap, no Tooling client, not PEP-shaped.
- Vocabulary correction: earlier text dropped "control plane" as Staff
vocabulary. Section 8 binds it to the Engine layer, which is why kings-guard
was asked to release it. The term is ours; we prefer "decision engine" for
precision, not boundary.
SCOPE.md
- Layer and role in the one-liner; the four obligations In Scope; five
boundaries established in review but never written down Out of Scope.
- Three capability blocks marked planned for workplans completed in May are now
current; two blocks added.
- Superseded ADR-0006 citation corrected to ADR-0009, which retires the global
flag outright rather than deferring it.
history/2026-08-29-layer-model-v0.7-alignment-review.md checks each obligation
against the code and finds six gaps. FLEX-WP-0019 closes them, with T02 before
T04 because a visibility deadline for registry-borne facts is unfalsifiable
until provenance can identify the snapshot a decision read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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flex-auth answers gate-house's assent request on the three items ratified in
GH-DEC-2026-001, following the estate precedent that a boundary is drawn on
review by the other side.
Assent to all three, with one conformance debt flex-auth accepts as its own and
two conditions on the rename:
- Engine framing and sole decision point: assent. flex-auth cannot hold this
boundary against zone-engine and decline it as a general rule. But standard
section 6 also binds flex-auth: DecisionProvenance carries no registry
snapshot digest, so a decision that turned on registry content cannot be
replayed from its own provenance. Recorded as a known non-conformance rather
than claimed as conformance.
- access-engine rename: assent to the name, not to execution. Repository
identity and runtime identity must rename in separate revertible steps —
since FLEX-WP-0016 the enforcing ops-warden pin binds tokens to the
protected-system name, so a single-step rename 401s every warden sign,
including the certificate the ops-bridge tunnels depend on. FLEX-WP prefix
ownership stays with the repository.
- Authoring/evaluation split: assent, with the section 6 test applied
symmetrically — a gate-house authority ceiling that determines an outcome
reaches the decision as an input claim or as a rule in the versioned policy
package, so its application stays reconstructable from the decision record.
FLEX-WP-0017-T03 stays wait: the design half re-routes to gate-house, the
durable storage half remains unowned and is raised as an engine gap under
section 5.
Decision id follows the canon scheme {PREFIX}-DEC-YYYY-NNN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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These workplans exist only in the retired local hub. Their random pre-ADR-007
identifiers are refused by C-06 as stale references, so they cannot be
registered. Deriving from the canonical record id takes no identity from
anything: central does not hold them and the old ids die with the cache.
Records central already holds were deliberately left untouched.
Refs CUST-WP-0068-T06
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FLEX-WP-0016 was titled 'so policy.enabled can flip' and the flip is not
coming. ops-warden's ADR-0006 defers it permanently in favour of
zone-scoped enforcement, so this closes rather than stalls: every task
it owned is delivered and enforce is independently verified by both
sides. The pin stays enforce and is not reverted to warn.
SCOPE's account of policy.enabled was stale - it read as a
build-stage timing choice. Replaced with the actual reason and with
flex-auth's boundary as the reviewing PDP: membership compiles to the
registry, stance stays in the policy package, fail-open is not
expressible by a PDP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0031 T04 minted audience-flex-auth tokens as
system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden and held the warn-log count.
Helm rev 2 is enforce. Live probe 200/401/403. policy.enabled is theirs.
policy.enabled cannot flip against the user-engine or tenant-engine
bindings. Helm release flex-auth-ops-warden rev 1 serves the production
registry in warn. Workstation warden sends no caller token; enforce and
the yaml flip stay ops-warden's.
flex-auth-tenant-engine Helm rev 2 is enforce on sha256:138aa347 after
tenant-engine 2063470 started sending a projected caller token
(sha256:7dc9d7bf). Probe 200/401/403. tenancy.current.A is 2. T04
cancelled: AuthZEN waits for a PEP we do not control.
Helm-adopted the kubectl-managed user-engine pin, promoted sha256:138aa347
warn then enforce. Reviewer volume needs fsGroup 65532; reviewer tokens
must use the API default audiences or TokenReview 401s on this k3s.
Live probe from user-engine-8569d7cb87-fp7px: 200 / 401 / 403. tenant-engine
is unchanged. tenancy.current.A stays 0 until that pin moves.
The sanctioned Helm chart could not promote ADR 0004 at all, and the
emergency manifests selected enforce. That made a FLEX-WP-0011 apply
either a no-op or a global 401. First production pin is now warn, per
consumer, on CI digest sha256:138aa347… . Enforce stays a later
per-consumer flip so USER-WP-0023-T03 can close without waiting on
tenant-engine.
Publishes tenancy.yaml (I1 A0 E2 P n/a R n/a, enables A3), the review
answering rapp-postgres's three asks, and FLEX-WP-0015 to close the gaps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI digest sha256:1bf060e6 (main-f304688) is live. Seven pre-existing
actions still allow; guardrail.read/set match the FLEX-WP-0014 split.
user-engine pin unchanged. Rollback target is sha256:9320df39.
FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries
nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on
resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping.
The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is
denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17
Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real
tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches.
In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin.
FLEX-WP-0013. Production had been rolled back to sha256:c25fc34a
(four actions), so tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate
denied unknown_action. Re-pin and apply the previously-live
sha256:9320df39 image (e9911eb). Live probe after restore: all seven
actions allow; misspelled action and unknown subject still deny.
user-engine pin unchanged. TEN-WP-0006 guardrail actions not added.
T04 is done: nine fixtures including registration-applicant match the
deployed /v1/check, user-engine is on the fail-closed HTTP adapter, and
the deploy manifest now pins the live digest.
Opens the State Hub capability request 893ff109, unanswered since
2026-07-02. Drafted as proposed/P3 rather than as the blocker it was
filed as, because two of its premises no longer hold:
- It is not blocking anyone. railiance-platform re-scoped and closed
RAILIANCE-WP-0005-T07 the same day it filed the request; WP-0005 is
finished and their grant catalog already enforces TTL, actor-type,
purpose and delivery-mode bounds locally. This buys defence in depth
and central decision records, not unblocking.
- The stated technical blocker is wrong. The request says the CARING
/v1/check schema cannot express TTL, purpose or delivery mode; the
ops-warden package in this repo already denies ttl_out_of_bounds by
reading input.context.ttl_hours against resource.attributes. CARING
constrains descriptor vocabulary, not the request payload.
The real gap is narrower: no credential-grant policy package exists, and
the helper's flat payload/response shape differs from CheckRequest. Its
endpoint path is configurable, so no bespoke endpoint is strictly
required. T01 makes the adapter-vs-consumer-mapping call an explicit,
jointly-agreed decision rather than a default.
Flags two things worth knowing before anyone implements: the helper sends
requested_ttl as a duration string while the ops-warden precedent compares
numeric hours (mis-parsing it would fail open on the check that matters
most), and without --require-flex-auth the helper continues by local
preauthorization when flex-auth is unreachable -- a different posture from
the tenant-engine and ops-warden gates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI-built image from e9911eb, digest
sha256:9320df394a642eff24da8af4a0ee8886a7bb78b0f14d8ee1deeb30ea8eeeaba7,
verified in a throwaway container before pinning and then probed again
against the live Service after rollout:
tenant.retire allow write_api_policy_matched decision:491bbef2db999c02
tenant.create allow write_api_policy_matched decision:fa3ba90e9cccb5aa
tenant.retired deny unknown_action decision:c5ee185de439ffe5
unknown subject deny unknown_subject decision:a98c59c6a34f84ad
tenant.retire has flipped from deny unknown_action to allow in
production, which is what TEN-WP-0005-T05 was waiting on.
Only flex-auth-tenant-engine was rolled. flex-auth-user-engine stays
pinned to a31961c4 -- its policy is unchanged and there is no reason to
move it. Previous tenant-engine digest kept in the runbook as the
rollback target.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
flex-auth had no image workflow, so its production images were hand-built
on a workstation and pushed with workstation credentials -- an artifact
whose provenance was someone's working tree rather than a forge revision.
Ports activity-core's canonical image.yaml: the container-build runner
fetches a tarball of the pushed commit, builds, and pushes :latest and
:main-<short-sha>, then reports the immutable digest for the rollout step.
examples/** is a build-trigger path on purpose -- policy packages are
COPYed into the image and there is no hot reload, so a policy change is
an image change.
Runbook updated to say plainly that images are not built on workstations.
FLEX-WP-0011 filed for the rest of the gap: flex-auth runs two production
Deployments on railiance01 but has never been brought under the
staged-promotion contract (RAIL-BS-WP-0006). No railiance/app.toml, no
stage commands, no canary or approval evidence; the deploy/ directory is
a rescue of specs that existed nowhere, not the sanctioned overlay shape.
Pre-existing debt found during the FLEX-WP-0010 rollout, not a regression
from it, and not a blocker for routine policy rollouts -- flex-auth fails
closed. T03 also flags that the coulombcore drain plan still lists
flex-auth on a host it no longer runs on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FLEX-WP-0010-T04: the deployed flex-auth-tenant-engine Deployment bakes
the policy package into its image, so production still serves the
four-action policy -- probed live, tenant.retire returns deny
unknown_action there while tenant.create allows. TEN-WP-0005-T05 is
unblocked in source but needs an image build from 8e127e5 and a rollout,
which this workplan does not scope. Stated in the workplan and in
examples/tenant-engine/README.md rather than left implied.
FLEX-WP-0009-T04: replayed all six user-engine fixtures against the
deployed flex-auth-user-engine service; all six matched expected effect
and reason, confirming the deployed failure matrix is still fail-closed.
T04 stays in progress -- the criterion also requires user-engine to
retire its local bridge, which is not flex-auth's to close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TEN-WP-0005 added tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate to
tenant-engine's write API. FLEX-WP-0008's policy package predates them, so
every lifecycle mutation resolves to deny unknown_action -- correct
fail-closed, but it blocks TEN-WP-0005-T05 rollout and USER-WP-0021.
Requested by tenant-engine; action strings taken verbatim from the live
_RESOURCE_TYPES mapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
